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chore(deps): [ai] Update dependency authlib to v1.6.11 [SECURITY]#479

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chore(deps): [ai] Update dependency authlib to v1.6.11 [SECURITY]#479
renovate-bot wants to merge 1 commit intoGoogleCloudPlatform:mainfrom
renovate-bot:renovate/pypi-authlib-vulnerability

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@renovate-bot renovate-bot commented Apr 17, 2026

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
authlib 1.6.91.6.11 age confidence

Warning

Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the Dependency Dashboard for more information.

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

GHSA-jj8c-mmj3-mmgv

Summary

There is no CSRF protection on the cache feature on most integrations clients.

Details

In authlib.integrations.starlette_client.OAuth, no CSRF protection is set up when using the cache parameter. When not using the cache parameter, the use of SessionMiddleware ties the client to the auth state, preventing CSRF attacks. With the cache, there is no such mechanism. Other integratons have the same issue, it's not just starlette.

The state parameter is taken from the callback URL and the state is fetched from the cache without checking that it is the same client calling the redirect endpoint as was the one that initiated the auth flow.

This issue is documented in RFC 6749 section 10.12:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-10.12

PoC

  • Set up a Starlette integration with a cache
  • The attacker starts the auth flow up until before the callback URL is followed.
  • The attacked sends the redirect URL to the victim
  • The victim now completes the authorisation

Impact

This impacts all users that use the cache to store auth state.

All users will be vulnerable to CSRF attacks and may have an attacker's account tied to their own. In our specific scenario, this allowed attackers to push invoices into a victim's account, ready to be paid. Very serious.

Severity
  • CVSS Score: 5.4 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Authlib: Cross-site request forging when using cache

GHSA-jj8c-mmj3-mmgv

More information

Details

Summary

There is no CSRF protection on the cache feature on most integrations clients.

Details

In authlib.integrations.starlette_client.OAuth, no CSRF protection is set up when using the cache parameter. When not using the cache parameter, the use of SessionMiddleware ties the client to the auth state, preventing CSRF attacks. With the cache, there is no such mechanism. Other integratons have the same issue, it's not just starlette.

The state parameter is taken from the callback URL and the state is fetched from the cache without checking that it is the same client calling the redirect endpoint as was the one that initiated the auth flow.

This issue is documented in RFC 6749 section 10.12:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-10.12

PoC
  • Set up a Starlette integration with a cache
  • The attacker starts the auth flow up until before the callback URL is followed.
  • The attacked sends the redirect URL to the victim
  • The victim now completes the authorisation
Impact

This impacts all users that use the cache to store auth state.

All users will be vulnerable to CSRF attacks and may have an attacker's account tied to their own. In our specific scenario, this allowed attackers to push invoices into a victim's account, ready to be paid. Very serious.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.4 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Release Notes

authlib/authlib (authlib)

v1.6.11

Compare Source

Full Changelog: authlib/authlib@v1.6.10...v1.6.11

  • Fix CSRF issue with starlette client

v1.6.10

Compare Source

Full Changelog: authlib/authlib@v1.6.9...v1.6.10

  • Fix redirecting to unvalidated redirect_uri on UnsupportedResponseTypeError.

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This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

@forking-renovate forking-renovate bot added dependencies Pull requests that update a dependency file p0 SECURITY labels Apr 17, 2026
@renovate-bot renovate-bot added dependencies Pull requests that update a dependency file SECURITY p0 labels Apr 17, 2026
@renovate-bot renovate-bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-authlib-vulnerability branch from 68ec7f3 to ab32355 Compare April 17, 2026 12:50
@renovate-bot renovate-bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-authlib-vulnerability branch from ab32355 to 09f627f Compare April 17, 2026 18:06
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