| title | Security policy | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| audience |
|
||||
| primary | humans | ||||
| stability | stable | ||||
| last_audited | 2026-05 | ||||
| related |
|
Drederick is a scope-enforced, full-auto offensive security harness used on authorized engagements. A vulnerability in the tool itself — especially one that weakens the authorization boundary (scope) or the audit trail — is treated as high severity.
Do not open a public issue or PR for security bugs.
Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting:
If you cannot use that channel, open a minimal public issue asking a maintainer to contact you privately — do not include details, PoC, or affected versions in the public issue.
In priority order:
- Scope-enforcement bugs — any path that lets a network call
(recon, exploit, credential, payload, or pivot) reach a target not
in the scope file. Path-traversal in scope parsing, scope bypass,
wildcard leakage (
0.0.0.0/0/::/0), prefix-cap bypass, missing_scope.Requirecall on a network-touching method, orExploitRunner.AssertTargetsInScopenot being called before a multi-host subprocess spawn. - Scope kill switches — any flag, env var, debug build, CLI prompt, or LLM instruction that disables the scope check, even partially. No kill switch must exist.
- Audit-log tampering — any code path that silences, rewrites,
deletes, or truncates entries in
audit.jsonl(one-way append is the only supported shape), or that logs plaintext credentials where only a SHA-256 digest is approved. - Subprocess argv injection — shell-metachar / path-traversal /
URL-host-spoofing that lets argv reach an out-of-scope target
without triggering
_scope.Require. - Scope-file write from code — any code path that modifies the user-authored scope file.
- Loot exfiltration — any outbound sink that sends captured credentials, hashes, tickets, or secrets to a third-party endpoint. Drederick is local-only by design.
- Cache poisoning — PoC source bytes, CVE data, or NSE scripts bypassing the SHA-256 integrity check (matters more now that cached PoCs are executed, not just presented).
- Credential-file disclosure in cleartext — captured secrets
written to
out/,memory/, or anywhere else in plaintext instead of as SHA-256 digests. - Doctor re-exec as root —
drederick doctorescalating outside the explicit consent flow, or touching anything other than the operator workstation.
Vulnerabilities in target systems discovered while running drederick are expected — the tool exists to find and exploit them. Report those to the target owner per your engagement rules; they are not drederick bugs.
Bugs in third-party exploits, Metasploit modules, nuclei templates, or cached PoCs are out of scope for drederick's tracker. Report them upstream.
Best-effort acknowledgement within 7 days. We will keep the advisory thread updated with a rough fix timeline once reproduced.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
main |
Yes |
| Most recent tagged release | Yes |
| Older tags | No |
Unless you request anonymity, we will credit you in the release notes for the fixing tag and in the advisory.
To help us reproduce quickly, include:
- The invariant id you believe is being bypassed
(
@invariant-id:*— see AGENTS.md and docs/SCOPE_AND_LEGAL.md). - Minimal scope file + CLI command that triggers the issue (redact targets if the engagement is under NDA).
- Expected vs. observed behavior.
- Affected commit SHA or tag.
- OS, kernel, and
dotnet --version.