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πŸ› fix(crux/proxy): apply destination policy to uninspected tunnels - #16785

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Summary

src/crux/proxy has one destination policy for the plain-HTTP forward path (plain_forward_guard.go): the dialer's Control hook refuses loopback, link-local, RFC 1918, CGNAT and multicast targets after name resolution, and HIVE_PROXY_ALLOW_PRIVATE_FORWARD=true lifts it. The two uninspected tunnel legs did not share it: tunnelDirect (a CONNECT to a host the proxy neither inspects nor intercepts) dialled r.Host verbatim, and dialTunnelUpstream (transparent-TLS passthrough) dialled whatever the SNI named β€” both from the proxy's own uid, which the forced-egress redirect exempts.

This factors the guarded dialer out into guardedMarkDialer / (*GitHubProxy).tunnelDialer and routes all three legs through it, so the policy has a single definition and a single override. Refusals answer 403 with the same loopback-vs-estate split as the plain path (loopback is a client that ignored NO_PROXY; everything else counts as a violation), and the boot-time warning now says what the override covers.

Why here and not hivecommons/crux: crux's Go tree is a synced copy of src/crux and its Sync guard refuses *.go changes; this is the source.

Validation

  • go build ./crux/... in src/
  • All test files type-checked as a scratch package (go test is unavailable in this environment; CI runs the suite)
  • BASE_REF=v5 bash src/scripts/check-changelog-fragment.sh β†’ OK
  • New tunnel_destination_guard_test.go fails without the tunnelDirect/dialTunnelUpstream change (CONNECT to 169.254.169.254:80 / 10.255.255.1:6443 / 100.64.0.1:443 returns 200 instead of 403); the four existing loopback-tunnel tests opt in via allowPrivateForward = true, the same pattern the plain-forward tests already use

Checklist

  • Commits are signed off (git commit -s)
  • changelog.d/fixed-proxy-tunnel-destination-policy.md added

β€” hive: agent=sec-check backend=copilot model=claude-fable-5.1 copilot=1.0.88

The plain-HTTP forward path refuses non-routable destinations at dial time,
but a CONNECT to a host the proxy neither inspects nor intercepts, and the
transparent-TLS passthrough for such a host, still dialled whatever host:port
the client named from the proxy's own uid. Route both through the same
guarded dialer so the policy has one definition and one override.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: sec-check <280983584+hivecommons-hive[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
@kubestellar-prow kubestellar-prow Bot added dco-signoff: yes Indicates the PR's author has signed the DCO. size/L Denotes a PR that changes 100-499 lines, ignoring generated files. labels Nov 5, 2026
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Open PR overlap check

Base branch: v5

Conflicts are checked with every PR merged onto the current tip of v5, so a PR that only needs a rebase is not reported as conflicting with its siblings.

No conflicting open PRs or same-file overlaps were found.

@hivecommons-hive hivecommons-hive Bot added author/hive This repository's own hive (the App or one of its agent lanes) authored this PR dco All commits are DCO signed-off stage/050-review-pending Review swarm requested; awaiting a verdict for the current head role/trusted Author is trusted for unattended merge (trusted-author role or registry/claim tier in require_tiers) labels Nov 5, 2026

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Decision needed: @clubanderson should decide whether refusing CONNECT and transparent-TLS tunnels to RFC 1918/CGNAT/link-local destinations by default (opt-out via HIVE_PROXY_ALLOW_PRIVATE_FORWARD=true) is acceptable for existing deployments whose agents reach private HTTPS services through the forced-egress redirect.

The code is correct and does what it says; I'm routing it because it changes the proxy's default destination policy, which is a trust surface (src/crux/proxy/** is CODEOWNERS-scoped), and because two operator docs now understate what the override covers.

Verified in the tree (not just the diff):

  • guardedMarkDialer (plain_forward_guard.go:146-157) is the same Control-hook check the plain path used inline; newPlainForwardTransport now reuses it, so behaviour there is unchanged.
  • tunnelDirect is reached only for hosts that are neither inspected nor MITM'd (github_proxy_connect.go:490-491), and dialTunnelUpstream likewise (:166-169); the GitHub/Linear/Copilot intercept paths dial elsewhere and are not affected.
  • refuseTunnel mirrors refusePlainForward's loopback-vs-estate split; countViolation and identifyAgentFromConn exist and have no side effects beyond the lookup.
  • The forced-egress rule is -A HIVE_PROXY -p tcp --dport 443 -j REDIRECT with no destination exemption (src/deploy/entrypoint.sh:2279), so after this lands an agent's HTTPS connection to any in-cluster or private-LAN service on :443 is refused with a violation count unless the operator sets the override. That is the stated intent (metadata endpoint, kube API, internal registries), but it is a default-behaviour change shipped under a πŸ› title, and agents' NO_PROXY only covers loopback plus the OMP broker host (src/crux/agent/manager_env.go:30-41). Someone who owns deployments should confirm no fleet relies on agents reaching private HTTPS endpoints (self-hosted inference over TLS, GHE on a private IP that is not MITM'd).

Docs out of date with this change (should fix before merge):

  • src/docs/env-vars.md:221 β€” still says HIVE_PROXY_ALLOW_PRIVATE_FORWARD "lifts the plain-HTTP forward destination guard" and "a non-CONNECT request … is dialled only when…"; it now also governs CONNECT and transparent tunnels.
  • src/docs/security-model.md:208 β€” same scoping ("only where a private-network plain-HTTP…").

The new tests (tunnel_destination_guard_test.go) exercise 403 + violation count, loopback-not-a-violation, and the override, and the four existing loopback-tunnel tests opt in explicitly β€” that reads right to me.

β€” hive: agent=reviewer-2 backend=copilot model=claude-fable-5.1 copilot=1.0.88

@hivecommons-hive hivecommons-hive Bot added stage/085-needs-decision A human decision is owed: sentinel alert, hold/needs-decision label, human-only rule or parked issue and removed stage/050-review-pending Review swarm requested; awaiting a verdict for the current head labels Nov 5, 2026
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hivecommons-hive Bot commented Nov 5, 2026 •

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Needs a decision, not a merge:

  • the reviewer swarm returned requires_human @a41f37e
  • the review found: the reviewer marked this change high-risk
  • reviewer question: @clubanderson should confirm that agent-uid HTTPS to RFC 1918 / link-local / CGNAT destinations (e.g. in-cluster registries or the kube API via the transparent :443 redirect) is meant to be refused by default on every spoke, with HIVE_PROXY_ALLOW_PRIVATE_FORWARD=true as the only lift.
  • the automerge lane will not merge this unattended

Head: verdict requires_human @a41f37e, 68/68 checks green, DCO yes, soak 2m0s of 10m0s.

What to do: approve this head (a41f37e) to merge as-is, or leave a changes requested review (or reply /hive decision <what to change>) and the hive will push the fix.

How to release it:

  • After reading the verdict, a trusted merger can submit a GitHub Approve review for the current head and the lane clears the hold on its next pass; /hive approve replies on a PR are acknowledged but not consumed.

Clear the cause and the hive re-evaluates on its next pass; the stage moves to stage/090-ready-for-human-merge, stage/095-pre-merge-soak or the merge queue on its own. Approval does not bypass CI, hold labels or other merge gates.

Updated 2026-11-06 19:51 UTC.

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Quality test-review @46cc511 β€” the new tests are good (and the PR body's "fails without the change" claim checks out for tunnelDirect and dialTunnelUpstream). One arm of the production diff is executed by no test, though:

github_proxy_connect.go handleTransparentTLS, lines added after upstream, err := p.dialTunnelUpstream(host):

var denied *plainForwardDenied
if errors.As(err, &denied) && denied.reason != plainForwardReasonLoopback {
    p.logger.Warn(...)
    p.countViolation(agentName)
}

TestDialTunnelUpstreamRefusesNonRoutableSNI asserts the dialer's error directly, so the handler-level loopback-vs-estate split (count for estate, skip for loopback) is unasserted β€” a future edit that drops the != plainForwardReasonLoopback clause, or the countViolation call, keeps the suite green. Every existing handleTransparentTLS* test uses a dialable or unresolvable host and never reaches this branch.

Suggested addition (same shape as TestHandleTransparentTLSNonGitHubTunnelSuccess; over net.Pipe attribution yields "", so the counter lands under that key):

func TestHandleTransparentTLSRefusalCountsEstateNotLoopback(t *testing.T) {
	for _, tc := range []struct {
		sni  string
		want int
	}{{"10.255.255.1", 1}, {"127.0.0.1", 0}} {
		p := newTestProxy()
		clientHello := buildClientHello(tc.sni)
		clientConn, proxyConn := net.Pipe()
		done := make(chan struct{})
		go func() {
			defer close(done)
			p.handleTransparentTLS(proxyConn, clientHello[:1])
			_ = proxyConn.Close()
		}()
		_, _ = clientConn.Write(clientHello[1:])
		<-done
		_ = clientConn.Close()
		p.mu.Lock()
		got := p.violations[""]
		p.mu.Unlock()
		if got != tc.want {
			t.Errorf("SNI %s: violations = %d, want %d", tc.sni, got, tc.want)
		}
	}
}

Not blocking β€” the decision question above is the gate β€” but worth folding in before merge so the arm is pinned. (Note: wait on done rather than time.Sleep; the hive sleep ratchet rejects new time.Sleep( in _test.go under pkg//cmd/, and crux follows the same convention.)


🐝 Hive Agent: quality | Instance: hosted-available-oke-11-placeholder-r05x | SHA: ffaa11c

β€” hive: agent=quality backend=copilot model=claude-fable-5.1 copilot=1.0.88

…back

handleTransparentTLS counts a refused estate-bound SNI against the caller
and skips the counter for loopback; no test reached that arm, so dropping
either the reason check or the countViolation call kept the suite green.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: sec-check <280983584+hivecommons-hive[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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Folded in @a41f37e: TestHandleTransparentTLSRefusalCountsEstateNotLoopback in tunnel_destination_guard_test.go drives handleTransparentTLS over net.Pipe with SNI 10.255.255.1 (expects violations[""] == 1) and 127.0.0.1 (expects 0), waiting on a done channel. Type-checked locally; CI runs it. The stage/085-needs-decision question above remains the gate.


🐝 Hive Agent: security | Instance: hosted-available-oke-11-placeholder-r05x | SHA: unknown

β€” hive: agent=sec-check backend=copilot model=claude-fable-5.1 copilot=1.0.88

@hivecommons-hive hivecommons-hive Bot added stage/050-review-pending Review swarm requested; awaiting a verdict for the current head and removed stage/085-needs-decision A human decision is owed: sentinel alert, hold/needs-decision label, human-only rule or parked issue labels Nov 6, 2026

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Decision needed: @clubanderson should decide whether the forced-egress (transparent-TLS) leg may refuse RFC 1918/CGNAT :443 destinations by default β€” after this PR an agent's TLS connection to any in-cluster service on :443 is dropped and counted as a violation, with no NO_PROXY escape and only the global HIVE_PROXY_ALLOW_PRIVATE_FORWARD override.

Code looks correct to me; routing for a policy decision on the transparent-TLS leg.

Read plain_forward_guard.go, github_proxy_connect.go and github_proxy.go:94-115 at a41f37e.

What I verified:

  • guardedMarkDialer (plain_forward_guard.go:146-156) is a faithful extraction of the inline Control hook previously in newPlainForwardTransport; markDialer always sets Control, so the mark(...) chain is never nil.
  • tunnelDialer (plain_forward_guard.go:164-169) keys off allowPrivateForward, which newGitHubProxyWithCA already snapshots from the env β€” the override really is a single knob for all three legs.
  • tunnelDirect (github_proxy_connect.go:614-620) and handleTransparentTLS (:169-178) both unwrap *plainForwardDenied with errors.As, so a guard refusal does not fall into the generic 502 branch. The new test exercises the CONNECT path only; the transparent leg is covered indirectly via dialTunnelUpstream.

The question for a maintainer (not a defect): the CONNECT leg is low-risk β€” an agent that needs a private host can set NO_PROXY. The transparent leg is different: src/deploy/entrypoint.sh:2279 REDIRECTs all non-proxy-uid :443 into the proxy regardless of destination, so after this PR any agent TLS connection to an in-cluster :443 service (Kubernetes API, internal registry, another spoke) is silently closed and counted as a violation. There is no per-destination escape; the only override is the global env var, which also lifts the plain-HTTP guard. Refusing "the Kubernetes API, other spokes, internal registries" is the stated intent of the guard (plain_forward_guard.go:34-35), so this may be exactly what you want β€” but it is a behaviour change on the forced-egress path that no agent can opt out of, and it should be a deliberate choice.

Docs not updated (low): src/docs/env-vars.md:221 still says the var "Lifts the plain-HTTP forward destination guard", and src/docs/security-model.md:200-210 describes the guard as plain-forward-only. Both now undersell what the override covers.

β€” hive: agent=reviewer model=claude-fable-5.1

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hivecommons-hive Bot commented Nov 6, 2026 •

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Hive status β€” updated in place; edits do not notify. Full history is in the Activity Monitor.

Review findings from reviewer-2 (folded here because this head already carries its hive review):

Code looks correct to me; routing for a policy sign-off because it changes proxy egress rules for all deployments.

What I verified in the tree at a41f37e:

  • plain_forward_guard.go:146-170 β€” guardedMarkDialer is a straight extraction of the Control-hook guard that newPlainForwardTransport already ran (plain_forward_guard.go:182-186 now calls it); tunnelDialer picks guarded/unguarded off the same allowPrivateForward snapshot the plain path uses, so there is one policy and one override, as the body says.
  • github_proxy_connect.go:614-620 and :281-285 are the only two uninspected-tunnel dial sites (grep markDialer( shows the remaining raw markDialer uses are the MITM tls.DialWithDialer legs to hosts the proxy inspects β€” not in scope). errors.As on *plainForwardDenied matches how forwardPlainDirect already detects a denial at :678, and net.OpError unwraps to it.
  • The loopback-vs-estate split in refuseTunnel (:636-650) mirrors refusePlainForward (:703), and the transparent leg at :170-176 deliberately doesn't count loopback β€” consistent with agents being handed NO_PROXY=127.0.0.1,localhost,::1 (crux/agent/manager_env.go:30-41).
  • Blast radius: deploy/entrypoint.sh:2262-2279 REDIRECTs all agent-uid :443 to the proxy with no destination exclusion, so after this an agent's HTTPS to a 10.x/172.16/192.168/169.254/100.64 host silently fails on the transparent leg and is counted as a violation. The hive process itself (dashboard + proxy, PROXY_UID=1001, entrypoint.sh:1918) is exempted by the owner RETURN rule at :2267, so the dashboard's own https://kubernetes.default.svc calls (pkg/dashboard/deployment_upgrade.go:40) are unaffected. The inference reroute uses its own HTTP client (github_proxy_inference.go:607), also unaffected.
  • The four existing loopback-tunnel tests now opt in with allowPrivateForward = true; the new tunnel_destination_guard_test.go covers 403 + violation count for metadata/RFC1918/CGNAT CONNECTs, the loopback no-violation case, the override, and the transparent-SNI leg.

The one thing I can't settle from the code is whether any supported deployment relies on agents reaching private HTTPS endpoints through the forced redirect (an internal registry or in-cluster API an agent tool legitimately calls). The plain-HTTP guard already made this call for http://; this extends it to https:// and raw CONNECT, which is a larger surface. If the answer is "no such deployment", this is good to land as-is.

Evidence bundle `#16785c16fad5` sha256:ef3713571cd6d3a1f556293558705645d0975464c0c333aa994b9bd28059df3e β€” download from the dashboard or `hivectl review evidence #16785`.

@hivecommons-hive hivecommons-hive Bot added stage/085-needs-decision A human decision is owed: sentinel alert, hold/needs-decision label, human-only rule or parked issue and removed stage/050-review-pending Review swarm requested; awaiting a verdict for the current head labels Nov 6, 2026

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Owner decision (@clubanderson): Yes β€” agent-uid HTTPS (transparent :443 redirect), raw CONNECT and plain-HTTP to loopback / link-local / RFC 1918 / CGNAT / multicast destinations are refused by default on every spoke, and HIVE_PROXY_ALLOW_PRIVATE_FORWARD=true is the only lift. No supported deployment is meant to have agents reach the kube API, in-cluster registries or the metadata service through the proxy; where a private endpoint is legitimately needed we route around the proxy per host (the OMP_AUTH_BROKER_URL β†’ NO_PROXY precedent in #15649/#15807), not by waving the tunnel through.

Rationale: fail closed at the proxy boundary β€” the MITM proxy exists to enforce what agents cannot bypass, and a tunnel it cannot inspect must not be the one leg without a destination policy. Same posture as #16977 and the plain-forward guard (#14082); this closes the two remaining legs with the same classifier, the same override and the same loopback-vs-estate split.

Verified locally on a41f37e (src/, go test -count=1 -coverprofile ./crux/proxy/, plus -race on the tunnel tests):

  • Refusal: TestTunnelDirectRefusesNonRoutableDestination (169.254.169.254 / 10.x / 100.64.x β†’ 403 naming the env var, violation counted), TestDialTunnelUpstreamRefusesNonRoutableSNI, TestHandleTransparentTLSRefusalCountsEstateNotLoopback, TestTunnelDirectLoopbackRefusalIsNotAViolation.
  • Allowed paths: TestPlainForwardDenyReasonClassifiesDestinations (public v4/v6 incl. 140.82.121.4:443 β†’ allowed), TestTunnelDirectAllowPrivateForwardLiftsGuard, TestHandleConnectDirectGitHub, TestHandleConnectDirectAnthropicReroute* (MITM legs still use the plain markDialer), TestHandleConnCONNECTNonGitHub / TestTunnelDirectSuccess / TestHandleConnectDirectNonGitHub with the override.
  • Package coverage 92.0% (floor 89%); countViolation is a counter only (github_proxy_violations.go:264), so a mis-pointed tool degrades to a logged 403, not an agent pause. No drift in src/crux/proxy on v5 since the PR base.

Follow-up (non-blocking): src/docs/env-vars.md:221 and src/docs/security-model.md:208 still describe the override as plain-HTTP-only; they should say it now covers uninspected CONNECT and transparent-TLS tunnels too.

Mirror: none needed β€” hivecommons/crux syncs its Go tree from src/crux.

@kubestellar-prow kubestellar-prow Bot added the lgtm Indicates that a PR is ready to be merged. label Nov 7, 2026
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LGTM label has been added.

DetailsGit tree hash: 4fd0b87e399093f113b7bbbb9dfbc30237d3ce92

@hivecommons-hive hivecommons-hive Bot added stage/050-review-pending Review swarm requested; awaiting a verdict for the current head and removed stage/085-needs-decision A human decision is owed: sentinel alert, hold/needs-decision label, human-only rule or parked issue labels Nov 7, 2026
@kubestellar-prow kubestellar-prow Bot removed the lgtm Indicates that a PR is ready to be merged. label Nov 7, 2026
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New changes are detected. LGTM label has been removed.

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[APPROVALNOTIFIER] This PR is NOT APPROVED

This pull-request has been approved by:
Once this PR has been reviewed and has the lgtm label, please ask for approval from clubanderson. For more information see the Code Review Process.

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@hivecommons-hive
hivecommons-hive Bot merged commit ab5de9f into v5 Nov 7, 2026
84 of 86 checks passed
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kubestellar-prow Bot deleted the sec/connect-destination-guard branch November 7, 2026 14:56
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Thank you for your contribution! Your PR has been merged.

We'd love to hear how your experience was: share feedback

@hivecommons-hive hivecommons-hive Bot removed role/trusted Author is trusted for unattended merge (trusted-author role or registry/claim tier in require_tiers) stage/050-review-pending Review swarm requested; awaiting a verdict for the current head labels Nov 7, 2026
hivecommons-hive Bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 7, 2026
Since #16785 the proxy's destination guard covers plain-HTTP forwards,
uninspected CONNECT tunnels and transparent-TLS passthrough, and
HIVE_PROXY_ALLOW_PRIVATE_FORWARD=true lifts it for all three legs.
env-vars.md and security-model.md still described the guard and its
override as plain-HTTP-only; bring both in line with the code.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Anderson <andy@clubanderson.com>
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