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Reject weak Ed25519 keys in CasePack checkpoint verification - #103

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EauDoon merged 1 commit into
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fix/portfolio-round2-20261002
Oct 2, 2026
Merged

EauDoon merged 1 commit into
mainfrom
fix/portfolio-round2-20261002

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@EauDoon EauDoon commented Oct 2, 2026

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CasePack checkpoint validation accepted an identity-point Ed25519 public key because OpenSSL could import it. If a caller pinned that malformed key, a signature constructed without a private key could satisfy checkpoint coverage. Reuse the existing strict key validator at the CasePack boundary and add a full CasePack regression with the forged signature and genuine checkpoint control.

Validation: 355 tests passed with six explicit Windows symlink skips; lint, typecheck, license/advisory checks, coverage, example, and isolated installed-package acceptance passed. Independent review rejected seven malformed key classes and accepted genuine controls. The new regression failed before the fix. No dependency or protocol change.

@EauDoon
EauDoon merged commit 708256d into main Oct 2, 2026
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