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4 changes: 4 additions & 0 deletions .jules/sentinel.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -31,3 +31,7 @@
**Vulnerability:** External shell command executed in `listLocalSnapshots()` triggered a deadlock when `tmutil` output exceeded 64KB, because stdout and stderr were read synchronously inside the process termination handler.
**Learning:** In Swift, reading from a process pipe synchronously inside a `terminationHandler` can result in a permanent deadlock if the child blocks writing to a full pipe, preventing it from exiting.
**Prevention:** Asynchronously drain pipes continuously while the process is running using background queues.
## 2026-06-25 - Insecure Temporary File Creation (TOCTOU)
**Vulnerability:** A file write function used `Data.write(to:)` to create temporary files with default permissions before restricting them to `0o600` via `FileManager.default.setAttributes()`.
**Learning:** This creates a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition where an attacker could read the sensitive file contents in the brief window before permissions are tightened.
**Prevention:** Always use POSIX `open()` with `O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_EXCL | O_CLOEXEC` and the explicit mode `0o600` to atomically create the file with restricted permissions, then wrap the file descriptor in a `FileHandle` to write data. Remove any stale temporary file before using `O_EXCL` to avoid failure.
28 changes: 21 additions & 7 deletions Sources/CacheoutHelperLib/SysctlJournal.swift
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -307,14 +307,28 @@ public final class SysctlJournal {
do {
let data = try PropertyListEncoder().encode(state)

// Write to temp file (non-atomic β€” we control the rename ourselves).
try data.write(to: tmpURL)
// Remove any stale temp file first, otherwise O_EXCL will fail.
try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: tmpURL)

// Set permissions to 0600 (root-only) on temp file before rename.
try FileManager.default.setAttributes(
[.posixPermissions: 0o600],
ofItemAtPath: tmpURL.path
)
// Securely create temp file with 0600 permissions, preventing TOCTOU.
let fd = tmpURL.withUnsafeFileSystemRepresentation { pathPtr -> Int32 in
guard let pathPtr = pathPtr else { return -1 }
return open(pathPtr, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_EXCL | O_CLOEXEC, 0o600)
}

guard fd >= 0 else {
logger.error("open(2) failed to securely create temp file")
return false
}

let handle = FileHandle(fileDescriptor: fd, closeOnDealloc: true)
if #available(macOS 10.15.4, *) {
try handle.write(contentsOf: data)
try handle.close()
} else {
handle.write(data)
handle.closeFile()
}

// Atomic rename(2) β€” atomicity on APFS/HFS+.
if rename(tmpURL.path, url.path) != 0 {
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