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CredGuard Killer

(C# port of CredGuardRuntimeShutdown. https://github.com/S12cybersecurity/CredGuardRuntimeShutdown)

A minimal, dependency-free PoC that disables Windows Credential Guard at runtime by signaling the internal LSA ISO event \LSA_ISO_DISABLE_CREDENTIAL_GUARD.

The tool is designed for offensive security research, red-team engagements, and lab environments where you need to tear down Credential Guard without a reboot and verify with certainty whether the teardown actually succeeded.


Table of Contents


Overview

Windows Credential Guard isolates LSA secrets inside a Hyper-V-backed secure process (LsaIso.exe, aka LSA ISO). The underlying mechanism used by Windows itself to disable CredGuard during shutdown is a named event, \LSA_ISO_DISABLE_CREDENTIAL_GUARD, exposed in the lsaiso namespace.

This PoC:

  1. Enables SeDebugPrivilege on its own process token.
  2. Steals a SYSTEM token from winlogon.exe / services.exe / lsass.exe.
  3. Opens the CredGuard teardown event under SYSTEM impersonation.
  4. Signals it via NtSetEvent.
  5. Polls NtOpenEvent until the event disappears, proving the teardown completed.
  6. Reverts impersonation and exits with a status code that encodes the outcome.

No reboot. No WMI. No System.Management.dll. No registry writes. No process spawns. Only mscorlib + System.dll.


How It Works

Credential Guard is implemented as a component running inside LsaIso.exe, which itself runs under VBS (Virtualization-Based Security). When VBS shuts down (or when CredGuard is deliberately disabled), the normal Windows sequence is:


lsaiso creates \LSA_ISO_DISABLE_CREDENTIAL_GUARD
↓
caller opens + signals the event (NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM required)
↓
lsaiso sees the signal and unloads the CredGuard subsystem
↓
lsaiso deletes the event

Because lsaiso destroys the event only after the CredGuard subsystem has been unloaded, the existence of the event after signaling is a reliable, race-free indicator of whether the teardown completed.

The PoC leverages this behavior directly — it does not need WMI, registry, or process-marker heuristics.


Precise Teardown Confirmation

After signaling, the tool enters a polling loop (1 s interval, 10 s timeout). Each iteration calls NtOpenEvent on the same name and interprets the NTSTATUS:

NTSTATUS Meaning Action
STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND (0xC0000034) Event has been deleted by lsaiso → teardown confirmed Exit 0
STATUS_SUCCESS (0x00000000) Event still present → teardown in progress Sleep, retry
STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED (0xC0000022) Event exists, but no rights (event still alive) Sleep, retry
Other Treat as still present Sleep, retry

On timeout, the tool exits with 3.

This is the only reliable way to confirm CredGuard teardown in-process without WMI:

  • The registry keeps LsaCfgFlags=1/2 even after teardown (it reflects intent, not runtime).
  • LsaIso.exe keeps running after teardown (it hosts more than just CredGuard).
  • WMI Win32_DeviceGuard.SecurityServicesRunning does reflect runtime state, but requires System.Management.dll from the GAC — a fragile dependency under execute-assembly.

Exit Codes


Code 0  - CredGuard disabled (or already disabled, teardown confirmed)
Code 1  - SYSTEM impersonation failed (missing privileges)
Code 3  - Signal delivered, but event did not disappear within 10s (teardown incomplete)
Code 4  - Failed to open the event (likely ACCESS_DENIED)
Code 5  - NtSetEvent failed
Code 99 - Unexpected result


Requirements

Target:

  • Windows 10 / 11 / Server 2016+ with Virtualization-Based Security enabled and running
  • Credential Guard configured (otherwise there is nothing to tear down — exit 0 / AlreadyOff)
  • Caller process running as SYSTEM (or as Administrator with SeDebugPrivilege, plus at least one SYSTEM process reachable via OpenProcess)
  • x64 process (do not run from a 32-bit host)

Build host:

  • Mono (mcs) — tested on Kali Linux
  • or .NET Framework csc.exe 3.5 / 4.0
  • or Roslyn csc.exe from Visual Studio / Build Tools

Compilation

The source targets the C# 3.0 syntax level to maximize compiler compatibility (Mono mcs, .NET 3.5 csc, .NET 4.x csc, Roslyn). No C# 6/7/8 features are used.

Mono (Kali / Linux)

TERM=dumb mcs -target:exe -platform:x64 -optimize+ \
  -out:CredGuardKill.exe \
  -r:System.dll \
  CredGuardKill.cs

The TERM=dumb prefix works around a Mono bug on some distros where terminfo files exceed the 4 KB limit and crash System.Console initialization.

.NET Framework (Windows)

%WINDIR%\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe ^
  /target:exe /platform:x64 /optimize+ ^
  /out:CredGuardKill.exe ^
  /r:System.dll ^
  CredGuardKill.cs

Roslyn (Windows, from VS or Build Tools)

"C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\2022\Community\MSBuild\Current\Bin\Roslyn\csc.exe" ^
  /target:exe /platform:x64 /optimize+ ^
  /out:CredGuardKill.exe ^
  /r:System.dll ^
  CredGuardKill.cs

Verification

dumpbin /headers CredGuardPoc.exe | findstr machine

Expected output:

8664 machine (x64)

Assembly dependencies should be limited to mscorlib and System:

dumpbin /dependents CredGuardPoc.exe

Usage

Standalone (interactive)

CredGuardPoc.exe

Requires the current token to be NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM (or elevated admin with SeDebugPrivilege).

=== CredGuardKill.exe (teardown-only, with precise confirmation) ===

[Stage 0] Enable SeDebugPrivilege
  [+] SeDebugPrivilege enabled

[Stage 1] Impersonate SYSTEM
  [+] Thread impersonating SYSTEM via winlogon.exe (PID 708)

[Stage 2] Signal + confirm teardown (max 10s)
  [+] NtSetEvent OK (prev=0), polling for teardown...
  [~] 1s: event still present, waiting...
  [+] Confirmed: event gone after 2s -> CredGuard torn down

[Stage 3] Revert impersonation
  [+] Reverted

[Result] Disabled

Sliver execute-assembly

From a 64-bit beacon running as SYSTEM:

execute-assembly /path/CredGuardPoc.exe

If the beacon is not SYSTEM, use getsystem and migrate into a SYSTEM-owned process first:

getsystem
migrate <pid_of_system_process>
execute-assembly /path/CredGuardPoc.exe

Sliver captures stdout, and the exit code is visible via the beacon console.


Sliver execute-assembly Notes

· 64-bit only. The PE is /platform:x64. Loading it from a 32-bit implant yields BadImageFormatException before Main. · No GAC dependencies. The assembly references only mscorlib and System, both of which are always present in any Windows CLR host. · No System.Management. The WMI approach was deliberately dropped — see Why Not WMI. · No process spawns. No powershell.exe, no WmiPrvSE.exe, no child processes. · No file writes. Everything happens in-memory. · Reverts impersonation before exiting, so the beacon thread is not left as SYSTEM.


Why Not WMI

The original design used Win32_DeviceGuard from root\Microsoft\Windows\DeviceGuard to read SecurityServicesRunning. That approach is functionally correct but problematic under execute-assembly:

  1. GAC resolution is unreliable. execute-assembly loads the assembly into the existing AppDomain without a full Fusion/GAC resolver. System.Management.dll frequently fails to resolve, producing FileNotFoundException or TypeLoadException at the first call site.
  2. Cross-platform build hazards. mcs on Linux links against Mono's System.Management (partially stubbed), and the resulting PE references the Windows GAC token — a subtle mismatch.
  3. COM initialization. ManagementObjectSearcher calls CoInitializeEx, which can conflict with the host process's apartment state (RPC_E_CHANGED_MODE).
  4. OPSEC noise. Each WMI query spawns WmiPrvSE.exe and generates DCOM/RPC traffic — extra IOCs in an already sensitive context.

The NtOpenEvent polling loop replaces WMI with a more precise runtime signal at zero dependency cost.


Limitations

· VBS must be running. If Virtualization-Based Security is disabled at the firmware/OS level, the lsaiso namespace does not exist — the tool exits 0 / AlreadyOff. · CredGuard must be configured. If LsaCfgFlags was never set (or was set to 0), the event is not created — exit 0 / AlreadyOff. · SYSTEM required. SeDebugPrivilege alone is insufficient; the caller must successfully impersonate SYSTEM to acquire the required handle. · Bypass is not persistent. CredGuard is disabled in the current VBS session only. A reboot re-enables it. Persistence requires modifying the registry or GPO — out of scope for this tool. · No PPL bypass. This tool does not touch RunAsPPL protection on lsass.exe; that is a separate, unrelated mechanism.


Disclaimer

This tool is provided strictly for authorized security testing, red-team engagements, CTF environments, and personal lab research.

Using it against systems without explicit written permission is illegal and unethical. The author assumes no responsibility for misuse.


Made by @Vulndisclosure

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