Do not open a public issue for a security problem.

Report it privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this repository: Security → Report a vulnerability. That channel is monitored by the maintainers and keeps the report unpublished while it is being fixed.

Please include:

• what an attacker gets, in one sentence
• the steps to reproduce it, and the macOS version and hardware you saw it on
• the app or commit version
• whether you have disclosed it anywhere else

Please do not include real API keys, real account numbers, real balances or unredacted terminal output. A redacted reproduction is enough. If a key was exposed while you were testing, rotate it at the provider first.

We aim to acknowledge a report within five business days and to tell you our assessment and a fix plan within fifteen. There is no bug bounty. Reporters are credited in the release notes unless they ask not to be.

There is no released build yet. Once releases begin, only the latest published version receives fixes.

The v0 trust boundary is: the officially signed app, the same macOS user account, and the official trdr CLI installed alongside it. Everything crossing into that boundary is untrusted input — WebView input, agent terminal output, strategy files, ingest bundles, and upstream API responses.

In scope, and treated as blocking:

• an API key, token or account number reaching the WebView, the CLI, a log, the database, an export, a backup or a crash report
• the WebView or an agent reaching Keychain, SQLite, arbitrary files, the network or a spawned process directly, instead of through the narrow commands the host exposes
• a strategy registration completing without a human approval in the running app, or an approval bypass through the CLI, the socket or the UI
• a crafted ingest bundle or backup package escaping its directory, corrupting canonical data, or committing a partial write
• an order or any broker mutation being reachable at all
• a deterministic backtest producing a different result hash for the same input, or reading data ahead of its available_at time

Out of scope for v0, and stated in the plan rather than defended against:

• another process running as the same macOS user, or an attacker with root or admin
• a compromised operating system, or a Mac where the attacker has physical access
• multi-user or multi-device isolation; trdr is a single local user product
• theoretical future surfaces that do not exist yet: plugins, cloud sync, a second broker, a hosted runner

trdr does not claim application-level encryption of the local database. Files are stored with user-only permissions. Portable backups are encrypted with a user passphrase because they leave the machine; the live workspace is not.

trdr talks to KIS, OpenDART and ECOS with credentials you supply. A vulnerability in one of those services belongs to that provider. Tell us anyway if trdr's handling of their response is what makes it exploitable.