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Restrict delegated secretaries to authorized knowledge reads - #92
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Delegated LO and Telegram conversations currently inherit the ordinary coding agent's shell, files and MCP tools while only the outgoing reply waits for approval. Enforce a separate read-only knowledge policy: the host retains the existing DuckBug credential and exposes only authorized, schema-validated
kb_search,kb_getandkb_listoperations through a bounded local proxy. Other providers reject this policy instead of falling back.Each delegated run receives a private temporary workspace, filtered provider-only environment, explicit restricted CLI settings and a fresh MCP capability. Separate
readonly_v1history preserves follow-up context without resuming ordinary or formerly unrestricted sessions. Roles, templates and README match the enforced policy. Explicit OAuth-token/API-key authentication is required; implicit credential-file/keychain auth is not inherited. This is an application tool policy, not an OS sandbox.Pin Claude Code 2.1.294 in all runtime images and add a real-CLI CI gate using synthetic local model/MCP/Bot API servers. It proves the advertised inventory contains exactly three read-only tools, authorized reads succeed, forced shell/write/direct-send calls produce zero Bot API deliveries, and history remains scoped across two turns and another recipient. No real provider/account credentials are used. Secure Go image pins are 1.27.2 (runtime builder) and 1.26.9 (dev tools).
Validation: full Taskfile default passed (format, lint, full race suite, both bot builds); govulncheck reports zero reachable vulnerabilities; actual pinned CLI isolation/history fixture passed. Two independent source reviews approved exact tree
ec5a33c6d880d2804d18871d91a370dfaf451ebb. Live Duck catalog/auth, published image and end-to-end behavior remain rollout gates; the synthetic fixture does not claim those are verified.