Do not open a public issue. Report privately via GitHub Security Advisories or email contact.dvorak@gmail.com with:
- Affected component and version/commit
- Reproduction steps or proof of concept
- Impact assessment
You will get an acknowledgement within a few days and credit in the release notes unless you prefer otherwise.
Anything in the Runway codebase: auth/session handling, deploy pipeline, edge/routing layer, secrets at rest, webhook verification, API key and token flows, MCP surface, remote-node mTLS.
Dependency vulnerabilities are best reported to the upstream crate and mentioned here for tracking.
- Set a strong random
SECRET_KEYandENCRYPTION_KEY—install.shgenerates these; never reuse values between installs. - Keep
APP_HOSTNAMEandDEPLOY_DOMAINon real TLS. Direct-IP mode uses Let's Encrypt; tunnel mode is TLS-terminated at Cloudflare. - Restrict the sign-up allowlist in Settings after creating your admin account — the first registered user becomes admin.
- Rotate
ak_API keys anddp_deploy-hook tokens like passwords; they are stored hashed, so lost keys must be regenerated, not recovered. - Webhook secrets (
GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET,GITLAB_WEBHOOK_SECRET,BITBUCKET_WEBHOOK_SECRET,GITHUB_APP_WEBHOOK_SECRET) should be set on every connected provider — unsigned payloads are rejected. - Remote Docker nodes: use the mTLS provisioning endpoint
(
POST /admin/nodes/{id}/tls) rather than exposing an unauthenticatedtcp://socket. - The dashboard binds whatever port you publish; do not expose Postgres or the Docker socket to the network.