OpenDRP is a security product: it holds an asset inventory, credentials for third-party providers, and an audit trail that is meant to be trustworthy. If you find a way to break any of those guarantees, please report it privately.
Use GitHub's private channel — Security → Report a vulnerability on https://github.com/OpenDRP/opendrp (GitHub Security Advisories). This keeps the report visible only to the maintainers until a fix is published.
Please do not open a public issue, and do not include working exploits in public discussions.
A useful report contains:
- the affected version or commit SHA;
- the deployment shape (Docker Compose is the supported one) and whether the stack was reached through Nginx or directly on the API port;
- what the attacker can already do (anonymous,
viewer,analyst,admin, or a registered connector); - a minimal reproduction, and the impact you believe it has;
- any suggested fix, if you have one.
- Authentication and session handling: login, refresh-token rotation and reuse detection, cookie flags, CSRF, rate limiting and lockout.
- Authorization: role boundaries (
admin/analyst/viewer), connector credentials, and the "last active administrator" guard. - The connector boundary: anything that lets a connector write outside its own module, impersonate another connector, or reach a route reserved for users.
- Injection of any kind, including through validated fields, report generation and the audit pipeline.
- Disclosure of secrets:
.env, the encryptedsystem_settingscolumns, the provider API key stored with a source account (source_accounts.api_key_encrypted), TOTP secrets, connector token storage (only digests are stored), logs, and API error messages. - Server-side request forgery and data exfiltration through connector configuration or monitored asset values.
- Integrity of the audit trail: anything that lets a security-relevant action happen without a corresponding audit record, or forge one.
- Findings that a monitored asset appears in a third-party data set. Those are the product's output, not a vulnerability.
- Missing hardening headers on endpoints that are not meant to be browser-facing (the connector protocol uses its own credential, not cookies).
- Denial of service through ordinary high request volume from an authenticated account: the platform bounds this by design (per-account request limits, bounded outbound probes, connection pooling). A bypass of those bounds is in scope.
- Vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies that are already published and tracked by Dependabot; report those upstream, but tell us if a shipped dependency is affected in a way Dependabot cannot see.
- Anything that requires an administrator to run untrusted code on the host.
The current checkout declares 0.2.4. The latest published release is the most
recent entry in GitHub Releases and the matching GHCR images; a development
checkout can be ahead of it. main is the supported development branch. Fixes
are published on main, and reports against older commits may be answered with
"please retry on main".
- Acknowledgement of the report: within 3 business days.
- An initial assessment (in scope, severity, planned fix): within 10 business days.
- A fix or a documented mitigation: target 30 days for high severity, longer for lower severity, and we will tell you when a fix ships so you can coordinate disclosure.
We are happy to credit reporters in the advisory and in the repository, unless you prefer to stay anonymous.
The repository ignores .env, generated reports, databases, caches and local
Compose overrides (see .gitignore). If a real credential — provider API key,
JWT or Fernet key, connector token, PostgreSQL password — is ever exposed, treat
it as compromised: report it privately as above, and rotate it.
Rotation is a documented procedure rather than an emergency, in
docs/upgrading.md:
ENCRYPTION_KEY— the key protects the four alert columns it encrypts insystem_settings, the provider API key of every source account (source_accounts.api_key_encrypted) and the TOTP secret of every enrolled account (users.totp_secret). Put the new key first, list the old one inENCRYPTION_PREVIOUS_KEYS, then re-encrypt and verify withpython -m scripts.rotate_keys rewrap/status. Those two cover all three families, the enrolled authenticators included, sostatusis what tells you whether a previous key can still be withdrawn. Dropping a key a value was written with makes that value undecryptable — a second factor is then refused rather than silently accepted, andmanage_admin mfa-offplus a fresh enrolment is the way back.JWT_SECRET_KEY— list the old secret inJWT_PREVIOUS_SECRET_KEYSso existing sessions survive, and remove it to withdraw the tokens signed with it.- Connector tokens — one connector at a time, through
python -m scripts.manage_connector_tokens rotate <name>.
Two different things are pinned here, and it is worth being precise about which.
Python and npm dependencies are pinned exactly and verified by hash.
backend/requirements.txt and the connector manifests carry name==version for
every direct and transitive dependency, each with the --hash=sha256: digests
of every artifact the index publishes for that version; the images install them
with pip install --require-hashes, so a substituted package fails the build
instead of being installed quietly. The frontend is locked by
frontend/package-lock.json and built with npm ci. Regenerate a lock with
python scripts/lock_requirements.py <file>, check one without writing it with
--check. Both shipped manifests carry a digest for every pin, and two gates keep
it that way: scripts/check_dependency_sources.py fails a shipped pin that
carries no hash, and backend/tests/test_lock_requirements_gate.py fails a
manifest whose resolution leaves a package undeclared or repeats a pin the file
it includes already makes.
Base images are moving tags, deliberately. The Dockerfiles use
python:3.12-slim, node:20-alpine and nginx:1.29.8-alpine3.23, and
docker-compose.yml names postgres:17-alpine and redis:7-alpine. A -slim
or -alpine tag moves when upstream republishes it, so rebuilding from the same
commit can pick up a new upstream patch. What compensates for that:
- the
securityjob fails the build on a known vulnerability in the shipped dependency sets (pip-audit,npm audit --omit=dev); - Dependabot raises base-image updates for the Dockerfiles (
dockerfor/backend,/frontendand five of the six connectors —connectors/exposure_endpoints/Dockerfileis the one it does not watch, so that base image is refreshed by hand); - an image scan sees the packages the image really contains, which is why pip's vendored SBOM is removed from the runtime image.
Dependabot's docker ecosystem reads Dockerfiles, not Compose files, so the two
images Compose names directly are refreshed by hand:
docker pull postgres:17-alpine
docker inspect --format '{{index .RepoDigests 0}}' postgres:17-alpine
To pin an image to a digest instead of a tag — the trade is a manual step on every upstream patch — replace the tag with the digest that command prints, in every file that names the image; a tag and a digest for the same release drift apart otherwise.