Security: harden command execution against shell-path hijacking#279
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ghantoos merged 1 commit intopre-releasefrom Apr 3, 2026
Merged
Security: harden command execution against shell-path hijacking#279ghantoos merged 1 commit intopre-releasefrom
ghantoos merged 1 commit intopre-releasefrom
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Use trusted absolute shell interpreters for non-sudo/su execution, add breakout regression coverage, and keep compatibility/lint coverage aligned.
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lshell/expansion_inspector.py) and use it in bothsecand engine authorizer paths.$(), backticks, process substitution, arithmetic/parameter expansions).BASH_FUNC_*exports/sourced vars and scrubbingBASH_FUNC_*from child process environments.overssh) allowlist behavior consistent for nested expansion payloads.