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Security: Rahulk644/docmost-mcp

Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy and deployment boundary

The MCP gateway Bearer token and the Docmost credential are different secrets. Use independent high-entropy values and rotate them independently.

Supported boundary

The default configuration is for a single machine: loopback HTTP, exact Host and Origin allowlists, and a local Codex client. If traffic leaves the machine, put the server behind an HTTPS reverse proxy or private authenticated overlay network. The Rust process intentionally does not terminate TLS.

Use a dedicated Docmost account with the smallest space permissions needed. Keep writes disabled unless an operator needs them. MCP clients must show the exact mutation to the user before sending confirm: true.

Secret handling

  • Never commit .env; it is ignored by Git.
  • Prefer a secret manager or container orchestrator secret injection.
  • Prefer DOCMOST_API_TOKEN when your Docmost edition supports it.
  • Email/password authentication does not persist the password when supplied via environment variables.
  • OS-keychain persistence is preferred for interactive stdio mode. File fallback requires DOCMOST_ALLOW_FILE_CREDENTIALS=true.

The audit log records timestamp, operation, target identifier, and status only. It deliberately excludes page content, comment content, passwords, and tokens.

Reporting

This is a local fork rather than an upstream-supported release. Treat findings in the upstream logic separately from findings in the HTTP/plugin hardening layer.

There aren't any published security advisories