FlakeLedger parses CI artefacts offline, so the attack surface is narrow but real:

• unbounded memory on crafted JUnit XML (nested suites, huge attributes),
• quadratic regex/parse behaviour on adversarial timestamps,
• report injection: case names from results must be escaped so a crafted suite name cannot smuggle markup into the rendered ledger or JSON.

Please do not open a public issue for these. Contact the repository owner through the profile with:

1. The affected version (flakeledger version or the commit SHA).
2. The smallest JUnit XML that triggers the behaviour.
3. Expected vs. actual behaviour.

You will get an acknowledgement within a week. Fixes land in the next minor release and the reporter is credited in the changelog unless they prefer otherwise.

• junit.py - untrusted input, primary focus.
• runs.py / classify.py - grouping and pairing logic.
• report.py - escaping of result-derived strings in output.