One asset, one lien, proven on-chain and trusted to no one.
An asset can be financed once. That is the invariant, and the name is the invariant: across every lending protocol on a chain, a pledged asset has exactly one live claim on it.
Nothing enforces that today. Two protocols that have never heard of each other will each lend against the same collateral, because neither can see what the other recorded.
Singleton is a neutral registry on Creditcoin that witnesses pledge events from unmodified, competing EVM protocols and refuses the second claim. Generalised, it is a first-to-file priority registry for on-chain collateral, in the shape of UCC-9.
Two unrelated lenders. One RWA token. The second pledge reverts, live, with no shared database and no integration between them.
Built for BUIDL CTC 2026 Fall on the Attestcoin Protocol. RWA track.
An EVM contract cannot read event logs. Not another contract's, and not its own.
LOG0 through LOG4 are write-only, receipts live in a trie that execution
never touches, and BLOCKHASH reaches back only 256 blocks.
So a neutral witness of events emitted by unmodified competing protocols is
either an off-chain indexer, which is a trusted party and therefore not neutral,
or a contract that consumes an inclusion proof of somebody else's log. The
second only exists on Creditcoin, through the BlockProver precompile at
0x0FD2.
This is not a framing device. It is a property of the virtual machine, and it is the reason the product has no equivalent anywhere else.
The registry is live on CC3 testnet and has taken one asset through its whole
life against two unrelated lenders on Sepolia: pledged, a second pledge refused
live, the refusal kept on file, settled, released, and re-pledged by the lender
that lost the first race. Six more proofs read two real protocols on Ethereum
mainnet, which have never heard of it, including a lien that ended in a failed
auction rather than a repayment. Twelve proofs, every hash in
docs/VERIFICATION.md, replayable with
node worker/demo.mjs.
| The site, live | https://singleton.unitynodes.com · the register at /register |
| The demo, 1:25 | /demo, captioned, no wallet needed to follow it |
| The deck | singleton-deck.pdf, ten slides |
| The one pager | singleton-one-pager.pdf |
| Registry, CC3 testnet | 0x8170B29ee13Ee120952F44eb17F00e0B161dfde7, verified on Blockscout |
| Harbor Credit, Sepolia | 0xaaD02e7Bebc37Acb5dc67c42F70d61d8C86dF3e5 |
| Meridian Credit, Sepolia | 0xfA72380654232c5538d1F17e2D8d6c261bd263AD |
| Demo asset | RwaDeed 0xee79491615882b5421dACEb765564f4c4a09dd64 token 42 |
| Read from mainnet | NFTfi v3 0xB6adEc2ACc851d30d5fB64f3137234BCDCBBad0D and Blur Blend 0x29469395eAf6f95920E59F858042f0e28D98a20B, both unmodified |
61 tests cover it, including both suppression attacks that independent reviews
found on 2026-08-19 and the regressions that keep them closed. The registry and both
adapters are verified on Blockscout, so the refusal in the demo decodes to
AssetNotFree(bytes32 assetKey, address incumbent) rather than to a blob of
hex.
Three technical gates were cleared against the live chain before any of it was
built: a custom multi-field event decodes byte for byte, the attested tip is
readable on-chain inside the accepting transaction, and the whole Sepolia read
path verifies through eth_call alone.
A protocol on the source chain accepts collateral and emits its own event. Nobody modifies that protocol and nobody asks its permission.
An off-chain relay builds an inclusion proof of that transaction with
@gluwa/usc-sdk and submits it to the registry on Creditcoin. The relay is
trusted with nothing: it carries bytes, and the registry re-checks every claim in
them inside its own transaction.
- Verifies the proof through
BlockProver.verifyat0x0FD2. - Rejects anything inside the reorg window, using the attested height read from
ChainInfo.get_latest_attestation_height_and_hashat0x0FD3. - Requires
receiptStatus == 1, because inclusion is not success. - Finds the log, requires its emitter to be allowlisted for that chain, and reads it either natively or through that emitter's adapter.
- Derives
assetKey = keccak256(chainKey, tokenAddress, tokenId). - Burns a per-operation nullifier so the same proof cannot be replayed.
- Records the pledge if the asset is free and issues a soulbound certificate to
the emitter. If it is not free, the transaction reverts with
AssetNotFree.
The asset key deliberately excludes the emitter. If it did not, the same asset pledged in two different protocols would produce two different keys and never collide, which is the entire point.
Each transition is its own inclusion proof of its own real log, so the source chain carries the whole life of the lien rather than only its first moment.
| Proof | Entry point | Effect |
|---|---|---|
| Pledge | registerPledge |
FREE to PLEDGED, certificate issued |
| Refused second pledge | reportCollision |
recorded against the asset, incumbent untouched |
| Settlement | registerSettlement |
PLEDGED to SETTLED |
| Release | registerRelease |
back to FREE, certificate burned, re-pledging allowed |
Settlement and release are bound to the emitter on file and to the instance id of the lien currently recorded, so a proof of last year's lien cannot move this year's.
registerPledge reverts on a collision, because that is what an integrating
protocol needs and a revert discards its own logs. The evidence is kept by the
separate, non-reverting reportCollision, and collisionCount(assetKey) tells a
lender how many times somebody already tried.
Most real lenders will not emit Singleton's event shape, and asking them to is
the integration this product exists to avoid. An adapter, one pure contract per
protocol, maps their native log onto (token, tokenId, borrower, amount, instanceId). See src/adapters and caveat 9: the allowlist
decides which logs are read, an adapter decides what they mean, and those are
different powers.
This is not hypothetical. Two real protocols on Ethereum mainnet are read this way, and the two could hardly be less alike.
NFTfi v3 keeps the collateral inside a struct
in the log data and has no settlement step, so repayment maps to release and a
settlement proof is refused rather than approximated.
Blur's Blend indexes nothing at all, and its
Repay names no token id, so the adapter returns a zero token and the registry
resolves the lien through the instance id it recorded when the loan was opened,
under that emitter and no other. Blend also ends liens two ways, by repayment and
by seizure after a failed auction, so a transition may name several events and
both are proven.
Nothing was deployed on mainnet and nothing was asked of either protocol. Creditcoin attests Ethereum, so an existing loan can simply be read.
src/ registry and interfaces
emitters/ the two Sepolia lenders and the demo RWA deed
adapters/ reference adapter for a foreign event schema
vendor/ EvmV1Decoder, vendored from @gluwa/usc-contracts
worker/ off-chain relay: proofs, lifecycle, admin
web/ the site: landing page and the register, React and Vite
gates/ the probes that cleared the technical unknowns
src/ probe contracts, run inside a constructor via eth_call
run/ scripts that execute them against live CC3
test/ Foundry tests
script/ deployment
docs/ brief, verification log, caveats
Read docs/CAVEATS.md before reading anything else. The design has nine real limitations and none of them are hidden. The most important one: this is a positive record and a priority rule, not prevention. Attestcoin proves that something happened. It cannot prove that something did not.
MIT. See LICENSE.