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@dependabot dependabot Bot commented on behalf of github Oct 25, 2026 •

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Bumps @vitest/mocker to 5.1.0 and updates ancestor dependency vitest. These dependencies need to be updated together.

Updates @vitest/mocker from 3.2.4 to 5.1.0

Release notes

Sourced from @​vitest/mocker's releases.

v5.1.0

   🚀 Features

   🐞 Bug Fixes

... (truncated)

Commits
Maintainer changes

This version was pushed to npm by GitHub Actions, a new releaser for @​vitest/mocker since your current version.


Updates vitest from 3.2.4 to 5.1.0

Release notes

Sourced from vitest's releases.

v5.1.0

   🚀 Features

   🐞 Bug Fixes

... (truncated)

Commits
Maintainer changes

This version was pushed to npm by GitHub Actions, a new releaser for vitest since your current version.


GGeronik and others added 20 commits March 16, 2026 11:51
Embeddable AI governance framework — human-readable trust contracts,
runtime policy enforcement, and evidence-grade auditability.

Core:
- Three-valued policy engine (permit/deny/modify) with 12 operators
- Compiled evaluator for sub-millisecond decisions
- MCP tool router with fail-closed authorization
- Model binding verification, secure boot, graceful degradation
- Ed25519-signed human overrides

Contracts:
- YAML/JSON/Markdown trust contract format with AJV validation
- Contract inheritance, registry, changelog, linter
- 9 drop-in threat contracts (PII, injection, hallucination, toxicity,
  cost, leakage, bias, copyright, MCP tool abuse)
- Signed policy bundles with DSSE envelopes + BundleWatcher hot-reload
- Zero-downtime ContractWatcher for directory-based updates

Audit:
- SHA-256 hash chain with HMAC signing
- Merkle tree seals, proof bundles, distributed tracing
- Immutable content-addressed storage with tamper detection
- File, webhook, multi-sink, and OpenTelemetry audit sinks
- CSV/JSON/summary export

Security:
- WASM sandbox (memory limits, timeouts) and V8 isolate sandbox
- DSSE contract signing + RFC 3161 timestamps
- IETF RATS (RFC 9334) remote attestation
- Pluggable trust anchors (software Ed25519, TPM shell-out, SGX/Firecracker stubs)
- TLA+ formal verification spec generator

Integrations:
- OpenAI, Anthropic (Claude), and Gemini wrapper examples
- Buffer-and-release streaming interceptor for mid-stream PII redaction
- LangChain callback handler, Vercel AI SDK wrapper
- HTTP middleware, standalone REST API server (24 endpoints)
- CLI: validate, lint, evaluate, serve, audit, attest, tlaplus

Compliance:
- 6 frameworks: EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF, ISO 42001, SOC 2, GDPR, HIPAA
- Multi-tenant isolation

48 source files, 35 test files, 504 tests, 4 dependencies, Node ≥18.
- package.json: add repository, homepage, bugs, author fields
- package.json: expand keywords for npm discoverability (19 terms)
- package.json: include examples/ in published files
- package.json: prepublishOnly runs tests before build
- .github/workflows/publish.yml: auto-publish on GitHub release with provenance
- .npmignore: exclude source, tests, dashboard, charts from npm tarball
Bumps [brace-expansion](https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion) from 5.0.4 to 5.0.7.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/releases)
- [Commits](juliangruber/brace-expansion@v5.0.4...v5.0.7)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: brace-expansion
  dependency-version: 5.0.7
  dependency-type: indirect
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Bumps [postcss](https://github.com/postcss/postcss) from 8.5.8 to 8.5.25.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/postcss/postcss/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/postcss/postcss/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](postcss/postcss@8.5.8...8.5.25)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: postcss
  dependency-version: 8.5.25
  dependency-type: direct:development
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Bumps [fast-uri](https://github.com/fastify/fast-uri) from 3.1.0 to 3.1.5.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/fastify/fast-uri/releases)
- [Commits](fastify/fast-uri@v3.1.0...v3.1.5)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: fast-uri
  dependency-version: 3.1.5
  dependency-type: indirect
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Bumps [postcss](https://github.com/postcss/postcss) from 8.5.8 to 8.5.26.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/postcss/postcss/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/postcss/postcss/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](postcss/postcss@8.5.8...8.5.26)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: postcss
  dependency-version: 8.5.26
  dependency-type: indirect
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
…8.5.26

Bump postcss from 8.5.8 to 8.5.26
…-3.1.5

Bump fast-uri from 3.1.0 to 3.1.5
…d/postcss-8.5.25

Bump postcss from 8.5.8 to 8.5.25 in /dashboard
…pansion-5.0.7

Bump brace-expansion from 5.0.4 to 5.0.7
Cut the library down to what it is: an embeddable TypeScript policy
decision point with a verifiable audit chain. Each removed module
existed so a README bullet could be true, but did not do what the
bullet said. Tests: 504 -> 267 (23 files); tsc, lint, build clean.

Removed, with the defect that made each unsafe to ship:
- src/sandbox/: vm sandbox escaped to `process` in one line; WASM modules could not read the context
- src/attestation/: signature covered [{}] instead of the claims; verifier accepted any key; TPM/SGX ops all threw
- src/compliance/tlaplus-generator.ts: generated spec was never passed to TLC
- src/compliance/reporter.ts: certified a hash chain it never verified; controls satisfied on schema-required fields alone
- src/crypto/timestamp.ts: never parsed or verified the TSA response; `timestamp` was the local clock
- src/contracts/p2t-generator.ts, markdown-parser.ts, changelog.ts: not wired into GodClause, the CLI or the server
- src/engine/human-override.ts + POST /v1/override: accepted any self-supplied public key
- src/engine/boot.ts + CLI boot + GET /v1/boot/preflight: swallowed parse errors and reported READY
- src/engine/degradation.ts + GET /v1/degradation + `degradation_tiers` schema section: the `locked` tier blocked nothing
- src/engine/cache.ts (DecisionCache): cache key ignored nested fields, so one user's decision could be served to another
- src/engine/compiled-evaluator.ts (CompiledPolicyEvaluator): passed every rule containing a rate_limit
- CLI subcommands generate, boot, tlaplus, attest; endpoints /v1/attestation/{challenge,verify,status}
- dashboard/ and its CI job; the dependabot PR surface goes with it
- docs/compliance.md; types used only by the modules above
- 12 test files covering the modules above

README and docs corrected:
- The library computes no detection signals; the host sets output.contains_pii etc. and applies obligations (examples/openai-wrapper.ts is the reference)
- "No other policy engine does this" replaced with the real differentiator: one 4-dependency package with engine + hash-chained/HMAC/Merkle audit + DSSE-signed policies
- Dropped "holds up in regulatory proceedings", "hand it to your auditor", "6 compliance frameworks", all RFC 3161 claims
- "Tampering retroactively invalidates the audit trail" softened to: each entry records the policy SHA-256
- Comparison table: OPA returns arbitrary JSON and signs bundles; Permit.io PDP and OPAL are open source; Guardrails AI has fix/filter/reask and anonymizing fixes
- Static "504 passing" badge replaced with the GitHub Actions CI badge
- CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, copilot-instructions, docs/architecture.md, docs/evidence-grade-audit.md, CHANGELOG (Unreleased) updated; endpoint count 17, test count 267

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The hash and HMAC used a JSON.stringify replacer array, which also
filters nested objects by the top-level key names, so caller and
rule_results were effectively unhashed. Entries now hash canonical
JSON (hash_version 3); logs written by earlier versions no longer verify.

- verifyAuditEntries(entries, key?, { prevHash?, headHash? }): recompute
  hashes, require a signature when a key is given, anchor both ends
- AuditLog.verifyChain requires the first entry to link to the chain
  start and the last entry to be the live head; headHash getter added
- AuditLogOptions.headHash / GovernanceOptions.auditHeadHash resume a
  chain across restarts; FileAuditSink.lastHash reads it, skipping a
  torn last line; the REST server resumes from AUDIT_DIR/audit.jsonl
- FileAuditSink terminates a torn last line before appending, so the
  first entry after a crash is not fused onto the fragment
- Entries are normalized to plain JSON before hashing; sinks receive
  them in chain order, each its own copy, and a failing sink does not
  stop delivery to the others
- Empty auditSecretKey is rejected; empty verification key no longer
  skips HMAC checks
- GodClause and TenantScope always keep the in-memory sink, so verify,
  query and seal work with custom auditSinks
- ProofBundleBuilder.verify recomputes hashes/HMACs and rejects empty
  bundles; ImmutableAuditSink shares the hash function
- CLI audit verify: --prev-hash and --head; unreadable lines are
  reported as INVALID with a line number

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ct README overclaims

Resolved src/index.ts (keep AuditChainAnchors, drop the deleted modules'
types) and CHANGELOG.md (keep both Unreleased sections).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
dashboard/package.json and package-lock.json stay deleted; the
dashboard was removed in 9f09f7d.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… values at load

- PolicyEngine.evaluate denies with a NO-CONTRACT block when nothing is
  loaded; GodClause and TenantScope audit that deny; the REST server
  answers 503 on /v1/evaluate, /v1/enforce, /v1/evaluate/batch and
  /v1/mcp/authorize until a contract is loaded
- A rule whose evaluation throws blocks instead of rejecting evaluate();
  the reason is in RuleEvaluation.error and the audit entry's
  rule_results. MCPRouter denies on a permission whose condition throws
  instead of skipping to the next rule
- verifyBundle validates every contract after the signature verifies and
  rejects envelopes whose payloadType is not a bundle
- parseContract (and loadContract, which now validates objects) rejects
  invalid or non-string matches patterns, wrong-typed greater_than /
  less_than / in / not_in values, malformed rate_limit values (max not a
  positive integer, window not a finite positive duration) and
  rate_limit inside mcp_permissions, naming the condition's path
- A StateStore that returns a non-number count is treated as an error

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@dependabot dependabot Bot added dependencies Pull requests that update a dependency file javascript Pull requests that update javascript code labels Oct 25, 2026
GGeronik and others added 6 commits November 3, 2026 13:59
- PolicyEngine.loadContract replaces a contract with the same name and
  version, so reloading never duplicates rules or rate-limit counting
- ContractWatcher remembers which contract each file provided and
  deactivates it when the file changes version or disappears; when two
  files provide the same contract and one goes away, the other is
  re-read; a vanished directory retires everything; start() is
  idempotent; reloadFile is public
- BundleWatcher applies each new bundle with the new
  GodClause/TenantScope.replaceContracts (validated before anything is
  dropped); attaching after the first poll still applies the bundle
- registry.register({ activate: false }) no longer deactivates a live
  version; loadContractVersion resyncs the engine from the registry
- Rate-limit counters are keyed per rule, so two rules on one field no
  longer share a bucket
- evaluate() uses one snapshot of the contract set and passes it to
  the hooks, so a reload landing mid-evaluation cannot attribute the
  decision or its audit rows to the new policy; PolicyHook gains that
  second argument

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…art and image config

- API_TOKEN / --api-token: every endpoint except /v1/health and
  /v1/ready requires "Authorization: Bearer <token>" (scheme
  case-insensitive, constant-time, latin1-safe compare) or gets 401;
  unset is allowed but logged at start
- MAX_BODY_BYTES (default 1 MiB, validated) caps request bodies with
  413 and stops buffering; 10 s header and 30 s request timeouts
- 400 instead of 500 for invalid JSON, a context without action/caller,
  bad options.includeTags/excludeTags, batch items and MCP calls missing
  fields, malformed URL encoding, non-date audit filters and non-bundle
  proof-bundle bodies; 500 responses no longer carry internal text
- /v1/mcp/authorize shares the server's state store so
  max_calls_per_session is enforced; session_id must be a string
- ProofBundleBuilder.verify checks each seal range in linear time (a
  160 KB bundle stalled the event loop for 80 s) and fails a seal whose
  entries are not in the bundle
- Blank AUDIT_HMAC_SECRET / API_TOKEN env vars mean unset (compose
  passes ${VAR:-}); missing AUDIT_DIR is warned about
- Helm chart: contracts mount at /app/contracts, CONTRACTS_DIR set,
  AUDIT_HMAC_SECRET (was HMAC_SECRET) and optional API_TOKEN from the
  secret, inline values quoted, render fails without a contracts
  ConfigMap or with several replicas on one audit volume
- Dockerfile CMD is env-driven so AUDIT_DIR/CONTRACTS_DIR apply; CLI
  serve flags no longer shadow PORT, CONTRACTS_DIR, LOG_LEVEL
- docs/deployment.md matches the code: import path, env table, --set
  keys, Docker/compose sections

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ional signals, enforced mcp_permissions

- PolicyEngine defaults to a MemoryStateStore, so rate_limit rules work
  without configuration; pass a shared store for several processes
- evaluate() applies the contracts' mcp_permissions when
  metadata.mcp_tool names a tool: a denied tool blocks under
  MCP-PERMISSIONS, require_human_approval becomes a require_review
  obligation, and the decision is audited like any other
- `matches` accepts /pattern/flags (i, m, s, u); unknown flags are
  rejected at load. not_contains fails on a missing or non-container
  field so category rules fail closed
- Threat contracts: optional signals (nsfw_score, estimated_cost_usd,
  per-type PII flags, the base template's token_count and confidence)
  are guarded with not_exists; required ones still fail closed; every
  header says which is which. prompt-injection uses case-insensitive,
  whitespace-tolerant regexes (disregard/forget/"the above",
  verb-anchored extraction) and blocks a non-string prompt (INJ-000);
  cost-control gained the expensive-model warning it promised;
  mcp-tool-abuse rules are scoped to action mcp_call so composing it no
  longer denies every request, and its audit rule marks each tool call;
  data-leakage, copyright-protection and base-compliance document every
  field their rules read
- tests/threat-contracts.test.ts loads all eleven contracts and checks
  the documented behaviour; tests/patterns.test.ts covers the flags

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…sions loaded

- POST /v1/mcp/authorize builds an mcp_call context and calls
  gov.evaluate(), so the contracts' mcp_permissions apply and every
  authorization is in the audit chain; the response carries allowed,
  require_human_approval, denial_reason, decision_id, obligations and
  governance_context
- evaluate() denies a named tool when no contract defines
  mcp_permissions, matching the router's fail-closed default
- examples/mcp-agent-demo.ts authorizes through evaluate(), so its
  "every call audited" claim is true

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Version 0.1.0 in package.json, the Helm chart, CHANGELOG, README and
SECURITY; the CLI reads its version from package.json; CONTRIBUTING gains
a Releasing section; schemas/trust-contract.schema.json is regenerated
from the TypeScript schema.

Fixes from the release review:
- build removes dist/ first; the tarball packed from the working tree
  shipped compiled copies of the removed modules (VM sandbox, cache,
  human override, ...)
- policy_sha256 hashes the canonical JSON of every loaded contract, not
  the rules alone, so a change to mcp_permissions changes the
  fingerprint; contract_id names every loaded contract
- /v1/metrics quotes label values and counts decisions from enforce,
  batch and mcp/authorize; the duration summary keeps 10,000 samples
- proof bundles and the OTel sink stamp the package version, not "2.0.0"
- HumanOverride, TimestampRef and ProofBundle.human_overrides/timestamps
  removed; nothing verified them
- examples/*.ts no longer ship in the package (they import ../src); the
  wrappers' simulated response has no SSN, so the default run reaches
  the redact_pii path
- docs: DSSE keys are RSA or ECDSA P-256, Merkle verification recomputes
  the root, only the in-memory state store ships, sidecar contracts load
  at startup, data_governance is declared not enforced, threat contracts
  are rules over host-supplied signals

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bumps [@vitest/mocker](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/tree/HEAD/packages/mocker) to 5.1.0 and updates ancestor dependency [vitest](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/tree/HEAD/packages/vitest). These dependencies need to be updated together.


Updates `@vitest/mocker` from 3.2.4 to 5.1.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/main/docs/releases.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commits/v5.1.0/packages/mocker)

Updates `vitest` from 3.2.4 to 5.1.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/main/docs/releases.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commits/v5.1.0/packages/vitest)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: "@vitest/mocker"
  dependency-version: 5.0.5
  dependency-type: indirect
- dependency-name: vitest
  dependency-version: 5.0.5
  dependency-type: direct:development
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
@dependabot
dependabot Bot force-pushed the dependabot/npm_and_yarn/multi-063a5f277b branch from 04676c8 to fbd862a Compare November 3, 2026 14:37
@dependabot @github

dependabot Bot commented on behalf of github Nov 3, 2026

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OK, I won't notify you again about this release, but will get in touch when a new version is available.

If you change your mind, just re-open this PR and I'll resolve any conflicts on it.

@dependabot
dependabot Bot deleted the dependabot/npm_and_yarn/multi-063a5f277b branch November 3, 2026 14:45
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