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✨ feat: establish job-bound Integration-aware candidate CI - #15921

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clubanderson merged 4 commits into
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feat/integration-candidate-producer
Oct 31, 2026
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clubanderson merged 4 commits into
v5from
feat/integration-candidate-producer

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@clubanderson clubanderson commented Oct 31, 2026 •

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Trusted immutable-candidate producer source

Built on landed native #15853, preserving merge_group semantics and default ordinary PR/push behavior. Completes deterministic real-Git ordered-prefix materialization, controlled create-only initial-dispatch claim, distinct materializer/candidate OIDC roles, three generated isolated read-only technical CI graphs, immutable artifact receipts, bounded actual run/job/check/artifact consumers, historic signer archival, and real-Git/Node/Go security and contract regressions. Initial claim is cooperating designated execution, not failover fencing or exactly-once Actions delivery; bootstrap overhead and duplicate ambiguity remain explicit.

Exact source CI receipt

Tested immutable head 6fa1775. All required checks pass. All 20 latest workflow/event suites are terminal SUCCESS or an explicit scope SKIP, including complete Docker/ARM images, Go/security/lint/coverage, v2 CI/Tests, and native policy 41165630919. Actual earlier native failure 41163770446 rejected this PR while draft; ready-for-review reevaluation passed. Canceled 41165628687 has that successful same-head replacement. No blind reruns or gate changes.

Not activation or whole-controller completion

Producer policy remains disabled with no actors/scopes. No live controlled candidate invocation, production policy-equivalence/protected promotion qualification, controller runtime, image deployment, configuration, permissions, protection, or concurrency changes. The separate execution/admission/promotion controller is still being implemented; this source PR does not claim it delivered or ready. No local suites/builds/guards run per AGENTS; CI is the sole verdict.

Signed-off-by: Andy Anderson <andy@clubanderson.com>
@kubestellar-prow kubestellar-prow Bot added the do-not-merge/work-in-progress Indicates that a PR should not merge because it is a work in progress. label Oct 31, 2026
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[APPROVALNOTIFIER] This PR is NOT APPROVED

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@kubestellar-prow kubestellar-prow Bot added dco-signoff: yes Indicates the PR's author has signed the DCO. size/XL Denotes a PR that changes 500-999 lines, ignoring generated files. labels Oct 31, 2026
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Open PR overlap check

Base branch: v5

Conflicts are checked with every PR merged onto the current tip of v5, so a PR that only needs a rebase is not reported as conflicting with its siblings.

No conflicting open PRs or same-file overlaps were found.

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1aab9f5

ℹ️ Sentinel notice — informational; author is trusted (owner), merge is not blocked

Hive flagged this PR (author @clubanderson, head 1aab9f5eee49) because it matches behaviors that can override security controls, escalate privileges or damage the codebase. This is a heuristic, not an accusation — a maintainer should confirm the change is intended before it merges.

  • sensitive_path — changes 3 sensitive path(s) (Touches a sensitive path (OWNERS, workflows, policies, hive config, security docs, …))
    • .github/workflows/go-security-analysis.yml
    • .github/workflows/v2-ci.yml
    • .github/workflows/v2-tests.yml

Hive did not add the sentinel-alert label because this author is trusted. The finding remains recorded for audit and the dashboard Security tab; set sentinel.trusted_authors_block: true to require the blocking label for trusted authors too.

…receipts

Signed-off-by: Andy Anderson <andy@clubanderson.com>
@kubestellar-prow kubestellar-prow Bot added size/XXL Denotes a PR that changes 1000+ lines, ignoring generated files. and removed size/XL Denotes a PR that changes 500-999 lines, ignoring generated files. labels Oct 31, 2026
Signed-off-by: Andy Anderson <andy@clubanderson.com>
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13d2315

ℹ️ Sentinel notice — informational; author is trusted (owner), merge is not blocked

Hive flagged this PR (author @clubanderson, head 13d23158c894) because it matches behaviors that can override security controls, escalate privileges or damage the codebase. This is a heuristic, not an accusation — a maintainer should confirm the change is intended before it merges.

  • sensitive_path — changes 8 sensitive path(s) (Touches a sensitive path (OWNERS, workflows, policies, hive config, security docs, …))
    • .github/workflows/go-security-analysis.yml
    • .github/workflows/integration-candidate-prepare.yml
    • .github/workflows/integration-candidate.yml
    • .github/workflows/integration-technical-go-security-analysis.yml
    • .github/workflows/integration-technical-v2-ci.yml
    • .github/workflows/integration-technical-v2-tests.yml
    • .github/workflows/v2-ci.yml
    • .github/workflows/v2-tests.yml
  • permission_escalation — widens workflow permissions or uses pull_request_target (Widens GitHub Actions permissions or switches to pull_request_target)
    • .github/workflows/integration-candidate-prepare.yml
    • .github/workflows/integration-candidate.yml
  • ci_gate_weakening — CI configuration is deleted, softened or has gate checks removed (Disables or softens CI gates (continue-on-error, || true, removed checks))
    • .github/workflows/integration-technical-go-security-analysis.yml
    • .github/workflows/integration-technical-v2-ci.yml
    • .github/workflows/integration-technical-v2-tests.yml

Hive did not add the sentinel-alert label because this author is trusted. The finding remains recorded for audit and the dashboard Security tab; set sentinel.trusted_authors_block: true to require the blocking label for trusted authors too.

Signed-off-by: Andy Anderson <andy@clubanderson.com>
@clubanderson
clubanderson marked this pull request as ready for review October 31, 2026 03:44
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Exact producer source head 6fa177529ccddf8c23fa60d83a3e2b9b205a13b0 now has all applicable technical checks terminal, including ARM. The native policy failure was diagnosed from actual run 41163770446: #15921: head/base moved, draft, closed, or held; this PR was still draft. Marked ready for normal policy reevaluation, without weakening checks or blindly rerunning any workflow. Source-only: producer policy remains disabled; no deployment, configuration, permissions, protection, or live candidate execution changes. This trusted producer is not the yet-unfinished orchestration controller or a protected-qualification receipt.

@kubestellar-prow kubestellar-prow Bot removed the do-not-merge/work-in-progress Indicates that a PR should not merge because it is a work in progress. label Oct 31, 2026
@clubanderson
clubanderson merged commit 1b66a34 into v5 Oct 31, 2026
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kubestellar-prow Bot deleted the feat/integration-candidate-producer branch October 31, 2026 04:00
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Thank you for your contribution! Your PR has been merged.

We'd love to hear how your experience was: share feedback

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docs-currency review @ 6fa1775 — verdict: approve (advisory).

Verified: src/docs/integration-orchestration.md matches the code it describes — generate-integration-ci.py --check and node --test .github/scripts/integration-materialize.test.cjs are wired into v2-ci.yml/v2-tests.yml, the three integration-technical-*.yml callees regenerate byte-identical from head, integration-candidate.yml:66-67,97,132-144 implements the documented tag-ref/GraphQL/three-callee flow, and integration-producer-policy.json is disabled with empty actorIDs/scopes as stated. No branches: filters in the new workflows, so .github/release-lines.yml needs no entry.

Low (in-scope): generated callees emit 11 run: scripts as single escaped lines.
.github/scripts/generate-integration-ci.py:62-66 chooses | style for multi-line strings, but yaml.dump (line 156) defaults to allow_unicode=False, so any script containing non-ASCII (the ─ box-drawing in the coverage-floor comments) falls back to a double-quoted one-liner — e.g. integration-technical-v2-tests.yml:1001 is the entire ~200-line coverage gate as one "THRESHOLD=90\nFAILED=..." string (2 such in integration-technical-v2-ci.yml, 9 in -v2-tests.yml). These are the security-sensitive read-only candidate workflows reviewers are asked to audit; an unreadable diff defeats that. Fix, then regenerate (the --check gate will require it):

    return HEADER + yaml.dump(
        document, Dumper=WorkflowDumper, sort_keys=False, width=10000,
        allow_unicode=True,
    )

— hive: agent=ci-maintainer backend=copilot model=claude-fable-5.1 copilot=1.0.88

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ACTUAL SOURCE MERGE: #15921 merged 2026-10-31T04:00:33Z, squash 1b66a34, tested immutable head 6fa1775. All required checks SUCCESS; all 20 latest workflow/event suites COMPLETED/SUCCESS or explicit scope SKIP, including complete Docker/ARM 41163772801, v2 CI 41163772746, Tests 41163772683, security 41163772755 and native policy 41165630919. Actual merge commit DCO sign-off verified via fetched Git object. Historical draft-native rejection/canceled ready event have a successful same-head policy replacement; no manual rerun or weakened gate. Producer policy remains disabled. No runtime/deployment/config/permissions/rules activation or protected-production qualification. Whole orchestration controller remains in progress separately.

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hivecommons-hive Bot commented Oct 31, 2026 •

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Hive status — updated in place; edits do not notify. Full history is in the Activity Monitor.

Review findings from adjudicator-3 (folded here because this head already carries its hive review):

Style / maintainability review (read head 6fa1775, Go sources + generator + workflows). No blockers; three small in-scope items the author may want to fold in.

1. decodeIntegrationEnvelope was generalized by filename but its error still hardcodes receipt.json — src/pkg/github/integration_producer_archive.go:40. The materializer path calls it with "materialization.json" (integration_materializer_observation.go:171), so a bad materializer artifact reports the wrong expected filename. Also the materialization filename is a bare literal while the receipt one is a const (archive.go:18).

		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("producer artifact requires one bounded %s", filename)

and add integrationMaterializationFile = "materialization.json" next to integrationReceiptFile, used at integration_materializer_observation.go:171.

2. Error text renders <nil> — integration_candidate_observation.go:210: fmt.Errorf("finalizer's actual check identity unavailable: %v", err) is reached when err == nil && len(finalizerProof.CheckIDs) != 1, producing ...: <nil>. Split the two branches or drop %v when err is nil.

3. ReadIntegrationCandidateObservation and ReadIntegrationMaterializerObservation duplicate ~60 lines of the same sequence — run read (observation.go:132-133 / materializer.go:97), attempt-supersession check, jobs cohort read + TotalCount guard (:158 / :119), IntegrationRunnerJob mapping loop (:165 / :127), waiting/running state (:173 / :140), ListCheckRunsForRef + truncation guard (:181 / :147), strict-decode-with-trailing check (:240 / :181, also archive.go), and the final re-read of the run (:262 / :238). A shared readIntegrationRunCohort(ctx, repo, runID, attempt, now) (run, jobs, []IntegrationRunnerJob, error) plus a decodeStrictJSON(payload, &v) helper would keep the two verifiers from drifting as the controller lands. Advisory — fine as a follow-up.

Minor: IntegrationCandidateExpectation/IntegrationMaterializerExpectation pack several exported fields on one line (observation.go:30, materializer.go:68), which blocks per-field doc comments; other structs in pkg/github (e.g. integration_attestation.go) use one field per line.

Review findings from adjudicator (folded here because this head already carries its hive review):

Security perspective (head 6fa1775): no blocking findings. Trust-boundary design checks out — enrolled-actor gate with policy shipped disabled (.github/integration-producer-policy.json:3-5), .github closure equality enforced before the tag push (.github/scripts/integration-materialize.cjs:263-267 precedes the git push at :276), candidate-side workflowTree self-check (.github/workflows/integration-candidate.yml:90), and the verifier pins RS256 / fixed issuer / exact aud digest / run / attempt / check_run_id / ref_type (src/pkg/github/integration_producer_token.go:200-221).

One low advisory, not blocking:

Receipt artifact persists a live OIDC bearer JWT for 30 days — .github/workflows/integration-candidate.yml:178-190 writes token into receipt.json and uploads it with retention-days: 30 (same pattern in integration-candidate-prepare.yml:98-100). Artifacts are readable by anyone with repo read, so the JWT is effectively public for the retention window. Impact is bounded because the hive verifier binds the payload digest and authoritative run metadata (replay re-proves the same facts) and the custom aud defeats cloud federation, but any relying party configured with a permissive audience and lax exp handling would accept it. If the observer persists verified receipts promptly (per ReadIntegrationCandidateObservation docs), a shorter retention limits exposure:

          retention-days: 3

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