Skip to content

About

eMudhra CA Compromise CVE-2026-111943 CVE-2026-114406 CVE-2026-91403 CVE-2026-113812

Topics

Resources

Stars

1 star

Watchers

0 watching

Forks

Latest commit

 

History

10 Commits

Folders and files

Repository files navigation

ca-trust-audit

CA Trust Audit: the same compromised CA can be rejected by a host and accepted by a container; illustrative results

CI Release

Read-only certificate trust auditing for Linux hosts and running Docker containers. One standalone Go binary for AMD64 / ARM64, including WSL; also available as a reusable Go library.

Install · Usage · Results · Coverage · Go API · Technical reference

Why this needs attention

Important

eMudhra intermediate CA compromise — CVE-2026-111943 (October 2026). The incident advisory reports compromised signing keys for six TLS intermediate CAs and two code-signing CAs, including cross-signed chains. Systems that still accept an affected TLS chain may trust attacker-issued HTTPS certificates.

Risk Why act promptly?
HTTPS impersonation / MITM An attacker able to intercept or redirect traffic could impersonate services, steal credentials/session tokens, or read and alter traffic.
Fresh fraudulent certificates A compromised CA key can sign new certificates. Renewing your own website certificate does not remove that trust.
Stale container or application bundles Updating the host does not replace CA bundles baked into existing images. PHP, curl, Python/certifi and Node.js can use different trust sources.

Recommended response:

  1. Audit the host, running containers, and relevant runtime clients.
  2. Apply vendor guidance: distrust/runtime updates, replacement of stale CA bundles, and rebuilding/redeploying affected images.
  3. Rescan and resolve incomplete coverage before treating an application as protected.

Incident keywords: CVE-2026-111943 · eMudhra · emSign · Sectigo cross-signing · compromised CA · intermediate CA · TLS/SSL certificate validation · trust store audit · Linux · Docker security.

Install and scan

Install the latest release with automatic AMD64/ARM64 selection:

curl -qfsSL https://github.com/andersundsehr/ca-trust-audit/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh

Then scan the host and every running container:

ca-trust-audit
Installation Behavior
Destination /usr/local/bin; sudo is used only when required.
Installer requirements curl and common POSIX utilities; verified HTTPS, no checksum downloads.
Scanner requirements No Go, Python, OpenSSL, curl or Java installation required to run the binary. Installed clients provide optional runtime evidence.
Failed update Completed downloads are staged; replacement is atomic.
Custom directory or pinned release
curl -qfsSL https://github.com/andersundsehr/ca-trust-audit/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh -s -- --install-dir "$HOME/.local/bin"
curl -qfsSL https://github.com/andersundsehr/ca-trust-audit/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh -s -- --version v0.2.2

Add $HOME/.local/bin to PATH for a user-local installation. See installer details or inspect install.sh.

Self-update

ca-trust-audit self-update --check    # check only
ca-trust-audit self-update            # update; use sudo if the directory requires it
ca-trust-audit self                   # short alias for self-update

self and selfupdate are aliases for self-update, with the same options (--check, --force, --timeout, --color). Suggested commands in permission errors are highlighted in cyan on terminals; NO_COLOR, redirection or --color never keep them plain. This explicit command replaces the executable; ordinary scans remain read-only. It selects the matching architecture, validates standalone Go/ELF metadata and installs atomically over verified HTTPS. No external tools or checksum file are required. Update options and trust boundary.

Usage

Task Command
Host + running containers ca-trust-audit
Host only ca-trust-audit --host (--host-only is equivalent)
Running containers only ca-trust-audit --containers-only
One running container ca-trust-audit --container webapp
Offline bundled-chain analysis ca-trust-audit --offline
Additional public CA files/directories --ca-file /opt/app/ca.pem / --ca-dir /opt/app/public-cas (repeatable)
Terminal + JSON file ca-trust-audit --json report.json
JSON-only stdout ca-trust-audit --json -
Require sufficient coverage ca-trust-audit --strict
Detailed per-chain results ca-trust-audit --verbose
Default / control Meaning
--workers Available logical CPUs (nproc equivalent, using Go); override with any positive integer. Bounds concurrent containers and total simultaneous TLS checks across all targets.
--timeout 10s Per-operation deadline, range 1ms–5m; signals cancel the scan.
--progress auto Progress on terminal stderr; always enables plain CI logs, never disables it.
--color auto Meaningful terminal colors; NO_COLOR, redirection and TERM=dumb disable automatic colors. always / never override detection.

Progress: counters and times stay first, the target stays last. Terminal redraws are limited to four per second and fitted to the terminal width.

[progress] 2/4 targets processed | elapsed    18s | ETA       ~12s | checking PHP cURL | container webapp

Parallel checks: the host is scanned first, then running containers in parallel. Within each client, chain requests also run in parallel; their shared global limit is --workers, so a single target benefits too. Clients within a target are tested one after another, each with its own positive control.

Conservative ETA: uses twice the slowest completed container duration plus a 10-second buffer, worker concurrency and queued work. Before measurements, it starts with a generous budget (normally 1 minute per online target, 15 seconds offline). Long-running targets expand the estimate; it never gets stuck at ~1s. Before Docker discovery, target ETA covers only the active target. Estimates can increase and are not deadlines. JSON remains free of progress and color escapes.

Selection rules: stopped containers are excluded. --host conflicts with container-only selection. CA paths refer to paths inside each selected target. Missing Docker leaves host results available; inaccessible Docker is reported as incomplete coverage. All CLI semantics and limits.

Read the results

Human result Color Meaning
PASSED Green This evaluated client or CA-file model rejected the incident chains.
PROBLEM Red A client or explicitly evaluated store accepted a compromised chain.
NOT VERIFIED Yellow Evidence is incomplete: for example offline mode, a failed positive control, DNS failure or timeout.
REVIEW Yellow Related CA material or a policy question needs review; effective trust is unestablished.
UNSUPPORTED Gray This runtime or format cannot be evaluated reliably.

Note

CA-file results and live-client results are separate. Offline PASSED covers the documented PEM model; live clients remain NOT VERIFIED. A DNS failure never counts as a pass. TLS results do not establish code-signing safety or protection of every application.

The final summary repeats affected hosts/containers, clients and CA paths. Repeated chains are grouped; large lists show three entries plus a remaining count. For example, a confirmed CA-file problem can produce:

SUMMARY
  Targets: 2 (hosts=1, containers=1)
  PROBLEM confirmed: clients=0, CA files=1
  PROBLEM container webapp (1234567890ab)
    CA files: /opt/app/ca.pem
  Action: update the listed runtimes/CA bundles using vendor guidance, then rerun.
  NOT VERIFIED incomplete coverage: targets=1, scan warnings=0

Exit codes and JSON

Exit Meaning
0 No confirmed vulnerability found; warnings or partial coverage may remain.
1 Confirmed vulnerable client/store; takes precedence over strict coverage.
2 Fatal setup/options, cancellation or report I/O error.
3 --strict only: no confirmed vulnerability, but insufficient coverage.

JSON uses stable schema 1.0 with precise statuses such as VULNERABLE_CLIENT, VULNERABLE_STORE and INCONCLUSIVE. It includes target identity, client, chain/root, CA path, fingerprints, evidence, remediation and coverage. Report files are created with 0600 permissions and never overwritten. Schema · Status evidence and exact exit semantics.

Coverage

Area Supported / limitation
Platforms Linux AMD64 / ARM64, including WSL.
Live TLS Go scanner stack (host only), curl, PHP OpenSSL streams + cURL, Python ssl/urllib + requests/certifi, Node.js HTTPS, Ruby HTTPS, when installed and introspection works. Each client gets an HTTPS positive control.
Static stores Common Debian/Ubuntu, Alpine and RHEL/Fedora PEM layouts, selected runtime overrides and explicit CA paths. Explicit chain validation uses certificate/SPKI identities, not names alone.
Incident fixtures Six TLS keys under both eMudhra and Sectigo signatures: 12 regular endpoints/chains plus two published no-CT variants, bundled and verified for offline use.
Minimal containers Read-only Docker archives analyze known bundles without a shell or installed clients. No available bundle means incomplete coverage.
Explicitly unsupported Java JSSE execution, JKS/PKCS#12/NSS policy evaluation, OpenSSL AUX trust attributes and full code-signing policy validation. Two affected code-signing CA keys are identified separately.

Important boundaries: PEM evaluation does not reproduce every runtime's distrust, CT or revocation policy; CRLs/OCSP are not fetched automatically. CLI clients can differ from long-running application processes. Custom stores are not exhaustively discoverable.

Runtime matrix · CA discovery and overrides · Validation model

Docker, distroless and running inside a container

  • The native Engine API respects DOCKER_HOST and supported Docker contexts; no Docker CLI is needed for a local socket or explicit endpoint. Transport/TLS limits.
  • Archive reads support distroless/scratch images with a known public PEM bundle. Exec probes use direct argv, without copying helpers or installing software.
  • Inside a container, its filesystem is the primary local target. For local-only operation, run ca-trust-audit --host --offline. Additional containers require an accessible Docker endpoint.
  • A Docker socket is powerful access, even through a read-only bind mount; use appropriate daemon/API authorization.

Tested PHP use case: webdevops/php-apache:8.5-alpine, with default-bundle checks against all 14 chains and trusted/untrusted PHP stream/cURL fixtures. Deployed overrides still need scanning as deployed.

Security and privacy

  • Read-only scans: no software installation, CA updates, restarts, configuration changes or disabled TLS verification.
  • Bounded access: designated public CA files/directories only; no broad secret, private-key or application-data search. Read/output limits.
  • Live endpoint privacy: operators may see the requesting IP, user-agent and connection metadata. Availability, proxies and certificate rotation can prevent conclusive results. Use --offline when endpoint traffic is inappropriate.
  • Runtime side effects: installed clients may execute initialization, import hooks or plugins outside the scanner's control. Static-only library use with a nil runner avoids invoking them.

Go API

r, err := audit.Scan(ctx, audit.Options{
    IncludeHost:       true,
    IncludeContainers: true,
    Timeout:           10 * time.Second,
    // Workers defaults to available logical CPUs.
})
if err != nil { /* fatal error; r may contain partial results */ }
code := r.ExitCode(true)

Public packages: audit, certificates, docker, probes, report. Zero options select host + Docker with online checks; Offline disables live probing. API examples, static-only use and progress callbacks.

Extension Approach
New compromised-CA incident Supply Options.Incident with pinned certificate/SPKI identities and leaf-first chains; verify provenance, signatures/hostnames and positive/negative fixtures.
New runtime Implement probes.Probe (Name, Discover, Check) and pass Options.Probes; return normalized evidence and a pinned leaf hash on acceptance.

Extension guide · Fixture provenance

Build, test and CI

Go 1.26+; CI/releases pin patched Go 1.27.3.

go test ./...
go vet ./...
go test -race ./...
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build -trimpath -o dist/ca-trust-audit-linux-amd64 ./cmd/ca-trust-audit
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux GOARCH=arm64 go build -trimpath -o dist/ca-trust-audit-linux-arm64 ./cmd/ca-trust-audit
Workflow Checks / output
CI, PRs + pushes to main Formatting, vet, unit/race tests, local TLS probes, AMD64/ARM64 builds; separate Docker/PHP integration job. Ordinary unit tests require neither Docker nor public network.
Release, v* tags Validate/test, build standalone binaries with reproducible metadata, publish binaries, installer, checksums and release notes. Only publishing has contents: write.
Optional Docker, PHP and network integration tests
CA_TRUST_AUDIT_RUNTIME_TESTS=1 go test -v ./pkg/probes -run TestInstalledRuntimeTLS
CA_TRUST_AUDIT_DOCKER_TESTS=1 go test -v ./pkg/audit -run TestRealDockerShellless
docker pull webdevops/php-apache:8.5-alpine
CA_TRUST_AUDIT_PHP_IMAGE_TESTS=1 go test -v ./pkg/probes -run TestPHP85Image
CA_TRUST_AUDIT_PHP_IMAGE_TESTS=1 go test -v ./pkg/audit -run TestPHP85ParallelChains
CA_TRUST_AUDIT_PHP_IMAGE_TESTS=1 go test -v ./cmd/ca-trust-audit -run TestPHP85CLI
# Explicit third-party network suite; discloses connection metadata:
CA_TRUST_AUDIT_NETWORK_TESTS=1 go test -v ./pkg/probes -run TestPublishedEndpoints

Optional suites explicitly skip unless enabled; missing runtimes/modules are reported as skipped. Enabled public-network checks fail on inconclusive results. Complete test instructions.

Technical reference · JSON schema · PHP test evidence · Changelog · MIT license

About

eMudhra CA Compromise CVE-2026-111943 CVE-2026-114406 CVE-2026-91403 CVE-2026-113812

Topics

Resources

Stars

1 star

Watchers

0 watching

Forks

Releases

Packages

Used by

Contributors

Languages