[Mafei]

A ready, host-verified Android connection can now opt into generating a local Ed25519 key, then separately inspect and confirm installing its public key for one SSH target. Private material remains native, wrapped with a per-key Android Keystore AES-GCM key in noBackupFilesDir. The UI offers public-key copying, last observed status, multiple keys for rotation, key-only login, and separately confirmed local deletion.

Installation uses an isolated exec channel. It validates the non-root Linux account, safe HOME, descriptor-relative no-follow paths, owners, permissions, access/default ACLs, file/link types, local filesystem, existing bytes and preflight identity. It appends once under an advisory lock, preserves existing authorized_keys bytes/options/permissions, and deduplicates restricted matching keys. Unsafe or unsupported environments offer public copy for an administrator. Lost installation replies remain uncertain; no automatic rollback or replay.

A fresh independent pinned transport verifies only public-key authentication, with no password fallback and no PTY/shell. Additional authentication is distinguished; successful authentication does not certify terminal or forced-command policy. Current terminal/password access remains available. Local deletion closes connections using the deleted key and cancels related recovery; server entries require explicit revocation.

Base is sealed product SHA 85dd17a2bd611ef414227440389881f531084a8d (draft PR #5). Candidate SHA is 5ebd250a499f6dff52f4713f84ebcbece09b81c7, source tree ce3d7ba2ee3e14f2644890a54f06407b1d007d49. Only mobile files and the Android workflow changed. The original device-tested ded417ba852295f3ad76bcca4e6e557d1288ca12, sealed product branch and Linux PR #3 branch remain unchanged.

Exact-head CI run 37839679489, attempt 3, completed successfully at 2026-10-08T21:30:45Z. All nine Android API31–37 phone/tablet configurations pass: 29/configuration, 261 total, zero skips. Each includes 10 native instrumentation cases, 10 actual WebView cases, 4 native tmux cases and 5 actual WebView tmux cases. Existing host pins, tmux list/collision/missing-session/read-only/takeover policies, keyboard/touch, optional password storage, lifecycle, foreground retention and notification Stop All remain required. Checks also pass: 66 browser cases, 6 key-enrollment cases on standard Linux, 10 Rust cases, 12 real application Kotlin/JVM/JNI SSH/tmux cases and 29 JVM unit tests. The ARM64 Linux core runs the Rust and real JNI suites on a verified aarch64 host.

All nine delivery receipts bind this clean commit/tree, common payload 597f4ff4e19206af2ea7ec24f6eedd7d0199e0550cb95d59be7dd7161d235865, and ARM64 library 49ff6fae6dbc9998ab0b5ab34a5a14b5acfaa1be12c3c367ec68aa01e5b5b05c. Packaging checks confirm the intended permissions/service policy, public test certificate, JNI exports, production AOT/CSP assets and 16 KiB ELF/ZIP alignment.

• API36 phone ARM64 APK and evidence ZIP: APK SHA256 d4efae26563079527c1343933b6113065b22efc3665f9308533b13e00be7a996.
• API36 tablet ARM64 APK and evidence ZIP: APK SHA256 ccc9bcad411930453416b973f9d61f668f4949eacc032d58ba7e978f2498765c.
• API37 tablet ARM64 APK and evidence ZIP: APK SHA256 bbd6213b20f179e74b59b95efb9d8c76ed1c86fb65470c82e6cc15dbf830da94.

These ZIPs contain APKs, source/runtime/delivery reports and seven actual adb screencap PNGs per configuration. Capture dimensions, UTC timestamps, byte lengths and SHA256 are in android-runtime-report.json. Phone target-confirmation screenshot: 2400×1080, 2026-10-08T20:40:33.456Z, SHA256 3f0d39a35acadeb53a4d5bd04c5da15f012458d702d7e269891b9567d580b7c2. API36 tablet target-confirmation screenshot: 1600×2560, 2026-10-08T21:25:56.390Z, SHA256 b98586d2c01c412c86464a389636f24d699f964632b351a5792bd940b5830b1e. GitHub artifacts expire 2026-10-22. Cloud-local download returned URLError, so these images have not received local pixel inspection or Library upload.

Earlier failures remain diagnostic evidence. c86ea9d exposed a nullable Kotlin device-key ID, now explicitly rejected before native storage access; one API37 SDK archive read failed before app execution. Corrected-head attempt 1 stopped on an API37 first-contact clipboard-overlay guard before key enrollment and cancelled checks after a Linux dependency-install stall. API37 tablet and checks passed on same-head attempt 2. API36 tablet stopped on a system Launcher ANR before app launch in attempts 1 and 2, then passed boot and all runtime/delivery tests on same-head attempt 3. No source edits, readiness/focus/ANR bypasses, timeout increases or relaxed acceptance counts were used for those retries. No failed/skipped runtime is a passed delivery receipt.

Tests use synthetic accounts, generated keys, temporary homes and loopback servers only. The local sandbox remaps system directory owners and rejects ACL writes; positive installer tests pass on standard Linux CI without relaxing safety checks. Private Ed25519 material is software-generated and Keystore-wrapped; short-lived JVM strings at the existing authentication boundary cannot be forcibly wiped. Android runtime evidence uses x86_64 emulators: ARM64 packaging/Linux JNI do not establish Android ARM64 execution, OPPO fold/unfold, user IME, Wi-Fi/cellular handover or 16 KiB runtime acceptance. Foreground retention cannot guarantee survival after system process termination. Debug certificate continuity, in-place upgrade and credential migration remain unverified. No real credentials, real servers, phone installs, persistent grants, merge or release.

Design, implementation boundaries and primary references: mobile/key-enrollment.md. The first batch remains sealed in draft PR #5, with its separate successful CI and preserved API36 phone APK.

AI disclosure: fully vibe coded by an AI coding agent. Draft for review and physical-device acceptance.