P0: Fix 4 critical security vulnerabilities #332

Summary

Full project scan (cora scan) identified 4 critical security vulnerabilities. All involve insufficient input validation before passing user-controlled data to sensitive operations.

Issues

#32 — Command injection via $EDITOR (src/commands/commit_cmd.rs:377)

Editor command is built by interpolating $EDITOR env var into a shell string executed with sh -c. If EDITOR contains shell metacharacters (e.g. vim; rm -rf /), they will be executed.

Fix: Parse EDITOR into program + args safely. Use Command::new(program).args(args).arg(&tmp_path) instead of sh -c.

#61 — Path traversal in JS/TS import resolver (src/engine/context/resolver.rs:235)

JS import resolver strips ../ prefixes manually, then joins with project_root. Paths with embedded traversal segments (e.g. foo/../../secret) bypass the strip and Path::join happily resolves outside repo.

Fix: Use std::fs::canonicalize() on resolved path and verify it starts with canonicalized project_root prefix.

#62 — Path traversal in symbol resolver (src/engine/context/resolver.rs:141)

resolve_symbols accepts entry.file from resolver helpers and reads via project_root.join(&entry.file). Absolute paths or .. segments escape the repo.

Fix: Same as #61 — canonicalize and verify containment before reading.

#91 — API key file written before restrictive permissions (src/config/loader.rs:438)

save_api_key writes ~/.cora/auth.toml with default umask, then chmods to 0o600 afterward. Brief window where the file is group/world-readable.

Fix: Use OpenOptions + OpenOptionsExt::mode(0o600) to create the file with restrictive permissions from the start.

Affected files

• src/commands/commit_cmd.rs
• src/engine/context/resolver.rs
• src/config/loader.rs

Effort estimate: 1-2 days