wBOB Contracts

The lock that can only be opened by three voices in agreement, none of which are "Bob"'s.

Foundry source for the wBOB Bridge on Gnosis Chain — the contracts that mint Wrapped Dobbscoin (wBOB) when native (BOB) is locked on the Dobbscoin L1, and burn it when (BOB) is released back.

These contracts are deployed and live. The bridge they back ships at bridge.subgenius.finance. The service code that drives them lives in dobbscoin/wbob-bridge.

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What's in the box

src/
  WBob.sol                 ERC-20 — wrapped (BOB), 8 decimals, role-gated mint/burn
  BridgeController.sol     3-of-5 EIP-712 mint authorization + burn-to-release accounting
  BridgeExecutorModule.sol Safe module that lets the automated executor call only
                            executeMint / pause / unpause — never admin

test/
  ...                      Unit tests + 1000-run fuzz + invariant suite at depth 100

script/
  Deploy.s.sol             End-to-end deployment script

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The 3-of-5 invariant

The load-bearing piece. Five EOAs are registered as authorized signers on BridgeController. To mint wBOB, an off-chain caller must present a MintAuthorization (EIP-712 typed data — depositId, recipient, amount, sourceChainId, deadline) along with at least 3 valid signatures from distinct signers. The contract:

1. Verifies signatures and dedupes signers in _countValidSignatures.
2. Bails early once it hits the threshold (gas savings on the happy path).
3. Marks processedDeposits[depositId] = true — forever, no clearing.
4. Mints the corresponding wBOB.

There is no admin escape hatch on executeMint. There is no oracle that can pause it mid-call. The mintNonce admin lever exists only to invalidate outstanding authorizations in an emergency (force every watcher to re-sign with the new nonce); it cannot fabricate or fast-forward a mint.

In Conspiracy terms: this is a vault that opens only when three of five strangers — none of them "Bob" — agree it should. Even the Safe that holds admin can't reach in and grab.

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Trust model — Tier B

Privilege	Who holds it
DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (pause, role mgmt, signer rotation, mintNonce bump)	Gnosis Safe (multi-owner, threshold-governed)
BRIDGE_EXECUTOR_ROLE on wBOB (callable mint/burn target)	BridgeController only
executeMint, pause, unpause automation	BridgeExecutorModule (Safe module — constrained surface)
Authorization signers (3-of-5)	Five independent watcher EOAs, no admin power

No hot wallet ever holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE. This is the single most important invariant in the whole repo.

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Key design decisions

• 8 decimals on wBOB to match Dobbscoin satoshi precision (so 1 BOB = 100,000,000 raw on both chains, no awkward rescaling).
• EIP-712 typed mints, not raw signature concatenation, so wallets can display human-readable mint authorizations and signers don't blind-sign opaque hashes.
• Signer dedup in _countValidSignatures — a single key can't count multiple times. The 3-of-5 threshold is on distinct keys.
• Early exit at THRESHOLD in the signature loop — no work done past 3 valid signatures, even if the caller submits all 5.
• processedDeposits[depositId] is one-way. Set on first mint, never cleared. Replay protection survives signer key rotation, admin changes, even a Safe takeover.
• withdrawalNonces[address] monotonically increases per user so burn requests can't be replayed against a single account.
• mintNonce (admin-incrementable) is the emergency-stop on outstanding authorizations: bumping it invalidates every signature in flight.

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Deployed addresses (Gnosis Chain, chainId 100)

Contract	Address	Status
wBOB ERC-20	0x13550ae65f22A36f60A50d625B70b58666488263	Source-verified on Gnosisscan
BridgeController	0x20a9A6D5FB3615a79603a6Ed74A3d26FB11aB872	Source-verified
BridgeExecutorModule	0xd5ebf9EC7971B18A6b1e7f05Ee0BF96BE72e3410	Source-verified

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Build, test, deploy

Solidity 0.8.27, Foundry 1.6.0-nightly, OpenZeppelin v5.3.0.

forge install
forge build

# Unit + fuzz (1000 runs each)
forge test --no-match-path 'test/invariants/*' -v

# Invariant suite (500 runs × depth 100)
forge test --match-path 'test/invariants/*' -v

# All
forge test -v

Deploy

cp .env.example .env
# fill in DEPLOYER_PRIVATE_KEY, SAFE_ADDRESS, WATCHER_1..5, RPC_URL, etc.
forge script script/Deploy.s.sol \
  --rpc-url $RPC_URL --broadcast --chain-id 100

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Foundry nightly STATICCALL quirk (developer note)

In the nightly Foundry used here, vm.prank and vm.expectRevert are consumed by STATICCALL (i.e. view-function calls), not just state-changing calls. If you read a role constant or build a signature inside an expectRevert-bracketed line, the prank/expectation is spent on the read, not the call you cared about.

// WRONG — prank consumed by BRIDGE_EXECUTOR_ROLE() STATICCALL
vm.prank(admin);
wBOB.grantRole(wBOB.BRIDGE_EXECUTOR_ROLE(), executor);

// CORRECT
bytes32 role = wBOB.BRIDGE_EXECUTOR_ROLE();
vm.prank(admin);
wBOB.grantRole(role, executor);

// WRONG — expectRevert consumed by _buildSigs() which calls
// getMintAuthorizationDigest() (a view)
vm.expectRevert(...);
bridge.executeMint(auth, _buildSigs(auth, indices));

// CORRECT
bytes[] memory sigs = _buildSigs(auth, indices);
vm.expectRevert(...);
bridge.executeMint(auth, sigs);

If a test fails with a confusing "expected revert but call succeeded" or "next call's caller is wrong", check this first.

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Audit status

Unaudited as of this writing. Test coverage is broad (unit + 1000-run fuzz + invariant runs at depth 100), but no third-party security audit has been completed. A formal audit is on the roadmap.

NOT FINANCIAL ADVISORS. NOT FINANCIAL ADVICE. Read the code. Verify the deployments on Gnosisscan. Trust 3-of-5 watchers only as much as you trust three strangers to disagree with each other when it matters.

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Related repos

• dobbscoin/wbob-bridge — the bridge service stack (backend, watcher, portal, ops)
• SubGeniusFinance/dobbscoin-source — the Dobbscoin L1 daemon (Bitcoin Core 0.10 fork, scrypt PoW, since Jan 2014)

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Eternal salvation, or triple your money back.

— Praise "Bob".