security: implement signing approval popup (replace silent auto-approve)#20
security: implement signing approval popup (replace silent auto-approve)#20jjohare wants to merge 1 commit into
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The previous showPermissionPrompt() unconditionally returned true,
meaning ANY website could silently sign Nostr events as the user
without any confirmation. This is a complete bypass of the extension's
security model -- equivalent to giving every website full access to the
user's private key.
This commit replaces the auto-approve stub with a proper popup-based
approval flow:
- New popup/approve.html: Approval dialog showing the requesting
origin, action description, and event preview data
- New popup/approve.js: Handles approve/deny button clicks and sends
the decision back to the background service worker via
chrome.runtime.sendMessage
- Modified src/background.js:
- showPermissionPrompt() now opens a chrome.windows.create() popup
and returns a Promise that resolves when the user clicks
approve or deny
- Pending approvals tracked via Map<requestId, resolve>
- 60-second auto-deny timeout prevents abandoned prompts from
blocking indefinitely
- APPROVE_SIGNING message type handled before the main message
router to avoid deadlock
- Event preview data (kind, truncated content, tag count) passed
to the approval popup for informed consent
This follows the same pattern used by established NIP-07 extensions
(nos2x, Alby) where every signing request requires explicit user
approval unless the origin has been previously trusted.
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
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Pull request overview
This PR addresses a critical security gap in the signing flow by replacing the background service worker’s silent auto-approval with an explicit user approval popup before releasing a public key or signing events.
Changes:
- Implement a real
showPermissionPrompt()that opens an approval popup and resolves via apendingApprovalsmap in the background worker. - Add a new approval UI (
popup/approve.html+popup/approve.js) that shows origin/action plus a small event preview. - Add a 60-second auto-deny timeout in the background to prevent hanging requests.
Reviewed changes
Copilot reviewed 3 out of 3 changed files in this pull request and generated 4 comments.
| File | Description |
|---|---|
src/background.js |
Replaces auto-approve stub with popup-based approval flow and request tracking/timeout. |
popup/approve.html |
Adds a dedicated approval dialog UI for signing/permission requests. |
popup/approve.js |
Wires the approval UI to send approve/deny messages back to the background worker. |
Comments suppressed due to low confidence (1)
src/background.js:325
formatEventForPrompt()is now unused after switching the signing prompt to passpreviewDataJSON intoshowPermissionPrompt(). Please remove this dead code (or re-use it to build the popup preview) to avoid confusing future maintenance.
/**
* Format event for display in prompt
*/
function formatEventForPrompt (event) {
const lines = [];
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| <html> | ||
| <head> | ||
| <meta charset="utf-8"> |
| <html> | ||
| <head> | ||
| <meta charset="utf-8"> | ||
| <title>PodKey - Signing Request</title> |
|
Folded into #22 — a single CI-green, adversarially-reviewed PR that consolidates this branch with the other security fixes plus NIP-44 and residual gap-fixes (exact-host trust, NIP-98 nonce, signEvent self-verify, honest provider surface, auto-sign default OFF). Suggest reviewing/merging #22; this can be closed in its favour. |
|
DreamLab-AI Mega-Sprint seems not to be a GitHub user. You need a GitHub account to be able to sign the CLA. If you have already a GitHub account, please add the email address used for this commit to your account. You have signed the CLA already but the status is still pending? Let us recheck it. |
Consolidated hardening of the Podkey key-holding signer: brings seven in-flight security/feature branches plus residual gap-fills, a polished CSP-clean UI, a CI build/test/lint gate, and a 133-test suite into one reviewable PR. The fix set was independently re-derived from a full audit of the extension and every item below was verified fixed *in the final tree* by an adversarial review pass (not just claimed). **Supersedes** (folded in here; safe to close in favour of this PR): #12, #14, #17, #18, #19, #20, #21. ## Security posture — before → after | Area | Before | After | |---|---|---| | Consent | Auto-approve everything (`showPermissionPrompt` hard-returned `true`) | **Explicit per-origin consent** popup that blocks on the user's decision; closing or 60s timeout denies | | Key at rest | `storage.local` (persisted plaintext) | **`storage.session` only** (in-memory, cleared on browser close); raw key never crosses to the page | | Crypto | A fake `crypto-browser.js` in the tree (`pubkey = sha256(privkey)`) | Deleted; **real `@noble` crypto** only, with `signEvent` schnorr self-verify before return | | NIP-98 | Signed-event cache → byte-identical id → replayable | **Fresh per-token 16-byte nonce**, redirect-aware `u` tag, page-side body-hash binding | | Solid-host trust | Substring match (`inrupt.net.evil.com` accepted) | **Exact-host match**, case-insensitive; lookalikes rejected | | Interception | Double fetch/XHR interception + double 401-retry | **Single interception path**, one retry | | Message channel | Page could inject arbitrary fields / origin / `privateKey` | Content script **whitelists 4 message types, forwards only safe fields, enforces the real origin** | | Provider surface | Advertised `nip04`/`getRelays` that throw / return `{}` | **Honest**: `getPublicKey`, `signEvent`, `nip44.{encrypt,decrypt}` only | | UI | Inline scripts + `innerHTML` XSS sinks | **CSP `script-src 'self'`**; all DOM via `textContent`/`createElement` | | Auto-sign | Defaulted **ON** (first-run silent trust + NIP-98 mint) | Defaults **OFF** — silent trusted-origin Solid signing and NIP-98 auto-trust are strictly opt-in | ## Notes for review - **Consent timeout:** `approve.js` actively sends `approved:false` + closes at the 60s mark (one-shot `decisionSent` guard) so the visible countdown is truthful; the background `chrome.windows` 60s timer remains a backstop. If you'd prefer the popup stay passive and let the background own the timeout, that is the single behavioural line to reconsider — everything else on the UI is restyling. - The page-context `nip98-interceptor.js` still duplicates a couple of `auth-header-utils.js` helpers because page context can't ESM-import the module; intentional, tracked separately. ## Verification - `npm run build` ✓ · `npm test` → **133 pass / 0 fail** ✓ · `npm run lint` → **0 errors** (now `no-unused-vars: error`) ✓ - New `.github/workflows/ci.yml` runs build → test → lint on every PR and push to `main`. 🤖 Generated by Claude Code
Summary
showPermissionPrompt()auto-approve stub with a real popup-based approval flowpopup/approve.html+popup/approve.js: Approval dialog showing origin, action, and event previewSecurity Impact (CRITICAL)
This is the most critical security fix. The current
showPermissionPrompt()implementation:Every website can silently sign Nostr events as the user. A malicious page can:
window.nostr.signEvent()to sign arbitrary events (posts, DMs, delegation tokens)window.nostr.getPublicKey()to identify the userThis completely defeats the purpose of a signing extension. The user's identity is effectively compromised the moment they visit any page with JavaScript.
How the Fix Works
The new flow follows the established pattern used by nos2x, Alby, and other NIP-07 extensions:
window.nostr.signEvent(event)showPermissionPrompt()generates a uniquerequestIdand openspopup/approve.htmlviachrome.windows.create()https://evil-site.com)approve.jssendsAPPROVE_SIGNINGmessage back to backgroundIf the user closes the popup without clicking, the
beforeunloadhandler sends a deny. If 60 seconds pass with no response, the request is auto-denied.Files Changed
src/background.jsshowPermissionPrompt(); addpendingApprovalsMap; handleAPPROVE_SIGNINGmessages; pass event preview data to promptspopup/approve.htmlpopup/approve.jsAPPROVE_SIGNINGmessages, deny on window closeTest plan
window.nostr.getPublicKey()-- verify approval popup appearswindow.nostr.signEvent()-- verify popup shows event kind and content preview