🛡️ dsh-permission-rules

Claude Code-style declarative permission rules for DeepSeek Harness.

Rules decide what is known. A reviewer model decides what is not.

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Compatibility

Surface	Status
Harness	DeepSeek Harness 0.1.0-rc.5–0.1.0-rc.6
Node	`^22.19.0
Platforms	All (host + web settings client)
Model	Any (deny/ask reasons surface through tool results)

What you get

dsh-permission-rules puts an ordered allow / deny / ask rule list in front of every tool call on the tools/pre-execute waterfall — deterministic, instant, auditable, and written by you in plain YAML:

• deny blocks the call; the rule's reason becomes the model-visible error.
• ask rides the official approval seam (mount dsh-auto-review for a second-model answerer, or a human answers; with neither, the harness fails closed).
• allow (and no-match) strictly delegates via next() — downstream listeners are never short-circuited.

Every hit and every passthrough is audit-logged as a permissionRules/decision session event (log-only — nothing extra is injected into the model context).

• Rich matching — tool-name globs (including mcp__*), agent-identity selectors (main / subagent / preset:*), argument key/value globs or regexes (with !pattern negation and an absent key dimension), workspace-relative path globs at any nesting depth, and when host conditions (env vars, platform).
• Hierarchical rule files — optional searchUp merges every .dsh/rules.yaml from the session cwd to the filesystem root, nearest first.
• Dry-run rollout — enforce: false audits what the policy would do while passing every call through.
• Hot reload — Chokidar watch with debounce; a broken edit keeps the previous rules, never crashes.
• Fail loud — invalid YAML, unknown actions/fields, bad globs/regexes, backtracking-prone patterns, or more than maxRules rules fail the load.

Rule syntax

# <project>/.dsh/rules.yaml
rules:
  - match: { tools: [bash, pwsh], params: { command: "git push*" }, paths: ["**/secrets/**"] }
    action: deny
    reason: "No pushes from protected paths"

  - match: { tools: [edit, write] }
    action: ask
    reason: "File writes need confirmation"

• Match dimensions — tools (globs, incl. mcp__*), agents (main / subagent / preset:<name>; unknown identity never matches — fail closed), params (key/value globs or regexes, !pattern negation, absent key dimension), paths (workspace-relative globs extracted at any nesting depth), when (env var globs/regexes + a closed platform list), and network (domains / ips / ports / schemes — globs, wildcards, CIDRs, port ranges).
• Actions — allow / deny / ask, evaluated in file order, first match wins.
• Rule metadata — enabled: false (visible but inert), description, tags; unknown fields fail the load.
• Schema — a JSON Schema ships at docs/rules-format.schema.json (editor completion via # yaml-language-server: $schema=...); the full vocabulary and a 5-rule security baseline live in docs/rules-format.en.md.

Network policy

A Codex-style process-level network policy: shell subprocess traffic flows through a built-in local HTTP/CONNECT proxy, and every connection is decided by ordered network rules or by three modes mapped onto the official sandbox presets:

• deny-all — the read-only sandbox preset: block all outbound.

• whitelist — the workspace-write preset: allow listed targets, unlisted: ask (or deny) for the rest.

• allow-all — the danger-full-access preset: allow everything.

• auto (default) — follows the sandbox preset; on hosts without the sandbox-policy service it resolves to autoFallback (allow-all).

• Matching — match.network with domains / ips / ports / schemes (globs, wildcards, CIDRs, port ranges; numeric YAML ports are accepted). URL-candidate extraction on the tools/pre-execute hot path fires on web-tool arguments and URLs embedded in bash/pwsh command text; loopback targets can short-circuit rules per loopback policy.

• Audit — denied connections append permissionRules/network to the owning session (same adaptive ignorable gate), with block counters and recent interceptions in /rules network and the settings page.

Quick start

# 1. install the bundle into your profile
dsh plugin --profile web add "github:PerryLink/dsh-permission-rules#main"

# or from npm (published releases)
dsh plugin --profile web add dsh-permission-rules

# 2. restart and verify the row
dsh --profile web --dump-config | grep -A4 'id: permission-rules'

Install & uninstall

• git channel (latest main): dsh plugin --profile web add "github:PerryLink/dsh-permission-rules#main" — the prepare script builds with production dependencies only.
• npm channel (published releases): dsh plugin --profile web add dsh-permission-rules.
• tarball channel: pnpm pack in this repo, then dsh plugin --profile web add ./dsh-permission-rules-<version>.tgz.
• uninstall: dsh plugin --profile web remove dsh-permission-rules.

Configuration

All tunables are Schemastery Config fields (changeable from cordis.yml). An id-targeted override replaces the whole row — restate every key you need.

Key	Default	Meaning
rulesFile	.dsh/rules.yaml	Rule file location; relative = resolved against the calling session's cwd, absolute = global and validated at mount
fallbackPath	(none)	Rule file used when per-cwd discovery finds nothing; validated at mount
badFilePolicy	fail	Bad rule file: fail errors the pending tool call loudly; ignore-with-warning warns and continues empty
maxRules	256	Hard cap on rule count across the effective source chain
maxCachedWorkspaces	512	Hard cap on cached per-workspace rule loads (LRU eviction)
patternMode	glob	params/paths/when.env pattern flavor: glob or regex (tool names are always globs)
watch	true	Chokidar watch + reload on change
watchStabilityThresholdMs	200	Reload debounce window (ms)
language	en	/rules output language: en, zh, es, pt, hi
caseInsensitivePaths	(win32)	paths patterns and workspace-root comparison ignore ASCII case; true on Windows
audit	all	Audit granularity: all logs every hit AND passthrough; hits skips passthrough events
searchUp	false	Walk parent directories from the session cwd and merge every found rule file, nearest first
maxGlobStars	2	Hard cap on unbounded */** quantifiers per glob pattern
enforce	true	false = dry-run mode: deny/ask hits are audit-logged with a dryRun marker and every call passes through
allowUnmarkedAudit	false	Pre-marker hosts drop the ignorable marker; the plugin disables session-log audit with a warning. Set true to opt back in
network.enabled	true	Master switch for the proxy, env injection, and web-tool mode defaults
network.mode	auto	Policy mode: auto follows the sandbox preset, or deny-all / whitelist / allow-all
network.autoFallback	allow-all	Mode used when auto has no sandbox-policy service
network.unlisted	ask	Whitelist-mode handling of targets no rule matched: ask or deny
network.proxyBind	127.0.0.1	Local proxy bind address (loopback only)
network.proxyPort	0	Local proxy port; 0 picks a free ephemeral port
network.proxyMaxRecent	100	Cap on recent-block records kept for the settings page
network.loopback	allow	Loopback targets: allow (Codex parity) or policy
network.injectEnv	true	Whether proxy environment variables are injected for subprocesses
network.noProxy	clear	Subprocess NO_PROXY handling: clear enforces the policy or preserve

Tools & surfaces

Surface	Kind	Notes
tools/pre-execute	listener	First-match allow/deny/ask rules + network URL-candidate extraction
/rules	command	list · reload · decisions [n] · test <tool> <json>
permissionRules/decision	event	Log-only audit for every hit and passthrough
permissionRules/network	event	Proxy-layer audit for blocked connections
HTTP/CONNECT proxy	service	Built-in local proxy governing shell subprocess traffic
settings page	client	Network-mode editor, rule editor, block counters, recent interceptions

/rules                        list the active rules, their source files, and any last-reload error
/rules list                   explicit alias for the bare listing
/rules reload                 re-read the rule-file chain for this workspace
/rules decisions [n]          show the last n permission decisions of this session (default 10)
/rules test <tool> <json>     dry-evaluate the rules against a hypothetical call

/rules test also accepts leading flags: --cwd <dir>, --env KEY=VALUE (repeatable), --agent <selector> (repeatable), and --platform <name>. In multi-file chains (e.g. searchUp), every listed rule line is attributed to its own source file.

Permissions & data

• Permissions: declares files:read, files:watch, files:write, session:append, and network:outbound in its workshop manifest. ask decisions ride the official approval seam — nothing is re-implemented or bypassed.
• Data: rule files are read from disk; no rule data is written. No model calls, no reviewer subagents.
• Session log: permissionRules/decision is never injected into the model context and is appended with the envelope's ignorable: true marker so any harness build loads the log.

Security boundaries

• Policy, not a kernel. paths candidates come only from a documented set of argument keys (at any nesting depth, depth-capped), and only workspace-relative paths match.
• No reviewer here. The plugin never spawns subagents or calls models — producing an ask decision is the end of its work.
• No sandbox changes. OS-level sandbox policy belongs to the sandbox seam, not this plugin.
• Loud misconfiguration. Unknown YAML fields, unknown actions, and bad patterns are rejected at load.
• Backtracking bounds. Glob patterns are capped at maxGlobStars unbounded star expansions; regex-mode patterns reject nested unbounded quantifiers and quantified overlapping literal alternations.

Known limitations

• Audit marker on pre-marker hosts. permissionRules/decision is appended with ignorable: true; hosts whose Session.append predates the marker (the 0.1.0-rc.6 line) silently drop it, so the runtime disables session-log audit with a one-time warning. Set allowUnmarkedAudit: true to opt back in; repair already-written logs with scripts/repair-session-logs.mjs.
• Path candidates are heuristic. Only the documented argument keys feed path matching, and workspace-relative matching is ASCII-case-insensitive only when caseInsensitivePaths is on.
• Globs are a conservative subset. No brace expansion — write two patterns, or use regex mode.
• The regex backtracking guard is structural, not exhaustive. Prefer glob mode for untrusted files.

Collaborating with dsh-auto-review

• dsh-permission-rules produces ask; dsh-auto-review answers on the approval/request waterfall with a read-only second-model verdict (or delegates to humans). Mount both for the full closed loop.
• Integration-tested: permissionRules/decision → approval/asked → autoReview/verdict → approval/decided, with the reviewer replaced by a scripted mock.
• The never approval policy and every fail-closed guarantee of the official harness stay untouched.

Session log repair

Session logs written before the ignorable marker existed can be refused by newer harness builds (SessionFormatUnsupportedError). The shipped scripts/repair-session-logs.mjs rewrites only the targeted audit rows to carry ignorable: true, frame-preserving, with backups:

node scripts/repair-session-logs.mjs scan [--home DIR]      # report foreign rows, change nothing
node scripts/repair-session-logs.mjs repair [--home DIR] [--dry-run]

--home defaults to $DSH_HOME/sessions (or ~/.dsh/sessions).

Development

pnpm install            # node ^22.19 || >=24
pnpm run typecheck      # tsc, src + tests
pnpm run lint           # eslint, src + tests + scripts
pnpm test               # vitest: 139 tests, 9 suites
pnpm run test:coverage  # coverage gate (90/80/90/90)
pnpm run build          # tsc declarations + tsdown bundles (lib/)
pnpm run pack:check     # build + pack (the published artifact)
node scripts/check-readme-sync.mjs   # five-language README sync gate (also in CI)

See VERIFICATION.md for the headless end-to-end verification record.

Topics

dsh, dsh-plugin, deepseek-harness, permission, policy, allow-deny-ask, approval, safety, network, network-policy, proxy

Contributors

• @PerryLink — creator and maintainer: rule vocabulary and evaluation, runtime, HMR watch, session-log audit, network policy + proxy, and the five-language docs.
• @22xuan — the detailed report on rc.6 hosts silently dropping the audit event's ignorable marker (#2) and the upstream harness discussion; the v0.4.1 runtime host-capability detection and the documentation correction drew directly from that analysis.

PerryLink DSH Plugin Family

This project is one of the 15 DeepSeek Harness plugins maintained by PerryLink. If this one helps you, the others likely will too:

Plugin	One-liner
dsh-mcp-panel	Read-only MCP runtime panel: /mcp command + Settings tab with status, tools and errors
dsh-doublecheck	Engineering-discipline guard: requirements grill, test gates, adversary review
dsh-background-agents	Durable background child agents with a Web UI sidebar, messaging and interrupt
dsh-lsp-actions	LSP diagnostics, formatting, completion, code actions and rename over language servers
dsh-output-styles	Claude Code outputStyles-equivalent runtime style switching
dsh-checkpoint-rewind	Claude Code /rewind-equivalent: snapshots, session forks, one-shot restore
dsh-permission-rules	Claude Code-style declarative allow/deny/ask permission rules with audit
dsh-auto-review	Second-model auto-review on the approval chain, fail-closed by default
dsh-memento	Approval-gated cross-session memory: ctx.memory seam + SQLite + memory tool
dsh-skill-pack-security	Security-audit skill pack: secret scan, dependency and supply-chain review
dsh-session-pin	Pin sessions in the Web sidebar with durable ordering
dsh-composer-history	Terminal-style input history for the web composer: arrows, Ctrl+R search
dsh-github	GitHub PR/issues integration for DSH, every write gated by approval
dsh-plugin-guide	Plugin-development knowledge base as an on-demand agent skill
dsh-claude-move	Migrate Claude Code sessions, memory, skills and CLAUDE.md into DSH

License

Apache License 2.0 © 2026 dsh-permission-rules contributors