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Security: FutureProofsTech/HypG

Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy and posture

Status

HypG v2.0 is a research prototype. It is unaudited, unvalidated, and not production-ready. Do not use it to protect real keys, messages, or signatures.

The workspace version is 2.0.0. The active signature wire/spec revision is 2.0.1. The KEM, Symm, and Hash wire revisions are 2.0.0. Parameter dimensions resemble NIST Category-5 profiles, but this is not a security certification, a NIST compliance claim, or a bit-security claim.

Specific non-claims:

  • The KEM's lattice hardness is unconfirmed; no lattice-estimator result for HypG exists.
  • The KEM's exact FO-style transform has no published proof.
  • The DS composition has no exact UF-CMA/SUF-CMA proof and no signing-volume bound. FORS is few-time; the code enforces no limit.
  • The AEAD composition is not a standardized algorithm and has no nonce-misuse resistance.
  • The ~14.6σ decapsulation margin is a working estimate, not a formal failure bound.
  • There is no external audit, formal verification, or coverage-guided fuzzing campaign.
  • There are no power, electromagnetic, or fault-injection laboratory results; the timing smoke test is not a dudect-grade evaluation.
  • There is no FIPS 140-3 validation, CMVP certificate, or ACVP/CAVP validation.

Read docs/threat-model.md, docs/nist-alignment.md, and docs/audit-prep.md before making any security statement about this repository.

Reporting a security issue

There is no bug-bounty program and no guaranteed response time. This is a research project. If you believe you have found a security-relevant defect, open a GitHub issue with enough detail to reproduce it, or contact the repository owner through the address published on the repository profile.

A useful report includes:

  1. the exact commit hash (git rev-parse HEAD);
  2. the target triple and toolchain version;
  3. a minimal reproducer or test;
  4. observed versus expected behaviour;
  5. the affected component and version;
  6. whether the issue affects a frozen invariant, a security claim, or only performance/robustness.

Please do not include real secret keys, private user data, or production credentials in a public issue.

Scope

The highest-value review areas are:

  • the exact KEM transform and implicit-rejection construction;
  • the decapsulation failure analysis and compression residuals;
  • the DS FORS/WOTS+/XMSS composition, deterministic randomizer, and signing-volume bound;
  • the v2.0.1 PRF/F tags and L-tree odd-node promotion;
  • the AEAD EtM composition and streaming plaintext semantics;
  • constant-time claims and best-effort zeroization;
  • malformed-key/signature handling and panic freedom.

Out of scope for this repository: a production protocol, key storage, HSM integration, network security, and operational deployment.

Frozen invariants

The following are treated as bugs if broken:

  • KAT files must match byte-for-byte for the active versions.
  • Signing is deterministic in (sk,msg) and ds_verify accepts its own output.
  • KEM encaps/decaps round-trip on honestly generated inputs.
  • decaps does not panic on correctly sized ciphertexts.
  • AEAD one-shot open does not write plaintext before tag verification.
  • Streaming AEAD output is byte-identical to one-shot for the same chunks.
  • Changing a wire format without a version bump and new KAT files.

A failed invariant should be reported even if the current test suite passes.

Disclosure

There is no formal embargo process. For a serious issue, coordinate privately with the repository owner before publishing exploit details so that a fix and an honest advisory can be prepared. Do not represent a fix as an audit or a production-readiness statement.

Roadmap to any security claim

  1. Run the community lattice-estimator on the exact q=4096, k=4 parameters and publish the cost tables.
  2. Derive an analytic decapsulation-failure bound and measure at least 10^6 trials.
  3. Obtain independent review of the FO variant, the DS composition and signing-volume bound, and the role of CA-PRF.
  4. Complete dudect-style timing evaluation and, if required, power/EM/ fault evaluation.
  5. Add coverage-guided fuzzing and a protocol-level misuse analysis.
  6. Commission a third-party audit.
  7. If FIPS compliance is required, redesign around approved primitives and pursue ACVP/CAVP and CMVP validation.

Until those steps are complete, the only appropriate use is research, teaching, reproducibility, and test harnesses.

There aren't any published security advisories