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🛡️ Sentinel: [MEDIUM] Fix unbounded strcpy in ar8327 LED driver #85

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Merged
ManupaKDU merged 4 commits into from
May 22, 2026
Merged

🛡️ Sentinel: [MEDIUM] Fix unbounded strcpy in ar8327 LED driver #85

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26574c1
🛡️ Sentinel: [MEDIUM] Fix unbounded strcpy in ar8327 LED driver
google-labs-jules[bot] May 22, 2026
5e823cd
net: phy: ar8327: 🛡️ Sentinel: [MEDIUM] Fix unbounded strcpy in ar832…
google-labs-jules[bot] May 22, 2026
3f08d3f
net: phy: ar8327: Sentinel: Fix unbounded strcpy in ar8327 LED driver
google-labs-jules[bot] May 22, 2026
f5be58e
kernel: phy: ar8327: Sentinel: Fix unbounded strcpy in ar8327 LED driver
google-labs-jules[bot] May 22, 2026
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4 changes: 4 additions & 0 deletions .jules/sentinel.md
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -102,3 +102,7 @@
**Vulnerability:** In `package/network/config/netifd/files/lib/netifd/utils.uc`, the `handler_load` function iterates over `.sh` scripts in a directory and uses their `basename` to execute them via a string interpolated `system()` call (`system("./${script} ...")`). If an attacker could place a maliciously named file in the parsed directory (e.g., `$(touch \/tmp\/pwned).sh`), it would result in arbitrary command execution.
**Learning:** In `ucode` scripts, `system()` with a string argument is executed by the shell (`/bin/sh -c`). When using variables derived from filenames or external sources within these string templates, failure to sanitize allows shell metacharacter injection.
**Prevention:** To protect `system()` or `fs.popen()` when string interpolation is unavoidable, always strictly validate variables using regex allowlists (e.g., `if (match(script, /[^a-zA-Z0-9_.-]/)) continue;`) to ensure only safe characters are evaluated by the shell.
## 2026-05-22 - [Fix buffer overflow risk in AR8327 LED driver]
**Vulnerability:** Unbounded `strcpy` used for copying dynamic string into flexible array member without reusing precalculated length.
**Learning:** In kernel modules, `strcpy` should be replaced with `strscpy`, and size variables should be precalculated to avoid TOCTOU races between allocation and copying.
**Prevention:** Use `strscpy` with a precalculated length variable instead of `strcpy` and `strlen`.
6 changes: 4 additions & 2 deletions target/linux/generic/files/drivers/net/phy/ar8327.c
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Expand Up @@ -307,6 +307,7 @@ ar8327_led_create(struct ar8xxx_priv *priv,
{
struct ar8327_data *data = priv->chip_data;
struct ar8327_led *aled;
size_t name_len;
int ret;

if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AR8216_PHY_LEDS))
Expand All @@ -318,7 +319,8 @@ ar8327_led_create(struct ar8xxx_priv *priv,
if (led_info->led_num >= AR8327_NUM_LEDS)
return -EINVAL;

aled = kzalloc(struct_size(aled, name, strlen(led_info->name) + 1),
name_len = strlen(led_info->name) + 1;
aled = kzalloc(struct_size(aled, name, name_len),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!aled)
return -ENOMEM;
Expand All @@ -332,7 +334,7 @@ ar8327_led_create(struct ar8xxx_priv *priv,
if (aled->mode == AR8327_LED_MODE_HW)
aled->enable_hw_mode = true;

strcpy(aled->name, led_info->name);
strscpy(aled->name, led_info->name, name_len);

aled->cdev.name = aled->name;
aled->cdev.brightness_set = ar8327_led_set_brightness;
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