Flowntier security posture. Status: v0.4 (Phase 2 additions marked with
[P2]).
Last updated: 2026-06-25 Maintainer: Thatgfsj
- Local secrets are encrypted at rest with the OS keystore (DPAPI on Windows, Keychain on macOS, libsecret on Linux) — Phase 3.
- The webview is sandboxed via Tauri's capability system and a strict Content-Security-Policy — Phase 2.
- Auto-update artifacts are signed with an ed25519 keypair; the public key is compiled into the shell binary — Phase 1.
- No telemetry, no phone-home. The only outbound network traffic is the user's own LLM API calls.
- Panics and React errors are written to a persistent log file so users can attach a stack trace to a bug report — Phase 2.
Do not file a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
Email security@flowntier.dev (the address is reserved but
not yet provisioned; until it's set up, open a GitHub issue
labelled security instead). Include steps to reproduce,
version affected, and your assessment of severity. Expect an
acknowledgement within 72 hours.
[P2] Content Security Policy restricts what the React app can load and connect to:
default-src 'self';
script-src 'self';
style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; /* Vite injects inline styles */
font-src 'self' data:;
img-src 'self' data: blob:;
connect-src 'self' ipc: https://ipc.localhost
https://api.openai.com
https://api.anthropic.com
https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com
https://api.deepseek.com
https://api.moonshot.cn
https://open.bigmodel.cn
https://api.siliconflow.cn;
frame-src 'none';
object-src 'none';
base-uri 'self';
form-action 'none'
In dev mode (pnpm tauri:dev) the CSP is relaxed to allow
HMR over ws://localhost:1421 and Vite's unsafe-eval. The dev
CSP is set via app.security.devCsp so production builds never
see it.
Tauri's built-in CSP augmentation is left enabled
(dangerousDisableAssetCspModification: false). At build time
Tauri parses every emitted JS/CSS asset and injects per-asset
nonces into the CSP, so script-src 'self' becomes
script-src 'self' 'nonce-XXXX' for each page load. Disabling
this would be more permissive; we don't.
Tauri capabilities (apps/desktop/src-tauri/capabilities/default.json)
are the second layer: even if a CSP bug let an attacker run
arbitrary JS in the webview, the attacker can only call the
Tauri commands we explicitly allow (shell:allow-open,
updater:default, plus a small set of core:* defaults).
There is no core:fs:*, no core:path:*, no dialog:*
in the webview capabilities.
[P2] Persistent logging writes to a daily-rolling file
under <data_dir>/logs/flowntier.log.YYYY-MM-DD. The same
file receives:
- Every
tracing::*!call from the Rust shell (includingtauri-plugin-updaterplugin events). - Every React error forwarded via the
log_frontend_errorTauri command. - Panics — captured by a
std::panic::set_hookthat writes both to the daily log file AND to a one-shotpanic-YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS.logwith a force-capture backtrace.
The user can:
- Click "📋 复制日志" on the React error screen (ErrorBoundary) to copy the last 50 lines of console output + the React error + component stack to the clipboard.
- Attach the log file in a GitHub issue.
[P2] ErrorBoundary catches every uncaught exception in the React tree and renders a dedicated crash screen with "复制日志 / 重启应用 / 上报问题" buttons. Without this, a single thrown error would blank the entire WebView2 process — the failure mode that hurt Phase 0 testing.
[P2] Graceful startup error dialog. If AppState::build() fails (data dir unwritable, SQLite migration error, etc.), the Tauri shell shows a native error dialog (Win32 MessageBox / NSAlert / GTK) containing the error message and the log file path. The user is no longer faced with a silent splash-then- disappear on launch failure.
- Windows code signing — SmartScreen will warn "Unknown publisher"; users click "More info → Run anyway". Deferred to v0.5.
- macOS notarization — Gatekeeper blocks the
.dmgon first launch. Users right-click → Open. - Sandbox escapes — the Tauri shell spawns the Rust
sidecar (
flowntier-runtime) with the user's ambient permissions. Malicious input that escapes the agent loop can run arbitrary commands. The threat is mitigated by the agent loop's tool capabilities (ToolContext::read_only(),no_modify(),network_off()) but is not eliminated. - Replay / MITM on the named pipe
\\.\pipe\flowntier_runtime. On a single-user Windows machine the pipe ACL is enforced by the OS; on multi-user systems a local user could in theory attach to the pipe. Out of scope for v0.4 because the desktop app assumes single-user; multi-user hardening is v0.5+.
| Use | Algorithm | Key location |
|---|---|---|
| Secret encryption | AES-GCM-256 | OS keystore (DPAPI/Keychain/libsecret) — Phase 3 |
| Auto-update signing | ed25519 | TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY GitHub secret — Phase 1 |
| TLS to LLM providers | TLS 1.2+ | System trust store |
| Local log integrity | (none) | Logs are plaintext JSON; trust relies on file ACL |
- The webview is single-process — a renderer crash kills the whole app. Mitigated by the ErrorBoundary reload button.
- Logs are plaintext JSON. If a user attaches
flowntier.logto a public GitHub issue, request/response bodies are redacted via thelogging.redactpatterns (*KEY*,*TOKEN*,*SECRET*,*PASSWORD*,*AUTH*), but API URLs and request IDs are not. - The
error.action.copyLogsbutton usesnavigator.clipboard.writeText()which requires a secure context. In Electron-style webviews this is satisfied; in regular browser preview of the React app it's not and the fallbackwindow.promptis used. - The panic hook's backtrace uses
Backtrace::force_capture()which requires RUST_BACKTRACE=full OR a debug build. In release without that env var, the backtrace will say "". Documented; user can setFLOWNTIER_LOG=debugto see more.
When adding a new outbound network call:
- Add the destination host to the CSP
connect-srclist. - If the call needs cookies / auth headers, document the storage location (must be one of: env var, OS keystore, runtime config — never plain disk).
- Get Thatgfsj's approval before merging.
When adding a new Tauri command:
- Implement the handler in
crates/pipe-server/src/handlers.rs(preferred) orapps/desktop/src-tauri/src/lib.rs(only when the command must run before AppState is ready). - Register the command in
invoke_handler!. - Add the JS wrapper under
apps/desktop/src/lib/or inline in the consumer if it's only used once. - Document any new IPC surface in
history/docs/AGENT_PROTOCOL.md(when that doc moves back from history/).
When adding a new dependency:
- Check that the dep's license is MIT / Apache-2.0 / BSD-3.
- Run
cargo deny checkandpnpm auditlocally. - CI runs both on every PR (see
.github/workflows/ci.yml).
- Added [P2]: Persistent logging (daily rolling file + panic hook).
- Added [P2]: React ErrorBoundary with copy / restart / report actions.
- Added [P2]: Graceful startup error dialog (native MessageBox with log path).
- Added [P2]: Content Security Policy (strict in production, relaxed in dev for HMR).
- Added [P1]: Auto-update signature verification (ed25519).
- Added [P1]: Signing key rotation procedure
(see
docs/INSTALLER.md §6). - Removed [P0]: All Python runtime + Claude Code adapter
(deleted in commit 9527436; see
history/docs/V03_DELETIONS.md). - Removed [P0]:
ACO_*env var prefix; renamed toFLOWNTIER_*. - Changed [P0]: Brand
Agent Company OS→Flowntierthroughout the codebase;tools/replace_in_files.pydocuments the safe text-replace procedure. - Removed [P1]: Python sidecar build (PyInstaller) from release CI; v0.4 ships a single Rust binary tree.