Skip to content

Security: VladoPortos/skillgoblin

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

SkillGoblin is a self-hosted homelab learning platform maintained as an open-source side project. There is no commercial entity behind it, no security team, and no SLA. That said, security issues are taken seriously — please follow the guidance below.

Supported versions

Only the main branch (latest commit) is supported. There are no LTS releases, and patches are not back-ported. If you're running an older snapshot, the upgrade path is to pull the latest image and restart the container.

Reporting a vulnerability

For low-impact, non-exploitable issues (CVE-style dep advisories that Dependabot already flags, hardening recommendations, configuration suggestions): open a regular GitHub issue and tag it security. Public discussion is fine — these are usually obvious from the codebase anyway.

For exploitable issues (auth bypass, RCE, privilege escalation, data exfiltration, anything where a working PoC exists or is straightforward to construct): use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting. This routes the report directly to the maintainer without exposing it publicly until a fix lands. Please include:

  • A clear description of the issue
  • Steps to reproduce, or a minimal PoC
  • Affected versions / commits if known
  • Your suggested severity (CVSS or just gut feeling — both are fine)

Acknowledgement is best-effort within a few days. Fix turnaround depends on severity and complexity.

Threat model — what's in and out of scope

SkillGoblin is designed for trusted local networks (a homelab, a small classroom, a family server). The defaults assume the operator controls the network and reverse proxy. The auth model protects against:

  • Account takeover within the deployed instance (auth bypass, session forgery, credential leakage, role escalation)
  • Server-side data exposure to unauthenticated clients
  • Persistent XSS in user-controllable content
  • Path traversal and other input-validation bugs

Out of scope (or addressed by deployment, not the app):

  • TLS termination — runs as a plain HTTP service. Operators put it behind nginx / Caddy / Traefik for HTTPS.
  • DDoS / volumetric attacks — the app has basic rate limiting on auth, but bulk traffic is the reverse proxy's job.
  • Reports based on running the container with default test credentials (ADMIN_NAME / ADMIN_PASSWORD env-var bootstrap is documented as required first-run setup — leaving these as defaults is operator error, not a vulnerability).
  • Reports based on exposing the service to the public internet without a reverse proxy / authentication layer in front of it. The threat model assumes a trusted LAN.

Legacy credential-less accounts

Upgraded installations can contain active non-admin accounts created by older releases without a password or PIN. Their first visitor may set a credential and claim the account because no prior secret exists to verify ownership. This recovery flow is retained for trusted-LAN deployments and is hardened as follows:

  • Admin accounts are never claimable this way. A credential-less admin (possible after upgrading from a pre-auth-hardening release) is refused by the self-claim endpoint; only another administrator can set its credentials from the Admin Panel. This closes the unauthenticated admin-takeover path.
  • Claiming is atomic. A compare-and-swap ensures only one racing request can ever claim a given account; the loser gets a 409 and no session.

If the wrong person claims a non-admin account, an administrator can reset its password or PIN from the Admin Panel. Do not rely on this flow on an untrusted network.

Deployment hardening

The defaults suit a plain-HTTP trusted LAN. When exposing the service through a reverse proxy (or to a less-trusted network), set these so the app's defenses line up with your topology:

Env var Default When to set
TRUST_PROXY_HOPS 0 (ignore X-Forwarded-For) Set to the number of trusted reverse proxies in front of the app so login rate-limiting keys on the real client IP instead of a spoofable header. With 0, a client-supplied X-Forwarded-For is ignored and the transport peer is used — safe, but every request behind a proxy shares one IP bucket.
COOKIE_SECURE auto-detect Set to true when TLS is terminated by a proxy that does not forward trusted X-Forwarded-Proto=https. This also enables HSTS. false forces both off for intentional plain-HTTP LAN use.

Unsafe browser requests with an Origin header must be same-origin. CLI and other non-browser clients that omit browser origin metadata remain supported. Responses include baseline CSP, clickjacking, MIME-sniffing, referrer, permissions, and cross-origin resource headers on both HTTP and HTTPS; HSTS is emitted only when HTTPS is explicitly detected or configured.

The app also caps request bodies (256 KiB for JSON APIs) to blunt memory- exhaustion attempts. As defense in depth, configure a body-size limit at your reverse proxy too (e.g. nginx client_max_body_size).

Hall of fame

When fixes ship, the commit message will credit the reporter (with permission) by name or handle. There is no bug bounty program.

There aren't any published security advisories