🛡️ Sentinel: Harden timing-safe equality checks#65
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This change prevents length-based side-channel attacks by hashing both inputs with SHA-256 before performing constant-time comparisons. This ensures that the comparison logic always operates on inputs of identical length, regardless of the original secret's length. - Updated `safeEqual` in `auth.js` to hash inputs with `node:crypto`. - Updated `safeEqualText` in `proxy.js` to be async and hash inputs using `crypto.subtle`. - Optimized `proxy.js` to avoid redundant hashing of the dashboard secret. - Added functional security tests in `frontend/tests/security-hardening.test.js`. - Updated Sentinel's journal with critical security learnings. Co-authored-by: SuvenSeo <263689617+SuvenSeo@users.noreply.github.com>
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🛡️ Sentinel Security Enhancement
Severity: HIGH (Defense-in-depth)
💡 Vulnerability:
Constant-time comparison functions like
timingSafeEqualwere used directly on sensitive secrets. While "timing-safe", these functions require inputs to be of equal length. If an attacker provides an input of a different length, the function either returns early or throws an error, potentially revealing the secret's length through timing or response differences.🎯 Impact:
An attacker could brute-force the length of sensitive secrets (like
DASHBOARD_PASSWORDorCRON_SECRET) by observing response times or error states, significantly reducing the search space for a full brute-force attack.🔧 Fix:
Implemented the "Hash-then-Compare" pattern. Both the secret and the user-provided input are now hashed with SHA-256 before constant-time comparison. This ensures the comparison always operates on fixed-length buffers.
safeEqualinfrontend/src/lib/middleware/auth.js.safeEqualTextinfrontend/src/proxy.js(Edge-compatible).✅ Verification:
npm testin thefrontenddirectory (36/36 tests passed).frontend/tests/security-hardening.test.jspass successfully.PR created automatically by Jules for task 8811627831529881274 started by @SuvenSeo