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fix(csp): make the policy correct enough to enforce, and make its violations visible (#10) - #18
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Umami has never loaded. app/root.tsx injects the tracker as a raw <script async defer src=...> with no nonce, and script-src is "'strict-dynamic' 'self' 'nonce-...'". Per CSP3, strict-dynamic makes CSP3 browsers ignore the host list entirely — including 'self' — and trust propagates only from nonced or hashed scripts. So the tag was never permitted, and the fallback path (browsers that ignore strict-dynamic) does not cover the Umami origin either. It stayed invisible because the policy is reportOnly and the directives object has no report-uri or report-to, so violations were never sent anywhere. git log -S confirms the ordering: c4f1db1 introduced the CSP and strict-dynamic, f28ea49 added the tracker on top of it. Three fixes, all in scope for #10: 1. nonce={nonce} on the tracker tag. Already in scope in Document; this was an oversight, not a limitation. 2. Umami's beacon POSTs to https://<UMAMI_DOMAIN>/api/send, which connect-src did not allow, so the script would load and then never report. Added as a full https:// origin rather than a wildcard, so a compromised Umami host cannot widen the policy. 3. img-src allowed *.cloudinary.com but not *.hashnode.com, so every blog and notes coverImage.url served by the Hashnode GraphQL API was being refused. Verified the real host from public/llms-full.txt: cdn.hashnode.com. Cloudinary stays — app/components/logo.tsx and app/routes/_marketing+/__data.ts do use it. A securitypolicyviolation listener in monitoring.client.tsx now forwards violations to Sentry as warning-level messages. Without it, the next CSP hole is just a devtools console line nobody reads, which is how this one hid for the life of the project. Kept reportOnly: true. Flipping enforcement needs to be its own commit once the violations above are observable in Sentry and confirmed gone. connect-src and img-src move into server/utils/csp.ts so they are unit testable without booting a server. Refs #9 (Task 2, the CSP move to @nichtsam/helmet, should now point here rather than re-diagnosing the nonce).
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Navigate logical layers of code changes, visualize relationships, and explore their blast radius. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe server now builds CSP connection and image source directives with helpers. The Umami script receives the document nonce. Client monitoring reports security policy violations to Sentry. ChangesCSP policy and Umami updates
Priority: ⬇️ Low Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Change: Bug fix · Severity of issue fixed: Low Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to Before merging, correct the misleading pageview diagnosis, cover the required unset-Umami state, and avoid sending raw CSP URLs to Sentry. The allowlist alone cannot confirm that pageviews are arriving while CSP remains report-only. Security Architecture ReviewSecurity architecture risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to The CSP changes remain report-only, but the new violation reporting path sends URL-bearing fields and the policy text to Sentry without visible application-side redaction. Its privacy impact depends on production event contents and downstream handling. The reporting path may also miss violations that occur before client monitoring starts. Retained concerns
Security review detailsSecurity Blast Radius
Security Findings and Attack Paths
Trust Boundaries and Controls
Resilience and Maintainability Implications
Hardening Proposals
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @app/utils/monitoring.client.tsx:
- Around line 61-67: Remove blockedURI and sourceFile from the CSP event extra
payload so raw URLs cannot be sent to Sentry; retain the other event metadata.
Review comments at @server/utils/csp.ts:
- Around line 4-5: Update the CSP comment near the `connect-src` allowlist to
clarify that the Umami beacon is blocked only when CSP enforcement is enabled;
retain the existing `/api/send` context and avoid implying the allowlist fixes
pageviews under report-only policies.
Review comments at @tests/server.smoke.test.ts:
- Around line 246-261: Extend the production smoke-test setup with a separate
subprocess where UMAMI_DOMAIN is unset, ensuring the environment schema accepts
that state; request /talks in that subprocess and assert the CSP contains no
Umami origin and the rendered HTML contains no Umami tracker script. Keep the
existing test using test-umami-domain unchanged, and do not mutate the parent
test process environment.
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📒 Files selected for processing (7)
app/root.tsxapp/utils/monitoring.client.tsxserver/index.tsserver/utils/csp.tstests/csp.test.tstests/monitoring.test.tstests/server.smoke.test.ts
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Registering the securitypolicyviolation listener from monitoring.client was too late to catch the violations this change exists to expose. entry.client.tsx dynamically imports the monitoring module, so the listener is not installed until after the document has been parsed. But CSP violations for parser-discovered resources — the Umami tracker, the SSR images — are dispatched *during* parsing. Those events fire before any listener exists and are dropped permanently. The listener would have reported post-hydration violations only, which is the empty half of the problem. The listener now comes from an inline nonced script as the first child of <head>, pushing into a bounded buffer. drainCspViolations forwards the buffer once Sentry exists, then installs a live listener for everything after, so nothing is double-reported. The buffer is capped at 20 so a page stuck in a violation loop cannot grow it without bound, and every field is coerced, because this runs before hydration and a throw here takes down the document rather than just reporting. Naming: the module is app/utils/csp.ts, not *.client.ts. The .client suffix makes Vite replace the module with an empty stub in the SSR build — which silently rendered the capture script as `cspCaptureScript = void 0`, i.e. an empty <script> in every document. Found by grepping the server bundle, not by reading the source. The smoke test now asserts the script is present and first in <head> with a nonce, so that failure mode cannot come back unnoticed. Refs #10
The first commit in this series claimed Umami "has never loaded" and that the missing hashnode img-src host meant cover images "were being refused". Both claims are wrong, and they came from reading the policy without checking whether the policy was in force. server/index.ts sets reportOnly: true. That is not a stricter mode, it is the *absence* of enforcement: the browser receives Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only, logs violations, and loads every resource anyway. Confirmed against production: $ curl -sI https://arpitdalal.dev | rg -i content-security content-security-policy-report-only: default-src 'self';...;script-src 'strict-dynamic' 'self' 'nonce-5dea2667...';img-src 'self' data: *.cloudinary.com;connect-src *.sentry.io 'self';... There is no enforcing Content-Security-Policy header. So: - the unnonced Umami tracker was permitted, because nothing was permitted-or-not. It has been loading and reporting all along. - the beacon POST was permitted for the same reason. - the cover images loaded; cdn.hashnode.com was never actually refused. The code changes in the first commit are still correct and still needed. They are prerequisites for turning enforcement on, not repairs for a live outage. What was wrong is the story attached to them, and the PR body and issue diagnosis repeated it. The trap is that a report-only policy looks identical to an enforced one when you read the source. Every directive reads as if it were binding. The new 'does not enforce the CSP yet' case asserts the enforcing header is absent, so the distinction is checked rather than assumed; verified it fails if reportOnly is flipped to false, which also makes the four policy assertions fail, so flipping cannot happen silently. Verified against production, not inferred from the source alone. Also rewrites the NOTE at the enforcement site, which was the original trap. Refs #10
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Reporting a CSP violation means sending an envelope to Sentry. If Sentry's own request is what connect-src refused, that envelope fails too, which raises another violation, which sends another envelope. Unbounded, from nothing but a page load, and it bills Sentry quota. Two causes, both fixed. `connect-src` allowed `*.sentry.io`, which does not cover a self-hosted or custom Sentry domain. Anyone pointing SENTRY_DSN at their own instance had every envelope blocked, so the loop was reachable in the exact configuration where reporting matters most. Replaced with `new URL(dsn).origin` — the exact configured host rather than every subdomain of sentry.io, so this is tighter than before as well as correct. A malformed DSN yields no host rather than a guess. As a second lock on the same door, `isSentryViolation` drops any violation whose blockedURI is on the DSN origin before it reaches captureMessage. connect-src being correct is the fix; this is what stops the loop coming back silently the next time someone tightens the policy and removes the Sentry host without knowing what the violation handler does. Verified by mutation: removing the guard fails the new monitoring case. The origin change is covered directly, including a self-hosted DSN on a custom domain with a port. Refs #10
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Summary
nonceto the Umami tracker tag inapp/root.tsx.connect-srcso the/api/sendbeacon is permitted.*.hashnode.comtoimg-src— the policy allowed Cloudinary but not the CDN that serves blog/notes cover images.<head>buffers them, and Sentry forwards them once it loads.reportOnly: true. The enforcement flip is deliberately a separate later commit.Closes #10. Refs #9 (Task 2 — the
@nichtsam/helmetCSP move should point here rather than re-diagnose the nonce).Correction: nothing is broken today
The first version of this PR, and the diagnosis in #10, claimed Umami "has never loaded" and that cover images "were being refused". That is wrong, and it came from reading the policy without checking whether the policy was in force.
server/index.tssetsreportOnly: true. That is not a stricter mode — it is the absence of enforcement. The browser getsContent-Security-Policy-Report-Only, logs violations, and loads everything anyway. Confirmed against production:There is no enforcing
Content-Security-Policyheader. So the unnonced tracker was permitted, the beacon was permitted, and the cover images loaded.The changes here are still correct and still needed — they are prerequisites for turning enforcement on, not repairs for a live outage. The trap is that a report-only policy is indistinguishable from an enforced one when you read the source: every directive reads as if it were binding.
Changes
app/root.tsx:175nonce={nonce}on the tracker tagapp/root.tsx:159<head>app/utils/csp.tsdrainCspViolations,isSentryViolationserver/utils/csp.tscspConnectSrc,cspImgSrc,sentryOrigin, unit-testable without booting a serverserver/index.tsconnect-srcgainshttps://$UMAMI_DOMAIN;img-srcgains*.hashnode.com; enforcement NOTE rewrittenapp/utils/monitoring.client.tsxTwo decisions worth flagging:
https://origin, not a wildcard, so a compromised Umami host cannot widen the policy.connect-srcnow names the exact Sentry host fromSENTRY_DSNinstead of*.sentry.io. Not a drive-by: reporting a violation means sending an envelope to Sentry, so ifconnect-srcrefuses Sentry's own request, every envelope raises another violation and the loop never terminates.*.sentry.iosilently excluded self-hosted Sentry, which is exactly the configuration where reporting matters most.isSentryViolationis a second lock on the same door in case the policy is tightened later.app/utils/csp.ts, not*.client.ts. The.clientsuffix makes Vite replace the module with an empty stub in the SSR build, which silently renderedcspCaptureScript = void 0— an empty<script>in every document. Found by grepping the server bundle, not by reading the source. The smoke test now asserts the script is present, first in<head>, and nonced.Three things review caught
entry.client.tsxdynamically imports the monitoring module, so the originalsecuritypolicyviolationlistener was not registered until after the document was parsed — but violations for parser-discovered resources fire during parsing. It would have reported the post-hydration half of the problem and dropped the half that mattered. Now captured inline in<head>into a bounded buffer (cap 20, every field coerced, since a throw there would take down the document).connect-src) and guarded (isSentryViolation), so a self-hosted Sentry now works instead of being silently excluded.Tests
npm run validate,npm run test:run(163 passed, 12 files),npm run buildall green.tests/csp.test.ts(new, 9 cases) — Umami origin present/absent perUMAMI_DOMAIN,sentryOriginfor sentry.io / self-hosted-with-port / absent / malformed, hashnode inimg-src.tests/csp-capture.test.ts(new, 11 cases) — the inline script buffers, is idempotent across re-renders, caps the buffer, survives a sparse event; drain clears then installs the live listener;isSentryViolationmatches the DSN origin and does not swallow a hostile lookalike subdomain.tests/monitoring.test.ts— buffered parse-time violations and post-init violations both reach Sentry, and a blocked Sentry envelope is not reported. Verified by mutation: removing the guard fails that case.tests/server.smoke.test.ts—does not enforce the CSP yetasserts the enforcing header is absent. Verified by flippingreportOnly: false: that case fails, and so do the four policy assertions, so the flip cannot happen silently. Also asserts the capture script ships first in<head>with a nonce, and the existing client-supplied-nonce defence is kept.The smoke test only inspects headers and markup, so it proves the policy is shaped correctly — it cannot prove analytics work in a browser.
Before merging
npm run build && npm start—/,/talks,/uses,/contact,/blog,/notesAfter deploy, before ever flipping
reportOnlyCSP:messages on any routeserver/index.tsRefs #9