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Plugins: OpenPGP web of trust and paseo-style tendcf plugin management #47
Third-party tendcf plugins (frontends, importers; see D46 and docs/architecture/plugin-layout.md, PR #46) need:
An OpenPGP web of trust for plugins. A plugin distribution is signed with its author's OpenPGP key. A site decides which plugins it trusts through the web of trust: keys the site trusts directly, or keys certified by them, recorded in site-private. A plugin whose signature doesn't verify through the site's trust set is refused before it can be named or pinned.
Paseo-style command-line plugin management. A tendcf plugin command family that manages what site-private names, rather than hand-editing it. For example: ls, add, remove, update, verify, inspect, each with --json output, plus explicit pin/upgrade steps. add/update verify the OpenPGP signature and record the name → distribution, version, hash binding (D46 activation rule).
Plugins are trusted build-time code the operator explicitly allows. They are not sandboxed. The release gates (schema lint, projector, preview diff) and signing run in a separate environment with no plugin installed, and the compile step holds no signing key.
A plugin loads only if site-private names it (name → distribution, version, hash). Duplicate names are a compile error, and built-in names are reserved. Release builds use in-tree plugins only until out-of-tree pinning exists. The release records its plugin set.
Supervisor renderers are in-tree only. Frontends and importers are open to third parties.
This issue covers how a site establishes trust in an out-of-tree plugin and manages the named set, which unlocks out-of-tree plugins in release builds.
Open questions
Key discovery and revocation: keyservers, WKD, keys shipped in site-shared, or only keys in site-private.
The minimum certification path (direct trust only vs. a bounded trust depth).
How signatures bind to the pinned artifact (detached signature over the wheel/sdist hash vs. a signed manifest).
Whether in-tree contrib/ plugins also carry signatures.
Activity
docs: apply D46 review fixes and djbclark's 2026-11-13 decisions
docs: apply D46 review fixes and djbclark's 2026-11-13 decisions
djbclark commentedon Nov 13, 2026
The adversary review of #46 (findings filed as #48) says this issue's scope also needs:
.pthfiles run beforeverify. Verify before installing, and install wheels only.tendcf plugin addinstalls into. It must never be the gate or signing environment.tendcfitself when an out-of-tree plugin depends on it.tendcf plugin add/updatewriting site-private counts as a privileged change, needing the gate-5 ceremony marker.🤖 Generated with Claude Code