🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix TOCTOU vulnerability in SysctlJournal

.jules/sentinel.md

@@ -31,3 +31,7 @@
 **Vulnerability:** External shell command executed in `listLocalSnapshots()` triggered a deadlock when `tmutil` output exceeded 64KB, because stdout and stderr were read synchronously inside the process termination handler.
 **Learning:** In Swift, reading from a process pipe synchronously inside a `terminationHandler` can result in a permanent deadlock if the child blocks writing to a full pipe, preventing it from exiting.
 **Prevention:** Asynchronously drain pipes continuously while the process is running using background queues.
+## 2026-05-21 - TOCTOU Vulnerability via Data.write and setAttributes
+**Vulnerability:** Found `try data.write(to: tmpURL)` followed by `try FileManager.default.setAttributes([.posixPermissions: 0o600], ...)` in `flushState()`, which introduces a TOCTOU window where the file is exposed with default umask permissions before being tightened.
+**Learning:** `Data.write(to:)` is vulnerable to TOCTOU if permissions need to be restricted after creation.
+**Prevention:** Use POSIX `open()` with `O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_EXCL | O_CLOEXEC` and the `0o600` mode to securely create files without relying on the process umask, then wrap the file descriptor in a `FileHandle`.

Sources/CacheoutHelperLib/SysctlJournal.swift

@@ -307,14 +307,24 @@ public final class SysctlJournal {
         do {
             let data = try PropertyListEncoder().encode(state)
 
-            // Write to temp file (non-atomic — we control the rename ourselves).
-            try data.write(to: tmpURL)
+            try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: tmpURL)
 
-            // Set permissions to 0600 (root-only) on temp file before rename.
-            try FileManager.default.setAttributes(
-                [.posixPermissions: 0o600],
-                ofItemAtPath: tmpURL.path
-            )
+            let fd = tmpURL.withUnsafeFileSystemRepresentation { pathPtr -> Int32 in
+                guard let ptr = pathPtr else { return -1 }
+                return open(ptr, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_EXCL | O_CLOEXEC, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR)
+            }
+            guard fd >= 0 else {
+                logger.error("Failed to securely open temp journal file: errno \(errno, privacy: .public)")
+                return false
+            }
+
+            let handle = FileHandle(fileDescriptor: fd, closeOnDealloc: true)
+            handle.write(data)
+            if #available(macOS 10.15.4, *) {
+                try? handle.close()
+            } else {
+                handle.closeFile()
+            }
 
             // Atomic rename(2) — atomicity on APFS/HFS+.
             if rename(tmpURL.path, url.path) != 0 {