Please do not open a public issue for security problems. Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this repository: jaywedgeworth22/BotFleet security advisories. You will get a response as soon as possible, normally within a few days.

This fork does not publish a security mailbox. Do not email the upstream OpenMausBot address for BotFleet findings.

• The harness server binds 127.0.0.1 only and has no authentication by design — it trusts the local user. Anything that makes it reachable from off-machine, or lets one local unprivileged other user drive it, is a vulnerability.
• Packaged desktop builds migrate API keys out of plaintext ~/.botfleet/config.json into OS-encrypted Electron safeStorage (credentials.bin). The UI is write-only (configured booleans out, never values). Source or unpackaged installs may still hold keys in config.json until that migration runs. Any path that echoes a stored secret back — API response, SSE event, log line, argv visible in ps — is a vulnerability.
• Agents run real CLIs (claude, codex) with the user's own privileges, and the permission broker is the consent layer for risky actions. Bypasses of the broker (approving without a user decision, spoofing the broker socket) are vulnerabilities.
• Spawning must never route user-influenced strings through a shell. Report any shell: true / cmd.exe string-building you find.