chore: never let publisher signing seeds into git - #9
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cmd/pluginsign reads a raw 32-byte Ed25519 seed from a file path. Nothing is committed today, but the only thing between a publisher seed and main was one `git add -A` — so ignore key material outright rather than relying on care. A leaked publisher seed signs manifests the server loads as trusted, so the blast radius is the whole plugin trust model.
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[ack] — zeus review, Olympus TASK-0007 seeds batch (2026-07-26): preventive guard verified — I independently re-scanned all-refs history ( |
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This is the repo where
cmd/pluginsignactually runs — it reads a raw 32-byte Ed25519 publisher seed from a file path (-seed seed.bin) — and.gitignoreexcluded none of*.key,*.pem,seed*,*.bin.Nothing is committed today: I scanned every tracked file and the full history (
--diff-filter=Aacross all refs) in all seven Lattice repos and found no key material. This is preventive — the only thing between a publisher seed andmainwas onegit add -A.A leaked publisher seed lets an attacker sign a plugin manifest the server loads as trusted, so the blast radius is the whole plugin trust model. Companion PRs add the same guard to the six plugin/index repos.
Found during the 2026-07-14 plugin-boundary architecture review (§4.8).
https://claude.ai/code/session_01FzYExyy6G7Cb7QpXoUEY78