Skip to content
Open
Changes from all commits
Commits
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension

Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
8 changes: 4 additions & 4 deletions _posts/2019-01-17-cat.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -79,11 +79,11 @@ for RSA , most will re-use their certificates instead of updating to the
more recent RSA-PSS. RSA digital signatures specified per the standard
are really close to the RSA encryption algorithm specified by the same
document, so close that Bleichenbacher’s decryption attack on RSA
encryption also works to forge RSA signatures. Intuitivelly, we have
$pms^e$ and the decryption attack allows us to find $(pms^e)^d = pms$,
encryption also works to forge RSA signatures. Intuitively, we have
\(pms^e) and the decryption attack allows us to find $$(pms^e)^d = pms$$,
for forging signatures we can pretend that the content to be signed
$tbs$ ([see RFC 8446](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.4.3)) is $tbs = pms^e$ and obtain $tbs^d$ via the attack, which is
by definition the signature over the message $tbs$. However, this
$$tbs$$ ([see RFC 8446](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.4.3)) is $$tbs = pms^e$$ and obtain $$tbs^d$$ via the attack, which is
by definition the signature over the message $$tbs$$. However, this
signature forgery requires an additional step (blinding) in the
conventional Bleichenbacher attack (in practice this can lead to
hundreds of thousands of additional messages).
Expand Down