Do not open a public issue.
Report it privately through GitHub private vulnerability reporting on this repository.
Include the affected package and version, what an attacker can do, and how to reproduce it.
A failing .holo, model or command is the most useful thing you can send.
| Version | Security fixes |
|---|---|
| Latest minor of each package | Yes |
| Anything older | No, upgrade to the latest minor |
From 1.0 on, the latest minor of the previous major also gets security fixes for twelve months after the next major ships. RELEASES.md has the full support windows.
Nothing is Stable yet, as STABILITY.md section 5 says. A security fix may change an Experimental surface in any release.
These are the timelines of the foundation's security policy, which covers this repository.
| Severity | Acknowledge | Triage | Patch released | Public disclosure |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 24 hours | 24 hours | 72 hours | After the patch is available |
| High | 24 hours | 48 hours | 7 days | After the patch is available |
| Medium | 48 hours | 5 days | 30 days | After the patch is available |
| Low | 5 days | 14 days | Next scheduled release | With the release notes |
- We confirm we received your report and agree a severity with you.
- We develop the fix in a private fork of the advisory.
- We release a patch and publish a GitHub Security Advisory naming the affected versions.
- We credit you in the advisory, unless you ask us not to.
Please keep the report private until the advisory is public.
PrismPM's security claims are specific, so these are in scope:
- A holo that passes verification while its proof, attestation or digest does not hold.
- A guest that reaches a capability its grant denies.
- A signature, attestation or transparency check that accepts what it should refuse.
- A build that does not bind the inputs its lock names.
- Anything in the release chain that lets someone publish as this project.
A standards claim beyond what standards.lock records is not a vulnerability, since the release makes no such claim. Please file those as ordinary issues.
To report accurately, or to check a fix, verify the artifact first.
Each GitHub Release from 0.4.0 on carries a SHA256SUMS file. The native archives carry a GitHub build provenance attestation.
sha256sum --check SHA256SUMSgh attestation verify prismpm-<version>-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz --repo UOR-Foundation/PrismPMFrom 0.4.0 on, images are signed keylessly with cosign by release.yml. Verify by digest and never by tag: the digests are in the signed release assets, and tags are only discovery names.
cosign verify --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com --certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github.com/UOR-Foundation/PrismPM/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/v<version>$' ghcr.io/uor-foundation/prismpm-sdk@sha256:<digest>prism-code is published through npm trusted publishing with SLSA provenance. No npm token exists for it.
npm audit signaturesprismpm is not on crates.io yet. When it is, release.yml uploads it, and docs/release/crates-io-publication.md says how.
Signing is keyless. No long-lived signing key exists to leak or rotate: each signature comes from a short-lived certificate bound to the GitHub Actions workflow that made it. A vulnerability in that chain, such as a workflow that can sign something it should not, is in scope.