Agon is pre-1.0; only the latest 0.x release gets fixes.

Please do not open a public issue for a vulnerability. Email sobatistacyber@gmail.com with details and a proof of concept if you have one. You'll get an acknowledgement within a few days.

Agon is a teaching implementation of a tamper-evident competition scoreboard. Its application threat model is the interesting part and is taken seriously: forged or replayed submissions, impersonation, message tampering, scoring a vulnerability a challenge does not contain, a leader scoring their own challenge, double-scoring, a crash mid-award, request floods (Proof of Work), and — the point of the project — a scoreboard that has been edited after the fact. All of these are defended and tested.

What Agon is not yet is networked. The arbiter and the demo run in-process, so there is no wire protocol, serialization endpoint or transport to harden — and nothing here should be exposed on a network as-is. When the networked arbiter lands (see the roadmap), the transport will need the usual care: authenticated channels, a safe wire format rather than Java serialization, and input limits.

A single arbiter is a single point of failure for availability and a single point of trust for liveness — but not for integrity: a dishonest arbiter cannot forge an award or hide one, because the scoreboard is a signed, hash-chained ledger anyone can verify. Replicating the arbiter behind a quorum, so it can't withhold or equivocate either, is on the roadmap. Demo keys are 1024-bit RSA for speed and are generated in-process; neither is a production choice.