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2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions .github/workflows/pr-validation.yml
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ on:

permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write
attestations: write
Comment on lines +27 to +28

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P1 Badge Keep attestation authority out of PR validation

For same-repository pull requests, this grants the checked-out PR code both an OIDC token and permission to publish repository attestations; the quality workflow subsequently executes branch-controlled npm scripts and shell commands, so a compromised internal branch can mint arbitrary attestations even though the built-in attestation step is skipped for pull_request. This also contradicts the documented boundary that PR checks are read-only and attestations come only from trusted pushes. Split the attestation work into a trusted-event job/workflow rather than delegating these write permissions to the PR caller.

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concurrency:
group: pr-validation-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.ref }}
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1 change: 1 addition & 0 deletions README.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ of production capacity or external service interoperability.
- [x] fast amd64-first CI with an explicit multiarch amd64+arm64 final gate;
- [x] tenant-bound DAV ETags and sync tokens;
- [x] OCI build-provenance attestations generated and verified;
- [x] pull-request validation delegates the identity-token and attestation permissions required by the provenance gate;
- [x] log rotation;
- [x] alerts;
- [x] Postfix queue visibility;
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