Phase 4: node certificate rotation endpoint - #38
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POST /control/v1/nodes/{node_id}/certificate re-issues a cert for the node's
registered public key, gated by the current cert (verify_node_identity) and
refused for revoked nodes. Safe to expose: the new cert is bound to the
on-record public key, so only the holder of that private key can use it.
Pairs with the meridian-node rotation loop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Stacked on #36 (P0 mTLS). Base is
p0-mtls-gate, so this PR shows only the rotation diff. Merge #36 first (or retarget tomainafter #36 lands).What
POST /control/v1/nodes/{node_id}/certificatere-issues a cert for the node's registered public key, gated by the current cert (verify_node_identity) and refused for revoked nodes.Safety
Safe to expose: the reissued cert is bound to the on-record public key, so a header-spoofer who lacks the private key gains nothing. Both old and new certs verify (same CA, same SAN) until the old one expires, so there's no chicken-and-egg during rollover.
Pairs with meridian-node
phase4-cert-rotation(the agent renewal loop).Tests
pytest tests/control -q→ 28 passed (+3: reissue-for-same-key, reject-revoked, end-to-end rotation through the enforced-mTLS path); ruff + mypy clean.🤖 Generated with Claude Code