fix(gateway): run turns as the signed-in account, not a claimed sender

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ All notable changes to this project are tracked in this file.
 
 - Required the `operator` role wherever a request runs the agent or mutates state, matching `POST /api/integration/messages`. Previously any authenticated identity, including viewer account tokens, viewer browser sessions, and OIDC users without an operator role claim, could run the agent with tools through these surfaces. New operator accounts default to `viewer`, so grant `operator` to accounts used for Companion, CLI/TUI chat, and API clients.
   - `/ws`: closed with code 1008, which web chat reports as an authorization failure.
+  - `/ws/live`: closed with code 1008. The live model bridge runs no tools but spends provider credentials.
   - `POST /v1/chat/completions` and `POST /v1/responses`: 403 with an OpenAI-style `permission_error` body.
   - A2A execution paths: 403. Discovery stays public.
   - `POST /apps/chat`: 403.
@@ -46,7 +47,9 @@ All notable changes to this project are tracked in this file.
   - Each denial is logged under `OpenClaw.Gateway.Authorization` with the surface, account, and role, so admins can find accounts to promote.
   - Migration aid: `OpenClaw:Security:AllowViewerAgentExecution=true` restores the previous behavior for authenticated identities below `operator`, logs each such request, and adds the `viewer_agent_execution_allowed` risk flag to `admin posture`. It is temporary and will be removed in the next release.
 - Stopped trusting a loopback client IP on `/apps/health`, `/apps/chat`, and `/apps/mcp/{appId}`. Behind a same-host reverse proxy without `TrustForwardedHeaders`, every caller has a loopback IP, so these routes answered unauthenticated requests, including agent runs and MCP App tool calls, and ignored `AlwaysRequireAuth`. They now follow the gateway's bind-based rule: open only on a loopback-bound gateway without `AlwaysRequireAuth`.
-- Added `OpenClawWebSocketClient.OnClosed`, raised with the gateway's close status and reason. Companion now marks itself disconnected and shows the reason instead of appearing connected after the gateway closes the socket.
+- Turns now run as the signed-in account instead of a caller-supplied sender id. `Session.AuthenticatedUserId` scopes per-user capability bindings and is passed to MCP servers as `_meta.userId`. Previously only `/ws` set it, so REST messages, MCP `send_message`, A2A, `/v1/*`, and `/apps/chat` turns ran as whatever `senderId` or `contextId` the caller supplied. MCP servers that read `_meta.userId` now receive account ids for those turns.
+- A turn from an external sender without an account no longer inherits the previous writer's account. Previously, after an operator posted into a Telegram session, the Telegram user's next turns ran as that operator. System, scheduled, automation, and background-continuation turns keep the session's identity.
+- Added `OpenClawWebSocketClient.OnClosed`, raised with the gateway's close status and reason. Companion now marks itself disconnected and shows the reason instead of appearing connected after the gateway closes the socket. It also asks the gateway before connecting: `GET /auth/session` now reports `canExecuteAgent`, which follows `AllowViewerAgentExecution`, and when it is `false` Companion explains the missing `operator` role instead of opening chat. The read-only status views stay available. Against a gateway that does not report the field, Companion connects and the gateway decides.
 - Bound tool-approval decisions to the original requester (`channelId` + `senderId`) for non-loopback/public binds.
 - Kept `POST /tools/approve` as an explicit admin override path.
 - Added WhatsApp official webhook signature validation support (`ValidateSignature`, `WebhookAppSecret`/`WebhookAppSecretRef`).

docs/AUTHENTICATION.md

@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ Request enters
 
 ### 3.2 WebSocket Authentication Flow
 
-WebSocket endpoints (`/ws`, `/ws/live`) authenticate in Phase 1. `/ws` then applies the chat role check (Phase 2) and resolves the user ID (Phase 3):
+WebSocket endpoints (`/ws`, `/ws/live`) authenticate in Phase 1 and then apply the role check (Phase 2). `/ws` also resolves the user ID (Phase 3):
 
 **Phase 1: `TryValidateWebSocketRequest` → `IsAuthorizedRequest`**
 
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ WebSocket request (/ws)
   └─ Passed ──→ Accept WebSocket connection
 ```
 
-**Phase 2 (`/ws` only): `EndpointHelpers.CanExecuteAgent`**
+**Phase 2: `EndpointHelpers.CanExecuteAgent`**
 
 Every `/ws` frame becomes agent input, so the connection needs the same `operator` role as `POST /api/integration/messages`. The role is resolved through `AuthorizeOperatorRequest`, the same chain the HTTP API uses:
 
@@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ WebSocket connected
 | Surface | Below operator |
 |---------|----------------|
 | `/ws` | Accepted, then closed with 1008 (PolicyViolation) |
+| `/ws/live` | Accepted, then closed with 1008. The live bridge runs no tools but spends provider credentials |
 | `POST /v1/chat/completions`, `POST /v1/responses` | 403 with an OpenAI-style `permission_error` body |
 | A2A execution paths (discovery stays public) | 403 |
 | `POST /apps/chat` | 403 |
@@ -195,6 +196,8 @@ Bootstrap tokens and open loopback resolve to `admin` and are unaffected. New op
 
 Each denial is logged as a warning under the `OpenClaw.Gateway.Authorization` category, naming the surface, auth mode, account, and role (never the credential), so admins can find the accounts to promote. To migrate without an outage, set `OpenClaw:Security:AllowViewerAgentExecution=true`, watch the log for the admitted accounts, grant them `operator`, then turn the setting off. The setting is temporary and will be removed in the next release.
 
+`GET /auth/session` reports the result of this check as `canExecuteAgent`, including the effect of `AllowViewerAgentExecution`, so clients can explain a refusal before connecting. Companion uses it; a gateway that predates the field omits it.
+
 ### 3.4 `IsAuthorizedRequest` — Detailed Logic
 
 ```csharp
@@ -235,6 +238,23 @@ return false;  // 401 Unauthorized
 
 ---
 
+### 3.5 Turn Identity
+
+`Session.AuthenticatedUserId` is the identity a turn runs with. It scopes per-user capability bindings and is passed to MCP servers as `_meta.userId`. When it is empty, those fall back to the session's `SenderId`.
+
+Surfaces that run turns set it from the signed-in account (`EndpointHelpers.ResolveAuthenticatedAccountId`), never from a caller-supplied sender id:
+
+| Surface | Identity source |
+|---------|-----------------|
+| `POST /api/integration/messages`, MCP `openclaw.send_message` | Account of the request; the body's `senderId` is only used for routing and display |
+| `/ws` | Account resolved at connection |
+| `POST /v1/chat/completions`, `POST /v1/responses`, `POST /apps/chat` | Account of the request |
+| A2A execution | Account of the request; the A2A `contextId` is only the sender id |
+
+Open loopback and bootstrap callers have no account, so their turns run without one.
+
+A pipeline turn from an external sender without an account runs without one too. It does not inherit the account of whoever wrote to the session before. For example, a Telegram user's turn never runs as an operator who posted into that Telegram session. System, scheduled, automation, and background-continuation turns act on the session's behalf and keep its identity.
+
 ## 4. Middleware Pipeline
 
 Authentication middleware is registered in `Program.cs` in the following order:

docs/zh-CN/AUTHENTICATION.md

@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ HTTP API 端点使用 `AuthorizeOperatorRequest` 方法（[EndpointHelpers.cs](.
 
 ### 3.2 WebSocket 认证流程
 
-WebSocket 端点 (`/ws`, `/ws/live`) 在第一步完成认证；`/ws` 随后执行聊天角色检查（第二步）并解析用户 ID（第三步）：
+WebSocket 端点 (`/ws`, `/ws/live`) 在第一步完成认证，随后执行角色检查（第二步）；`/ws` 还会解析用户 ID（第三步）：
 
 **第一步：`TryValidateWebSocketRequest` → `IsAuthorizedRequest`**
 
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ WebSocket 请求 (/ws)
   └─ 通过 ──→ 接受 WebSocket 连接
 ```
 
-**第二步（仅 `/ws`）：`EndpointHelpers.CanExecuteAgent`**
+**第二步：`EndpointHelpers.CanExecuteAgent`**
 
 每个 `/ws` 帧都会成为智能体输入，因此连接需要与 `POST /api/integration/messages` 相同的 `operator` 角色。角色通过 `AuthorizeOperatorRequest` 解析，与 HTTP API 使用同一认证链：
 
@@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ WebSocket 已连接
 | 入口 | 角色低于 operator 时 |
 |------|----------------------|
 | `/ws` | 先接受，再以 1008 (PolicyViolation) 关闭 |
+| `/ws/live` | 先接受，再以 1008 关闭。实时桥接不运行工具，但会消耗提供商凭据额度 |
 | `POST /v1/chat/completions`、`POST /v1/responses` | 403，返回 OpenAI 风格的 `permission_error` 响应体 |
 | A2A 执行路径（发现端点仍然公开） | 403 |
 | `POST /apps/chat` | 403 |
@@ -195,6 +196,8 @@ WebSocket 已连接
 
 每次拒绝都会在 `OpenClaw.Gateway.Authorization` 类别下记录一条警告日志，包含入口、认证方式、账户和角色（绝不包含凭据），便于管理员找出需要提升角色的账户。如需无中断迁移，可设置 `OpenClaw:Security:AllowViewerAgentExecution=true`，从日志中找出被放行的账户，为其授予 `operator` 角色，然后关闭该设置。该设置是临时的，将在下一个版本移除。
 
+`GET /auth/session` 会以 `canExecuteAgent` 字段报告这项检查的结果（包括 `AllowViewerAgentExecution` 的影响），客户端可以在连接前说明拒绝原因。Companion 会使用该字段；早于此字段的网关不会返回它。
+
 ### 3.4 `IsAuthorizedRequest` 详细逻辑
 
 ```csharp
@@ -235,6 +238,23 @@ return false;  // 401 Unauthorized
 
 ---
 
+### 3.5 轮次身份
+
+`Session.AuthenticatedUserId` 是一个轮次运行时所用的身份。它划分按用户的能力绑定范围，并以 `_meta.userId` 传给 MCP 服务器。为空时，二者回退到会话的 `SenderId`。
+
+运行轮次的入口会根据已登录账户设置它（`EndpointHelpers.ResolveAuthenticatedAccountId`），绝不采用调用方提供的发送者 ID：
+
+| 入口 | 身份来源 |
+|------|----------|
+| `POST /api/integration/messages`、MCP `openclaw.send_message` | 请求的账户；请求体中的 `senderId` 只用于路由和显示 |
+| `/ws` | 连接时解析出的账户 |
+| `POST /v1/chat/completions`、`POST /v1/responses`、`POST /apps/chat` | 请求的账户 |
+| A2A 执行 | 请求的账户；A2A 的 `contextId` 只作为发送者 ID |
+
+开放回环和引导令牌调用方没有账户，因此它们的轮次不带账户身份运行。
+
+来自外部发送者且不带账户的管道轮次同样不带账户身份运行，不会继承此前写入该会话的账户。例如，Telegram 用户的轮次绝不会以曾向该 Telegram 会话发消息的操作员身份运行。系统、定时、自动化和后台续跑轮次代表会话执行，保留会话原有身份。
+
 ## 四、中间件管道
 
 认证相关的中间件在 `Program.cs` 中按以下顺序注册：

src/OpenClaw.Companion/ViewModels/MainWindowViewModel.cs

@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ public sealed partial class MainWindowViewModel : ViewModelBase
     [ObservableProperty]
     private string _operatorRole = OperatorRoleNames.Viewer;
 
+    private bool? _agentExecutionAllowedByGateway;
+
     [ObservableProperty]
     private string _operatorAuthMode = "account_token";
 
@@ -526,11 +528,22 @@ private async Task ConnectAsync()
             SaveSettings();
 
             Status = "Connecting…";
+
+            // Ask the gateway first: an account it won't let run the agent would be admitted and then closed, so say why
+            // up front and keep the read-only status views. Only its answer counts, not the role: a viewer can still chat
+            // under Security.AllowViewerAgentExecution, and a gateway that doesn't report it decides at connect time.
+            await LoadAdminStatusAsyncInternal();
+            if (_agentExecutionAllowedByGateway == false)
+            {
+                Status = "Disconnected";
+                AddSystemMessage($"Signed in as {OperatorIdentity} with the {OperatorRole} role. Chat needs the operator role; ask an admin to change this account's role.");
+                return;
+            }
+
             await _client.ConnectAsync(uri, string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(AuthToken) ? null : AuthToken, CancellationToken.None);
             IsConnected = true;
             Status = "Connected";
             await SendCanvasReadyAsync();
-            await LoadAdminStatusAsyncInternal();
             await LoadWhatsAppSetupAsync();
         }
         catch (Exception ex)
@@ -628,6 +641,7 @@ private async Task LoadAdminStatusAsync()
 
     private async Task LoadAdminStatusAsyncInternal()
     {
+        _agentExecutionAllowedByGateway = null;
         using var client = CreateAdminClient(out var error);
         if (client is null)
         {
@@ -647,8 +661,9 @@ private async Task LoadAdminStatusAsyncInternal()
         try
         {
             var auth = await client.GetAuthSessionAsync(CancellationToken.None);
-            var setup = await client.GetSetupStatusAsync(CancellationToken.None);
             ApplyOperatorIdentity(auth.AuthMode, auth.Role, auth.DisplayName, auth.Username, auth.IsBootstrapAdmin);
+            _agentExecutionAllowedByGateway = auth.CanExecuteAgent;
+            var setup = await client.GetSetupStatusAsync(CancellationToken.None);
             AdminStatus = auth.IsBootstrapAdmin
                 ? "Using bootstrap/breakglass admin auth."
                 : $"Authenticated as {auth.DisplayName ?? auth.Username ?? "operator"} via {auth.AuthMode}.";

src/OpenClaw.Core/Models/AdminApiModels.cs

@@ -27,6 +27,12 @@ public sealed class AuthSessionResponse
     public string? Username { get; init; }
     public string? DisplayName { get; init; }
     public bool IsBootstrapAdmin { get; init; }
+
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Whether this caller may run the agent (chat over /ws, /v1/*, A2A, and the other agent surfaces).
+    /// Null from gateways that predate the field; those decide only when the client connects.
+    /// </summary>
+    public bool? CanExecuteAgent { get; init; }
     public bool PublicBind { get; init; }
     public string[] AllowedAuthModes { get; init; } = [];
     public string EffectiveToolSurface { get; init; } = "web";

src/OpenClaw.Core/Models/GatewayConfig.cs

@@ -387,7 +387,8 @@ public sealed class SecurityConfig
     /// <summary>
     /// Temporary compatibility switch, to be removed in the next release. When true, authenticated identities
     /// below the operator role (such as viewer accounts) can still run the agent through /ws, /v1/*, A2A,
-    /// /apps/chat, MCP App tool calls, and mutating MCP tools. Each such request is logged so the accounts can be promoted.
+    /// /apps/chat, MCP App tool calls, mutating MCP tools, and /ws/live. Each such request is logged so the accounts
+    /// can be promoted.
     /// </summary>
     public bool AllowViewerAgentExecution { get; set; } = false;
 

src/OpenClaw.Gateway/A2A/A2ACallerContext.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+namespace OpenClaw.Gateway.A2A;
+
+/// <summary>
+/// The signed-in account behind the current A2A request. The A2A middleware sets it before the SDK runs the
+/// handler; unlike the HTTP context, an async-local value still flows into work the SDK detaches from the request.
+/// </summary>
+internal static class A2ACallerContext
+{
+    private static readonly AsyncLocal<string?> Current = new();
+
+    public static string? AccountId
+    {
+        get => Current.Value;
+        set => Current.Value = value;
+    }
+}

src/OpenClaw.Gateway/A2A/A2AEndpointExtensions.cs

@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ public static void UseOpenClawA2AAuth(
                     return;
                 }
 
+                A2ACallerContext.AccountId = EndpointHelpers.ResolveAuthenticatedAccountId(ctx, startup);
+
                 if (!runtime.Operations.ActorRateLimits.TryConsume(
                         "ip",
                         EndpointHelpers.GetRemoteIpKey(ctx),

src/OpenClaw.Gateway/A2A/OpenClawA2AExecutionBridge.cs

@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ public async Task ExecuteStreamingAsync(
 
         await using var sessionLock = await runtime.SessionManager.AcquireSessionLockAsync(session.Id, cancellationToken);
 
+        // The A2A request's SenderId is the caller's contextId, so the turn's identity comes from the signed-in account.
+        session.AuthenticatedUserId = A2ACallerContext.AccountId;
+
         var (handled, commandResponse) = await runtime.CommandProcessor.TryProcessCommandAsync(
             session,
             request.UserText,

src/OpenClaw.Gateway/Composition/IntegrationApiFacade.cs

@@ -787,7 +787,14 @@ public async Task<LearningProposalListResponse> ListLearningProposalsAsync(strin
         return rejected;
     }
 
-    public async Task<IntegrationMessageResponse> QueueMessageAsync(IntegrationMessageRequest request, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    /// <param name="authenticatedUserId">
+    /// The signed-in account resolved by the calling surface. It becomes the turn's identity; the request's
+    /// senderId is caller-supplied and only used for routing and display.
+    /// </param>
+    public async Task<IntegrationMessageResponse> QueueMessageAsync(
+        IntegrationMessageRequest request,
+        CancellationToken cancellationToken,
+        string? authenticatedUserId = null)
     {
         var effectiveChannelId = string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(request.ChannelId) ? "integration-api" : request.ChannelId.Trim();
         var effectiveSenderId = string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(request.SenderId) ? "http-client" : request.SenderId.Trim();
@@ -805,7 +812,8 @@ public async Task<IntegrationMessageResponse> QueueMessageAsync(IntegrationMessa
             Type = "user_message",
             Text = request.Text,
             MessageId = request.MessageId,
-            ReplyToMessageId = request.ReplyToMessageId
+            ReplyToMessageId = request.ReplyToMessageId,
+            AuthenticatedUserId = authenticatedUserId
         };
 
         if (!_runtime.Pipeline.InboundWriter.TryWrite(message))

src/OpenClaw.Gateway/Endpoints/AdminEndpoints.Support.cs

@@ -234,6 +234,7 @@ private static AuthSessionResponse MapAuthSessionResponse(
             Username = auth.Username,
             DisplayName = auth.DisplayName,
             IsBootstrapAdmin = auth.IsBootstrapAdmin,
+            CanExecuteAgent = EndpointHelpers.AllowsAgentExecution(auth, startup),
             PublicBind = startup.IsNonLoopbackBind,
             AllowedAuthModes = [.. policy.AllowedAuthModes],
             EffectiveToolSurface = preset.Surface,

src/OpenClaw.Gateway/Endpoints/AppsEndpoints.cs

@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ public static void MapOpenClawAppsEndpoints(
                 ? $"apps-{Guid.NewGuid():N}"
                 : requestedSessionId!;
             var session = await runtime.SessionManager.GetOrCreateByIdAsync(sessionId, "apps", sessionId, ct);
+            session.AuthenticatedUserId = EndpointHelpers.ResolveAuthenticatedAccountId(ctx, startup);
 
             await SendAsync(ctx, new JsonObject { ["type"] = "session", ["sessionId"] = sessionId }, ct);