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… weak encryption keys Two protections that existed in the codebase but were not enforced. Outbound OIDC discovery: getOpenIdConfiguration fetched wellKnownUrl without any check. That URL is operator-supplied - an organisation admin sets it on the authentication portal row - so anyone able to create an organisation could make the server issue requests to private or loopback addresses and probe the internal network. The repository already ships assertNotPrivateUrl with a full test suite and uses it for webhooks, Zapier subscriptions and DOS avatar fetches; this was the one outbound fetch missing it. Self-hosted identity providers on private addresses stay supported through NEXT_PRIVATE_WEBHOOK_SSRF_BYPASS_HOSTS, now documented as covering discovery too. Encryption keys: all three guards in constants/crypto.ts were commented out while .env.example shipped CAFEBABE/DEADBEEF and docker/Dockerfile bakes those same values in as ENV defaults. An instance started that way encrypts DKIM private keys, SSO client secrets and account-link tokens under a key published in this repository. describeEncryptionKeyProblem now rejects missing, placeholder, short and equal keys, and the server entry point refuses to boot when it reports a problem. The check runs at boot rather than at module load on purpose: the Docker image carries the placeholder values as ENV defaults, so throwing during import would fail the image build itself, and every test or script importing the module would need a full server environment. docker/testing/compose.yml moves off the placeholders to 32-character test-only values and .env.example now ships empty with the generation command instead of a weak default. Production is unaffected: both keys verified at 32 characters and distinct before this change.
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe change adds encryption-key validation during server startup and protects OpenID Connect discovery requests from private URLs. Environment documentation and test configuration now use valid, distinct encryption keys. ChangesSecurity guards
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Change: Bug fix Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: 🟠 High · up to OIDC discovery can still reach private infrastructure through DNS rebinding or redirects, so the SSRF protection should be completed before merge. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
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Code Review
This pull request introduces stricter validation for encryption keys on startup, ensuring they are configured, at least 32 characters long, distinct, and not set to default placeholders. It also extends SSRF protection to OpenID Connect discovery URLs. Feedback suggests wrapping the private URL assertion in OIDC discovery with a try-catch block to provide a more context-appropriate error message instead of a webhook-specific one.
| // The discovery URL is operator-supplied — it comes from an organisation's | ||
| // authentication portal row or from NEXT_PRIVATE_OIDC_WELL_KNOWN — so it is | ||
| // treated like any other outbound target. A self-hosted identity provider on a | ||
| // private address must be listed in NEXT_PRIVATE_WEBHOOK_SSRF_BYPASS_HOSTS. | ||
| await assertNotPrivateUrl(wellKnownUrl); |
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Reusing assertNotPrivateUrl directly here will throw an error with the message 'Webhook URL resolves to a private or loopback address' if the OIDC discovery URL resolves to a private IP. This is confusing to operators configuring SSO/OIDC, as they are not configuring webhooks. Wrapping the call in a try-catch block to throw a more context-appropriate error message improves the user experience and prevents leaking internal implementation details.
// The discovery URL is operator-supplied — it comes from an organisation's
// authentication portal row or from NEXT_PRIVATE_OIDC_WELL_KNOWN — so it is
// treated like any other outbound target. A self-hosted identity provider on a
// private address must be listed in NEXT_PRIVATE_WEBHOOK_SSRF_BYPASS_HOSTS.
try {
await assertNotPrivateUrl(wellKnownUrl);
} catch (error) {
throw new Error('OIDC discovery URL resolves to a private or loopback address');
}![coderabbitai[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/in/347564?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
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Actionable comments posted: 2
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Inline comments:
In `@packages/auth/server/lib/utils/open-id.ts`:
- Line 25: Update the URL validation flow around assertNotPrivateUrl and the
subsequent fetch so DNS validation is bound to the actual connection, or enforce
equivalent egress filtering that blocks private and metadata addresses. Ensure
lookup errors and timeouts fail closed rather than allowing fetch(wellKnownUrl)
to resolve the hostname independently.
- Line 25: Update the OIDC discovery fetch flow around assertNotPrivateUrl and
fetch so redirects are handled manually; resolve every Location against the
current URL, validate each resolved URL with assertNotPrivateUrl before
following it, and allow only validated redirects while preserving the initial
URL validation.
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.env.exampleapps/remix/server/router.tsdocker/testing/compose.ymlpackages/auth/server/lib/utils/open-id.tspackages/lib/constants/crypto.test.tspackages/lib/constants/crypto.ts
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…te message assertNotPrivateUrl reports that a webhook URL resolves to a private address, which is confusing to an operator configuring single sign-on rather than a webhook. Re-throw with a message naming the discovery URL and keep the original as the cause. The comment now also records the limitation raised in review: this helper resolves DNS separately from the fetch, so it does not defeat rebinding, and it fails open on lookup errors or timeouts. That is a documented property of the shared helper and applies equally to the webhook, Zapier and DOS avatar call sites. Closing it properly means a connection-bound resolver or deployment-level egress filtering, which is tracked separately rather than folded into this change.
1 participant
What
Enforces two protections that already existed in the codebase but were not actually applied.
1. SSRF via OIDC discovery URL
getOpenIdConfiguration()inpackages/auth/server/lib/utils/open-id.tsfetchedwellKnownUrlwith no validation. That URL is operator-supplied — an organisation administrator stores it on theOrganisationAuthenticationPortalrow, andNEXT_PRIVATE_OIDC_WELL_KNOWNsupplies it for the instance-wide provider — so any account able to create an organisation could make the server issue requests to private or loopback addresses and probe the internal network.The repository already ships
assertNotPrivateUrl()with a full test suite and already calls it for outbound webhooks (execute-webhook-call.ts), Zapier subscriptions (zapier/subscribe.ts) and DOS avatar fetches (sync-dos-profile.ts). This was the one outbound fetch missing it. The fix is the same one-line call.Self-hosted identity providers on private addresses (a Keycloak on localhost, an internal ADFS) remain supported through the existing
NEXT_PRIVATE_WEBHOOK_SSRF_BYPASS_HOSTSallow-list, which is now documented in.env.exampleas covering discovery as well as webhooks.This is blind SSRF rather than a read primitive: the response is parsed as an OIDC discovery document and is not returned to the caller, and GCP metadata endpoints additionally require a
Metadata-Flavorheader this code does not send. It is still an unnecessary internal request surface, and the fix is nearly free.2. Boot guard for the encryption keys
All three guards in
packages/lib/constants/crypto.tswere commented out, while:.env.exampleshippedNEXT_PRIVATE_ENCRYPTION_KEY="CAFEBABE"/...SECONDARY_KEY="DEADBEEF"under a comment saying "at least 32 characters"docker/Dockerfilebakes those same two values in asENVdefaultsAn instance started that way encrypts DKIM private keys, SSO client secrets and account-link tokens under a key that is published in this repository — which is worse than storing them in plaintext, because it also produces a false sense of protection.
describeEncryptionKeyProblem()now rejects keys that are missing, equal to a published placeholder, shorter than 32 characters, or equal to each other, and the server entry point (apps/remix/server/router.ts, the rollup entry) refuses to boot when it reports a problem. The check is a pure parameterised function so it is unit-tested directly (10 tests) without touchingprocess.env.Why at boot and not at module load: the Docker image carries the placeholder values as
ENVdefaults, so throwing during import would fail the image build itself, and every test or one-off script importing the module would need a full server environment.Supporting changes
docker/testing/compose.ymlmoves offCAFEBABE/DEADBEEFto 32-character test-only values so the testing stack still boots..env.examplenow ships both keys empty, with theopenssl rand -base64 32generation command and an explicit statement of what the server rejects. A new contributor who copies it gets a clear boot error instead of silently running on a published key.docker/development/compose.ymlruns only supporting services (postgres, redis, minio, inbucket, gotenberg) and needs no keys;docker/compose.crove-server.ymlreads.env, not.env.example. Both checked.Verification
vitest run --root packages/lib: 31 files / 418 tests passing (10 new)npx tsc --noEmitclean forpackages/lib,packages/authandapps/remix; the pre-existing errors in the untouchedfield/,subscription/,team/files and inapps/remix/app/root.tsxremainbiome checkclean on both new files. Twoformatdiagnostics remain onrouter.ts:60andopen-id.ts:14— lines this PR does not touch; they are the known CRLF working-tree artifact of a Windows checkout (git ls-files --eolreportsi/lf w/crlf)Note
High Risk
Touches authentication (OIDC outbound fetch) and symmetric keys for at-rest secrets; misconfiguration can block boot or break SSO until bypass hosts are set, but that is intentional fail-closed behavior.
Overview
Closes two security gaps where protections existed in the repo but were not wired up.
OIDC discovery now runs operator-supplied
wellKnownUrlvalues through the sameassertNotPrivateUrlguard used for webhooks, blocking SSRF to private/loopback targets unless the host is onNEXT_PRIVATE_WEBHOOK_SSRF_BYPASS_HOSTS(documented in.env.examplefor internal IdPs like Keycloak on localhost).Encryption keys are validated at server boot via
assertEncryptionKeysConfigured()inrouter.ts: bothNEXT_PRIVATE_ENCRYPTION_*values must be present, ≥32 characters, distinct, and not the publishedCAFEBABE/DEADBEEFplaceholders. Commented-out checks incrypto.tsare replaced by testabledescribeEncryptionKeyProblem()plus unit tests..env.exampleships empty keys with generation hints;docker/testing/compose.ymloverrides with long test-only secrets so the stack still starts.Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit 52dfaab. Configure here.
Summary by CodeRabbit