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fix: add bounds check before memcpy in 3D-ICE-Server.c#2

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orbisai0security:fix-v-002-memcpy-bounds-validation
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fix: add bounds check before memcpy in 3D-ICE-Server.c#2
orbisai0security wants to merge 1 commit into
esl-epfl:masterfrom
orbisai0security:fix-v-002-memcpy-bounds-validation

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Summary

Fix critical severity security issue in bin/3D-ICE-Server.c.

Vulnerability

Field Value
ID V-002
Severity CRITICAL
Scanner multi_agent_ai
Rule V-002
File bin/3D-ICE-Server.c:72

Description: The 3D-ICE server processes binary network messages and uses attacker-controlled field values ('chunk' and 'index') directly as parameters to memcpy at line 72 without any bounds validation. A malicious client can send a crafted packet with an oversized 'chunk' value (e.g., 0xFFFFFFFF) causing memcpy to read or write gigabytes beyond the allocated buffer, corrupting heap memory. At line 240, memcpy writes to message->Content without verifying the pointer is non-NULL and the destination has sufficient capacity. No authentication is required to send such messages.

Changes

  • bin/3D-ICE-Server.c

Verification

  • Build passes
  • Scanner re-scan confirms fix
  • LLM code review passed

Automated security fix by OrbisAI Security

Automated security fix generated by OrbisAI Security
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