π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix TOCTOU vulnerability in cleanup logging#366
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix TOCTOU vulnerability in cleanup logging#366acebytes wants to merge 1 commit into
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Replaced vulnerable Foundation file APIs (`FileHandle(forWritingTo:)` and `String.write(to:atomically:)`) with a secure POSIX `open()` call. By using `O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC` flags, we explicitly refuse to follow symlinks, preventing a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) vulnerability where an attacker could overwrite sensitive files by creating a symlink in the `~/.cacheout` directory. Co-authored-by: acebytes <2820910+acebytes@users.noreply.github.com>
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π¨ Severity: CRITICAL
π‘ Vulnerability:
FileHandle(forWritingTo:)andString.write(to:atomically:)follow symlinks by default. This makes the code vulnerable to a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) symlink attack when appending to the cleanup log file.π― Impact: An attacker could replace the
~/.cacheout/cleanup.logfile with a symlink pointing to a sensitive file. The application would then write to that sensitive file, potentially escalating privileges or causing data loss.π§ Fix: Replaced the high-level file APIs with a secure POSIX
open()call usingO_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXECflags to explicitly refuse symlinks, then wrapped the resulting file descriptor in aFileHandle.β Verification: Ensure the
.cacheout/cleanup.logis written successfully without following symlinks.PR created automatically by Jules for task 132128948724264125 started by @acebytes