CoreDataDabbi opens untrusted database files and renders their contents. Bugs in the model loader, content decoders, SQLite handling or the web preview are therefore security-relevant, and we treat them that way.

Please do not open a public issue. Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting for this repository (Security › Report a vulnerability). Include:

• the affected version or commit,
• a description of the issue and its impact,
• a reproducer — ideally a minimal store file or blob. Never attach real user data.

You will get an acknowledgement within 7 days. We will agree a disclosure date with you once a fix is ready, and credit you in the release notes unless you prefer otherwise.

In scope:

• memory safety or code execution from opening a store, model cache, project file, container or blob;
• class instantiation from attribute data (attribute data must only ever be parsed);
• decompression bombs or unbounded recursion in decoders;
• any write to a store opened read-only, or any write reachable through the MCP server;
• remote loads from the content viewer when the project has not allowed them;
• row data appearing in logs or problem reports.

Out of scope: issues that require an attacker who already controls the user's account, and vulnerabilities in Apple frameworks themselves (report those to Apple; tell us too if CoreDataDabbi can mitigate them).

See ARCHITECTURE.md §10. In short: hardened read-only SQLite connections, the model unarchiver restricted to Core Data's own classes, bounded decoders, no telemetry, no network use beyond opt-in remote content and update checks.