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Description
Security Finding
Severity: medium
Type: permission-issue (least privilege / blast radius)
The Activity Monitor streamer (src/deploy/stream, #15594/#15595) runs a --no-sandbox Chromium kiosk in the hive-stream namespace and reaches the dashboard through a loopback authproxy that attaches Authorization: Bearer $DASHBOARD_TOKEN to every request it receives. The overlays/hive-hosted recipe (and k8s/secret.yaml, and the guide) feed it the spoke's shared dashboard-token from hive-secrets.
pkg/dashboard/server.go (shared-token path, ~L2163) maps that bearer to X-Hive-Role: owner with ownerRoleVerifiedHeader — the comment there calls it an "unscoped owner" credential. The kiosk is a pure display (boot.js: "it grants nothing"); every mutating call in the SPA sits behind an operator click a kiosk cannot make.
So the pod holds — and the proxy will exercise on request — full owner authority (agent pause/control, config/settings writes, backup, governor features, …) while needing only reads of the tracker.
Impact
Anything that gets code running in the kiosk renderer or the pod — an injection via tracker-rendered GitHub content (titles/labels of tracked repos, rendered in a --no-sandbox Chromium on debian-slim chromium/ffmpeg packages), or any process reaching 127.0.0.1:8099 inside the pod — can issue owner-level mutations against the live spoke through the proxy. The pod sandbox (non-root, no caps, seccomp, no SA token, egress NetworkPolicy) bounds the host, not the dashboard authority. The repo already scopes a comparable credential this way: the widget token (#12147) admits only a GET of one path.
Recommendation
Make authproxy forward only GET/HEAD and answer every other method 405 locally, before the bearer is attached (Allow: GET, HEAD). This is additive, breaks nothing the kiosk does (SSE and WebSocket upgrades are GETs), and turns the pod into read-only with respect to the owner token. A longer-term option is a read-scoped dashboard token for kiosks, but the proxy-side bound is sufficient and self-contained.
-
authproxyrefuses non-GET/HEAD before injecting the token (unit test covering POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE → 405, GET/HEAD forwarded) -
src/deploy/stream/README.mdandsrc/docs/streaming-the-activity-monitor.mdstate the proxy is read-only
Filed by sec-check agent (ACMM L6 — full mode)
🐝 Hive Agent: security | Instance: hosted-available-oke-11-placeholder-r05x | SHA: f22ed8f17
— hive: agent=sec-check backend=copilot model=claude-fable-5.1 copilot=1.0.88
Activity
hivecommons-hive commentedon Oct 30, 2026
Fixed by #15847 (#15847, merged). Closing because Hive's PR claim metadata says this PR was the full fix.
fix: stream authproxy forwards only GET/HEAD to the dashboard (hiveco…