fix(security): close native SSE and credential-redaction gaps

companion/src/wire.ts

@@ -136,13 +136,21 @@ function scrubEvent(event: string): string {
       if (!line.startsWith("data:")) return line;
       const raw = line.slice(5).trimStart();
       if (!raw) return line;
+      let parsed;
       try {
-        return `data: ${JSON.stringify(scrub(JSON.parse(raw)))}`;
+        parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
       } catch {
-        // not JSON: pass it through rather than dropping it. A frame this
-        // code does not understand is still the harness's to send.
         return line;
       }
+      try {
+        return `data: ${JSON.stringify(scrub(parsed))}`;
+      } catch {
+        // scrub() recurses, so a body nested deep enough throws RangeError
+        // where JSON.parse handles it fine. Passing the original line through
+        // sends exactly what the scrubber exists to withhold — the same class
+        // of issue the proxy's JSON response path already handles.
+        return "data: {}";
+      }
     })
     .join(eol);
 }

companion/test/wire.test.ts

@@ -166,4 +166,17 @@ describe("createSseScrubber", () => {
   it("still handles a bare CR, which the spec also allows", () => {
     expect(createSseScrubber()('data: {"a":1,"resumeCursors":{}}\r\r')).toBe('data: {"a":1}\r\r');
   });
+
+  it("replaces unscrubable JSON data instead of leaking withheld keys", () => {
+    // scrub() recurses; a body nested a few thousand deep throws RangeError
+    // where JSON.parse handles it fine. A single try-catch around both treated
+    // that as "not JSON" and returned the original unscrubbed line — sending
+    // exactly what the scrubber exists to withhold.
+    let json = '{"resumeCursors":{"ghost":"leak-me"}}';
+    for (let i = 0; i < 12_000; i++) json = `{"n":${json}}`;
+    const out = createSseScrubber()(`data: ${json}\n\n`);
+    expect(out).not.toContain("resumeCursors");
+    expect(out).not.toContain("leak-me");
+    expect(out).toBe("data: {}\n\n");
+  });
 });

electron/diagnostics.mjs

@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ const CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_FORMATS = [
   /\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/g,
   /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{30,}/g,
   /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g,
+  /\bglpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,
+  /\bpypi-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{48,}/g,
+  /\bbox_(?:live|test|prod)_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/g,
+  /\bwhsec_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,
 ];
 const KEY_VALUE_PAIR =
   /\b([A-Za-z0-9_.-]*(?:api[_-]?key|apikey|secret|token|password|passwd|authorization|auth[_-]?token|access[_-]?key|private[_-]?key)s?)\s*[:=]\s*("[^"]*"|'[^']*'|[^\s"',;)\]}]+)/gi;

electron/diagnostics.test.mjs

@@ -113,6 +113,26 @@ describe("buildDiagnosticsReport", () => {
     expect(report).toContain("«redacted");
   });
 
+  it("keeps diagnostics redaction in parity with the server content-token formats", () => {
+    const alpha = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789";
+    const values = [
+      `glpat-${alpha}`,
+      `pypi-${alpha}${alpha}`,
+      `box_live_${alpha.slice(0, 20)}`,
+      `box_test_${alpha.slice(0, 20)}`,
+      `box_prod_${alpha.slice(0, 20)}`,
+      `whsec_${alpha}${alpha.slice(0, 8)}`,
+    ];
+    const report = buildDiagnosticsReport({
+      appInfo,
+      configSummary: {},
+      logTail: values.join("\n"),
+    });
+    for (const value of values) {
+      expect(report).not.toContain(value);
+    }
+  });
+
   it.each(["Bearer abcdefghijklmnop", "Basic dXNlcjpwYXNzd29yZA=="])(
     "masks the full Authorization credential for %s",
     (authorization) => {

server/redact.test.ts

@@ -168,6 +168,12 @@ describe("redactSecretsInText", () => {
       [`aws ${"AKIA" + "IOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"} and more`, /IOSFODNN7EXAMPLE/],
       [`google ${"AIza" + "SyA-"}${alpha.slice(0, 32)}`, /AIza/],
       [`npm ${"npm" + "_"}${alpha}`, /npm_[a-z]/],
+      [`gitlab ${"glpat" + "-"}${alpha}`, /glpat-[a-z]/],
+      [`pypi ${"pypi" + "-"}${alpha}${alpha}`, /pypi-[a-z]/],
+      [`box ${"box_" + "live_"}abcdefghijklmnop`, /box_live_[a-z]/],
+      [`box ${"box_" + "test_"}ABCDEF0123456789`, /box_test_/],
+      [`box ${"box_" + "prod_"}0123456789abcdef`, /box_prod_/],
+      [`webhook ${"whsec" + "_"}${alpha.slice(0, 32)}`, /whsec_[a-z]/],
     ];
     for (const [input, leak] of cases) {
       const out = redactSecretsInText(input);
@@ -216,6 +222,14 @@ describe("redactSecretsInText", () => {
       "const token = await getToken(); // fetches later",
       "password: (leave blank to keep the current one)",
       "Bearer tokens are sent in the Authorization header",
+      "pypi-publishing-workflow",
+      "pypi-mirror-configuration",
+      "pypi-upload-action-v1",
+      "pypi-trusted-publisher-github-action-config",
+      "box_shadow_none",
+      "box_model_border",
+      "box_sizing_content",
+      "box_background_color",
       "sk-8", // too short to be a key
     ]) {
       expect(redactSecretsInText(s), s).toBe(s);

server/redact.ts

@@ -52,6 +52,10 @@ const KEY_PREFIXES: RegExp[] = [
   /\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/g, // aws access key id
   /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{30,}/g, // google api key
   /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g, // npm
+  /\bglpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g, // gitlab personal access token
+  /\bpypi-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{48,}/g, // pypi api token (macaroon payload)
+  /\bbox_(?:live|test|prod)_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/g, // ascii.dev box api token
+  /\bwhsec_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g, // helmryth webhook secret
   /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\b/g, // jwt
 ];
 const BEARER = /(\bBearer\s+)([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{12,})/g;