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Plugins: OpenPGP web of trust and paseo-style tendcf plugin management #47

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Description

@djbclark

Requirement

Third-party tendcf plugins (frontends, importers; see D46 and docs/architecture/plugin-layout.md, PR #46) need:

  1. An OpenPGP web of trust for plugins. A plugin distribution is signed with its author's OpenPGP key. A site decides which plugins it trusts through the web of trust: keys the site trusts directly, or keys certified by them, recorded in site-private. A plugin whose signature doesn't verify through the site's trust set is refused before it can be named or pinned.
  2. Paseo-style command-line plugin management. A tendcf plugin command family that manages what site-private names, rather than hand-editing it. For example: ls, add, remove, update, verify, inspect, each with --json output, plus explicit pin/upgrade steps. add/update verify the OpenPGP signature and record the name → distribution, version, hash binding (D46 activation rule).

Context (decided 2026-11-13, PR #46 review)

  1. Plugins are trusted build-time code the operator explicitly allows. They are not sandboxed. The release gates (schema lint, projector, preview diff) and signing run in a separate environment with no plugin installed, and the compile step holds no signing key.
  2. A plugin loads only if site-private names it (name → distribution, version, hash). Duplicate names are a compile error, and built-in names are reserved. Release builds use in-tree plugins only until out-of-tree pinning exists. The release records its plugin set.
  3. Supervisor renderers are in-tree only. Frontends and importers are open to third parties.

This issue covers how a site establishes trust in an out-of-tree plugin and manages the named set, which unlocks out-of-tree plugins in release builds.

Open questions

  1. Key discovery and revocation: keyservers, WKD, keys shipped in site-shared, or only keys in site-private.
  2. The minimum certification path (direct trust only vs. a bounded trust depth).
  3. How signatures bind to the pinned artifact (detached signature over the wheel/sdist hash vs. a signed manifest).
  4. Whether in-tree contrib/ plugins also carry signatures.

Related: tracker #1, PR #46.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

Activity

  1. djbclark commented on Nov 13, 2026

    @djbclark
    CollaboratorAuthor

    The adversary review of #46 (findings filed as #48) says this issue's scope also needs:

    1. The transitive dependency closure. A signature over the plugin's own wheel doesn't cover its dependencies.
    2. Code that runs during installation. sdist build backends and .pth files run before verify. Verify before installing, and install wheels only.
    3. Which environment tendcf plugin add installs into. It must never be the gate or signing environment.
    4. Rollback and freeze protection for plugin updates. This covers stale versions that are still validly signed; keep update metadata fresh, TUF-style.
    5. Revocation. What revoking a plugin key means for rebuilding older releases.
    6. Dependency confusion on tendcf itself when an out-of-tree plugin depends on it.
    7. Privilege. Whether tendcf plugin add/update writing site-private counts as a privileged change, needing the gate-5 ceremony marker.

    🤖 Generated with Claude Code

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