[SECURITY] Directory Traversal in GeoIP Download#234
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This commit fixes a directory traversal vulnerability in the GeoIP download task. Although the input was previously escaped and used with filepath.Base, the lack of strict validation allowed for potential edge cases. Changes: - Added a centralized regex validation for GeoIP edition strings. - Enforced validation in NewGeoIPUpdateTask, ProcessTask, and Download. - Added defense-in-depth validation in getDBPath to ensure filenames only contain allowed characters. - Updated unit tests to verify that invalid inputs are rejected early. - Documented the vulnerability and prevention in .jules/sentinel.md. Co-authored-by: arumes31 <114224498+arumes31@users.noreply.github.com>
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Fixed a directory traversal vulnerability in
internal/tasks/geoip_task.go. The issue was that theeditionparameter was not strictly validated, potentially allowing an attacker to influence URL construction or file paths.I implemented a strict regex-based allow-list (
^[a-zA-Z0-9-]+$) for theeditionstring and enforced it at all entry points:NewGeoIPUpdateTask(constructor), preventing the creation of malicious tasks.ProcessTask(handler), as a second layer of defense.Download, to ensure the dynamic URL construction is safe.getDBPath, as a defense-in-depth measure for file system operations.Unit tests were updated to verify that traversal attempts are caught early and rejected.
The learning was recorded in
.jules/sentinel.md.PR created automatically by Jules for task 4554217155269103256 started by @arumes31