| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
Latest on main |
✅ |
This project is a single-script tool (sccmpatch.ps1) without semantic versioning releases.
Only the current version on the main branch receives updates.
If you discover a security vulnerability in this project, please report it responsibly:
- Do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
- Email the maintainer at the address listed in the repository profile, or use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting for this repository.
- Include a description of the vulnerability, steps to reproduce, and potential impact.
- You can expect an initial response within 7 business days.
This script operates with elevated privileges and interacts with infrastructure components:
-
WinRM: The script uses
Invoke-Commandover WinRM. Ensure WinRM is configured with HTTPS (port 5986) or Kerberos authentication rather than basic/plaintext HTTP. -
Service account: The Veeam Backup Administrator account used to run this script should follow least-privilege principles and must not have MFA enabled (Veeam PowerShell limitation per KB4535).
-
Execution policy: The script requires an execution policy that permits script execution. Use
RemoteSignedorAllSignedrather thanUnrestricted. -
Startup checks: The script uses native Windows installed-product metadata to validate the required shell, then confirms the connected server build before proxy operations. It refuses unsupported or inconsistent releases with exit
99. Run it in a fresh 64-bit process and pass an explicit-VBRServeron Console-only hosts. -
Veeam connections: Connections use the current Windows identity. The script does not force TLS certificate acceptance or disconnect a pre-existing caller session. It closes only a session it opened.
-
Validation boundary: Mocked local checks verify control flow and return values. They do not establish live Veeam assembly, Windows installer metadata, task-to-proxy mapping, WinRM, or service compatibility. Validate those on a non-production deployment before rollout.