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32 changes: 32 additions & 0 deletions docs/release-signed-run-identity.md
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# Inactive signed run identity inspection

This isolated reference is not imported into the Worker, release workflow or
publisher. It preserves the current fixed GitHub issuer, repository IDs, main
workflow ref, audience, signature and expiration checks. A regression test binds
its verifier to the active implementation apart from the named identity extension.
No existing verifier semantics are changed by adding this module.

The reference requires signed run_id and run_attempt as canonical positive decimal
strings of at most20digits and workflow_sha as a40character lowercase hex SHA.
Strings avoid rounding identifiers. The returned immutable record preserves these
claims but separately marks serviceRunVerified, artifactUploadAttemptVerified and
productionActionAllowed false. workflow_sha is the executing workflow revision,
not necessarily the candidate commit, and is never silently substituted for it.

A valid signature authenticates the issuer's claims. It does not prove a particular
validation run completed, an artifact belongs to that attempt, or a deployment
occurred. Independently fetched exact run/attempt and original artifact provenance
must establish those facts. matchExpectedRun is only a structural field comparison;
it accepts neither service authority nor permission from caller assertions.

Tests use an ephemeral synthetic RSA key and fixed responses, not real credentials
or live issuer qualification. Wrong issuer/audience/repository/workflow/ref/event,
expired tokens, modified signed run attempts, malformed identifiers and redirects
fail. No route, credential, workflow trigger, activation or public-site change is
included. Existing denied operations remain denied. Next: bounded authenticated
service evidence acquisition and read-only shadow admission before any write path.

The fetcher and clock options are trusted test/runtime dependencies, never request
input. Synthetic tests intentionally supply a fixture signing-key response. A
future admission route must bind the real fixed issuer fetch and trusted finite
clock internally; exposing these options would defeat identity/time guarantees.
9 changes: 9 additions & 0 deletions tests/publisher-run-identity.test.cjs
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const {test}=require('node:test'),assert=require('node:assert/strict'),crypto=require('node:crypto'),fs=require('node:fs');
const repo='LeiterConsulting/splunk-version-value-explorer',now=1794777600000;
let signing;const modulePromise=import('../tools/release-coordination/publisher-run-identity.mjs');
async function fixture(changes={}){signing||=await crypto.webcrypto.subtle.generateKey({name:'RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5',modulusLength:2048,publicExponent:new Uint8Array([1,0,1]),hash:'SHA-256'},true,['sign','verify']);const seconds=now/1000,claims={iss:'https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com',aud:'https://versioncompass.com',sub:'repo:'+repo+':ref:refs/heads/main',repository:repo,repository_id:'1366223729',repository_owner_id:'152733483',repository_visibility:'public',ref:'refs/heads/main',ref_type:'branch',workflow_ref:repo+'/.github/workflows/publish-content.yml@refs/heads/main',runner_environment:'github-hosted',event_name:'workflow_run',sha:'a'.repeat(40),workflow_sha:'b'.repeat(40),run_id:'43758558524',run_attempt:'2',iat:seconds,nbf:seconds-1,exp:seconds+300,...changes};const b64=x=>Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(x)).toString('base64url'),body=b64({alg:'RS256',typ:'JWT',kid:'fixture'})+'.'+b64(claims),sig=await crypto.webcrypto.subtle.sign('RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5',signing.privateKey,Buffer.from(body)),jwks={keys:[{...await crypto.webcrypto.subtle.exportKey('jwk',signing.publicKey),kid:'fixture',use:'sig',alg:'RS256'}]};return {token:body+'.'+Buffer.from(sig).toString('base64url'),fetcher:async(url,options)=>{assert.equal(url,'https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com/.well-known/jwks');assert.equal(options.redirect,'manual');return Response.json(jwks)}}}
test('signed identity preserves exact strings but never asserts run or artifact provenance',async()=>{const m=await modulePromise,f=await fixture(),r=await m.inspectPublisherRunIdentity(f.token,{...f,now});assert.equal(r.runId,'43758558524');assert.equal(r.runAttempt,'2');assert.equal(r.workflowSha,'b'.repeat(40));assert.equal(r.claimsSignatureVerified,true);for(const k of ['serviceRunVerified','artifactUploadAttemptVerified','productionActionAllowed'])assert.equal(r[k],false);assert(Object.isFrozen(r));assert.equal(m.matchExpectedRun(r,r).identityFieldsMatch,true);for(const key of ['runId','runAttempt','commit','workflowSha','eventName','workflowRef'])assert.throws(()=>m.matchExpectedRun(r,{...r,[key]:'changed'}),/mismatch/)});
test('missing, numeric, ambiguous or huge run identifiers fail closed',async()=>{const m=await modulePromise;for(const key of ['run_id','run_attempt'])for(const value of [undefined,null,1,'0','01','1.0','-1',' 1','1e2','9'.repeat(21)]){const f=await fixture({[key]:value});await assert.rejects(m.inspectPublisherRunIdentity(f.token,{...f,now}),/signed run identity/)}for(const value of [undefined,null,1,'x','A'.repeat(40)]){const f=await fixture({workflow_sha:value});await assert.rejects(m.inspectPublisherRunIdentity(f.token,{...f,now}),/signed run identity/)}});
test('signature and existing issuer, audience, workflow, ref and expiry boundaries remain',async()=>{const m=await modulePromise;for(const changes of [{iss:'https://evil.example'},{aud:'other'},{repository_id:'1'},{ref:'refs/heads/other'},{workflow_ref:repo+'/.github/workflows/other.yml@refs/heads/main'},{event_name:'pull_request'},{exp:now/1000-1}]){const f=await fixture(changes);await assert.rejects(m.inspectPublisherRunIdentity(f.token,{...f,now}),/identity/)}const f=await fixture(),parts=f.token.split('.');const claims=JSON.parse(Buffer.from(parts[1],'base64url'));claims.run_attempt='3';parts[1]=Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(claims)).toString('base64url');await assert.rejects(m.inspectPublisherRunIdentity(parts.join('.'),{...f,now}),/signature/)});
test('key redirects and unsigned claims fail; structural matching never grants authority',async()=>{const m=await modulePromise,f=await fixture();await assert.rejects(m.inspectPublisherRunIdentity(f.token,{now,fetcher:async()=>new Response('',{status:302})}),/unavailable/);await assert.rejects(m.inspectPublisherRunIdentity('{}',{...f,now}),/token/);const fake={commit:'x',eventName:'x',runId:'x',runAttempt:'x',workflowSha:'x',workflowRef:'x'};const r=m.matchExpectedRun(fake,fake);assert.equal(r.serviceRunVerified,false);assert.equal(r.productionActionAllowed,false)});
test('inactive reference retains exact existing cryptographic verifier except named extensions',()=>{let reference=fs.readFileSync('tools/release-coordination/publisher-run-identity.mjs','utf8').split('// Structural expected identity')[0];reference=reference.split('\n').slice(2).join('\n').replace('inspectPublisherRunIdentity','verifyPublisherOIDC');reference=reference.replace(/ const decimal=x=>[^\n]*\n if\(!decimal\(claims.run_id\)[^\n]*\n/,'');reference=reference.replace(/return Object.freeze\(\{ type:'github-oidc-signed-run-claims'[^\n]*\);/,"return { type: 'github-oidc', commit: claims.sha, eventName: claims.event_name };");const upstream=fs.readFileSync('worker/publisher.mjs','utf8').split('async function publisherIdentity')[0];assert.equal(reference.trim(),upstream.trim())});
68 changes: 68 additions & 0 deletions tools/release-coordination/publisher-run-identity.mjs
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// Inactive identity inspection reference; not in the Worker build.
const REPOSITORY='LeiterConsulting/splunk-version-value-explorer';
/* Separate maintenance boundary. No browser identity, telemetry or public writes. */
const publisherIssuer = 'https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com';
const publisherAudience = 'https://versioncompass.com';
const publisherWorkflow = REPOSITORY + '/.github/workflows/publish-content.yml@refs/heads/main';

function publisherBase64(value) {
if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(value)) throw Error('Invalid token');
return Uint8Array.from(atob(value.replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/')), c => c.charCodeAt(0));
}
export async function inspectPublisherRunIdentity(token, { fetcher = (...args) => globalThis.fetch(...args), now = Date.now() } = {}) {
if (typeof token !== 'string' || token.length > 16000) throw Error('Invalid token');
const parts = token.split('.'); if (parts.length !== 3) throw Error('Invalid token');
const decode = part => JSON.parse(new TextDecoder('utf-8', { fatal: true }).decode(publisherBase64(part)));
let header, claims;
try { header = decode(parts[0]); claims = decode(parts[1]); } catch { throw Error('Invalid token'); }
if (header.alg !== 'RS256' || header.typ !== 'JWT' || typeof header.kid !== 'string' || header.jku || header.jwk || header.crit) throw Error('Invalid token');
const seconds = Math.floor(now / 1000);
if (claims.iss !== publisherIssuer || claims.aud !== publisherAudience ||
claims.repository !== REPOSITORY || claims.repository_id !== '1366223729' || claims.repository_owner_id !== '152733483' ||
claims.repository_visibility !== 'public' || claims.ref !== 'refs/heads/main' || claims.ref_type !== 'branch' ||
claims.workflow_ref !== publisherWorkflow || claims.runner_environment !== 'github-hosted' ||
!['repo:' + REPOSITORY + ':ref:refs/heads/main', 'repo:LeiterConsulting@152733483/splunk-version-value-explorer@1366223729:ref:refs/heads/main'].includes(claims.sub) ||
!['workflow_run', 'workflow_dispatch'].includes(claims.event_name) || !/^[a-f0-9]{40}$/.test(claims.sha) ||
!Number.isSafeInteger(claims.exp) || !Number.isSafeInteger(claims.nbf) || !Number.isSafeInteger(claims.iat) ||
claims.exp <= seconds || claims.nbf > seconds + 30 || claims.iat > seconds + 30 || claims.iat < seconds - 600 || claims.exp - claims.iat > 600) throw Error('Invalid publisher identity');
const decimal=x=>typeof x==='string'&&/^[1-9][0-9]{0,19}$/.test(x);
if(!decimal(claims.run_id)||!decimal(claims.run_attempt)||typeof claims.workflow_sha!=='string'||!/^[a-f0-9]{40}$/.test(claims.workflow_sha))throw Error('Invalid signed run identity');
let response;
// Workers supports manual redirect handling; reject every non-2xx response
// without following it, preserving the fixed issuer boundary.
try { response = await fetcher(publisherIssuer + '/.well-known/jwks', { redirect: 'manual', signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10000) }); }
catch (error) {
if (/illegal invocation/i.test(error.message)) throw Error('Publisher identity fetch receiver invalid');
if (/redirect/i.test(error.message)) throw Error('Publisher identity redirect rejected');
if (/not implemented|not supported|unsupported|not a function/i.test(error.message)) throw Error('Publisher identity fetch option unsupported');
throw Error('Publisher identity unavailable');
}
if (!response.ok) throw Error('Publisher identity unavailable (HTTP ' + response.status + ')');
if (!response.body) throw Error('Publisher identity unavailable');
const reader = response.body.getReader(), chunks = []; let size = 0;
try {
while (true) { const { value, done } = await reader.read(); if (done) break; size += value.byteLength; if (size > 128 * 1024) throw Error('Publisher identity exceeds limit'); chunks.push(value); }
} finally { await reader.cancel().catch(() => {}); }
const bytes = new Uint8Array(size); let offset = 0;
for (const chunk of chunks) { bytes.set(chunk, offset); offset += chunk.length; }
let keys;
try { keys = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder('utf-8', { fatal: true }).decode(bytes)).keys; }
catch { throw Error('Invalid signing key document'); }
const matches = Array.isArray(keys) ? keys.filter(key => key.kid === header.kid && key.kty === 'RSA' && (!key.use || key.use === 'sig') && (!key.alg || key.alg === 'RS256')) : [];
if (matches.length !== 1) throw Error('Unknown signing key');
let key;
try { key = await crypto.subtle.importKey('jwk', matches[0], { name: 'RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5', hash: 'SHA-256' }, false, ['verify']); }
catch { throw Error('Signing key import unavailable'); }
let verified;
try { verified = await crypto.subtle.verify('RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5', key, publisherBase64(parts[2]), new TextEncoder().encode(parts[0] + '.' + parts[1])); }
catch { throw Error('Signature verification unavailable'); }
if (!verified) throw Error('Invalid signature');
return Object.freeze({ type:'github-oidc-signed-run-claims', commit:claims.sha, eventName:claims.event_name, runId:claims.run_id, runAttempt:claims.run_attempt, workflowSha:claims.workflow_sha, workflowRef:claims.workflow_ref, claimsSignatureVerified:true, serviceRunVerified:false, artifactUploadAttemptVerified:false, productionActionAllowed:false });
}

// Structural expected identity only: does not authenticate an API receipt.
export function matchExpectedRun(identity,expected){
const keys=['commit','eventName','runId','runAttempt','workflowSha','workflowRef'];
if(!identity||!expected||keys.some(key=>typeof identity[key]!=='string'||typeof expected[key]!=='string'||identity[key]!==expected[key]))throw Error('Expected run identity mismatch');
return {identityFieldsMatch:true,serviceRunVerified:false,artifactUploadAttemptVerified:false,productionActionAllowed:false};
}
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