Enforce per-user resource isolation for pipelines and executions

[fuzziecoder]

Motivation

• Implement strict owner-based isolation so each user only sees and operates on their pipelines and executions to prevent cross-user access and ID enumeration.
• Add stable user identity propagation through JWTs so the backend can always enforce ownership checks independent of the frontend.

Description

• Added user_id to the authenticated principal and included it in issued/decoded JWT claims so get_current_user() exposes user_id for every request (backend/api/security.py).
• Added user_id ownership to domain models (Pipeline, Execution) and to response schemas (PipelineResponse, ExecutionResponse) so ownership is explicit in the domain and API layers (backend/models/pipeline.py, backend/api/schemas.py).
• Enforced ownership in routes: pipeline routes now assign user_id on create, and list/get/update/delete filter/check by user_id and return 404 for non-owned resources; execution routes create executions scoped to the calling user, persist user_id through background execution, and filter/read/cancel by user_id (backend/api/routes/pipelines.py, backend/api/routes/executions.py).
• Preserved tenant boundaries for external triggers by making Airflow-triggered executions inherit the owning pipeline's user_id, and updated the pipeline engine to propagate user_id into created execution contexts (backend/api/routes/airflow.py, backend/core/pipeline_engine.py).
• Updated tests and fixtures to validate user-level isolation semantics and adjusted in-memory stores clearing for tests (backend/tests/test_security.py, backend/tests/test_airflow_integration.py).

Testing

• Ran the API unit/integration tests with PYTHONPATH=. pytest backend/tests/test_security.py backend/tests/test_airflow_integration.py and all tests passed.
• Test summary: 10 passed (no test failures).

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Codex Task

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🔎 Detected hardcoded secret in your pull request

GitGuardian id	GitGuardian status	Secret	Commit	Filename
27568531	Triggered	Username Password	41af9c9	backend/tests/test_security.py	View secret

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Project	Deployment	Actions	Updated (UTC)
flexi-roaster	Ready	Preview, Comment	Feb 25, 2026 1:18pm

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[devin-ai-integration]

Devin Review found 1 potential issue.

View 7 additional findings in Devin Review.

[devin-ai-integration]

🔴 authenticate_user references username before it is defined, causing NameError on every login attempt

The new code block inserted at lines 115-124 uses the variable username (e.g., DEMO_USERS.get(username) on line 115), but username is only defined as the loop variable in the for username in _candidate_usernames(principal): loop at line 125. Since lines 115-124 execute before the loop, every call to authenticate_user() raises a NameError: name 'username' is not defined.

Root Cause and Impact

The PR appears to have inserted a new code block (lines 115-124) that was intended to replace the existing for loop (lines 125-136), but both blocks were left in. The new block runs first and immediately crashes because username doesn't exist in scope.

Since authenticate_user is the sole authentication function called by the /api/auth/token endpoint (backend/api/routes/auth.py:18), this bug completely breaks all user login. No user can obtain a JWT token, which means all authenticated API endpoints become inaccessible.

Additionally, even if the NameError were somehow avoided:

1. Lines 125-136 would be dead code (unreachable after the return statements at lines 117 and 118-124).
2. The UserPrincipal(...) constructor at line 130-134 is missing the now-required user_id field, which would cause a TypeError if reached.

Actual behavior: NameError on every call to authenticate_user().
Expected behavior: The function should iterate over candidate usernames and return a UserPrincipal with user_id for valid credentials.

Suggested change

	record = DEMO_USERS.get(username)
	if not record or record["password"] != password:
	return None
	return UserPrincipal(
	user_id=str(record["id"]),
	username=username,
	roles=list(record["roles"]),
	scopes=list(record["scopes"]),
	subject=f"local:{username}",
	)
	for username in _candidate_usernames(principal):
	record = DEMO_USERS.get(username)
	if not record or record["password"] != password:
	continue
	return UserPrincipal(
	user_id=str(record["id"]),
	username=username,
	roles=list(record["roles"]),
	scopes=list(record["scopes"]),
	subject=f"local:{username}",
	)

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