feat(store): require PostgreSQL as the production control plane

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -11,6 +11,22 @@ permissions:
 jobs:
   rust:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    services:
+      postgres:
+        image: postgres:16-alpine
+        env:
+          POSTGRES_USER: wardnet
+          POSTGRES_PASSWORD: wardnet
+          POSTGRES_DB: wardnet
+        ports:
+          - 5432:5432
+        options: >-
+          --health-cmd "pg_isready -U wardnet -d wardnet"
+          --health-interval 10s
+          --health-timeout 5s
+          --health-retries 5
+    env:
+      CONTROL_PLANE_TEST_DATABASE_URL: postgres://wardnet:wardnet@localhost:5432/wardnet
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
       - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@4be7066ada62dd38de10e7b70166bc74ed198c30 # stable

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -9,5 +9,11 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
 
 ### Security
 
+- PostgreSQL `security_event` is HASH-partitioned by `tenant_id` (8 children). Unpartitioned tables convert in place and keep unmasked client IPs and paths. `/healthz.event_partitions` reports the child count (0 on file/memory). Logical restore still accepts schema 2 through the current migration version; HASH does not change the snapshot shape.
+- PostgreSQL control-plane runtime is `wardnet_runtime` (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS, not the table owner). Migrations run as the login role, then `SET ROLE` so FORCE RLS binds even when the URL user is a superuser. Missing `wardnet.tenant_id` yields no rows. DDL (`DROP TABLE`, `DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY`) is denied. Logical restore accepts schema 2 through the current migration version so a role-only upgrade cannot void the last pre-upgrade backup.
+- PostgreSQL control-plane logical backup and isolated restore drill (issue #80 remainder). `GET /api/backup` exports a hashed tenant snapshot (policy, events, outbox, receipts). `POST /api/backup` restores after schema and payload-hash checks. `POST /api/backup/drill` restores into an isolated tenant, compares unmasked invariants, and drops the drill tenant. Declared RPO is the last successful export; declared RTO is 60 seconds. File/memory adapters report `/healthz.backup=disabled`. Client IPs, paths, and actor names stay unmasked.
+- PostgreSQL control-plane mutations enqueue a transactional outbox row in the same transaction (issue #81). Security events append incrementally instead of rewriting the snapshot. A leased worker claims with `FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED`, retries with bounded backoff, dead-letters exhausted/permanent failures, and records unique receipts. Stdout SIEM export is at-least-once; the receipt is the exactly-once ack. `/healthz.outbox` and `GET /api/outbox` are operator-visible; `POST /api/outbox/{id}/replay` requeues dead letters with audit. File/memory adapters report `outbox=disabled`. `GET /api/outbox` is bounded to `EVENT_LIMIT` (dead letters and pending first). Processed `outbox_message` rows are pruned to that same cap on append, snapshot save, and worker ack; receipts stay as the exactly-once ack.
+- Control-plane PostgreSQL URLs honor `sslmode=require` / `verify-ca` / `verify-full` with rustls and Mozilla roots (certificates always verified). tokio-postgres 0.7 only parses `require`, so verification modes are rewritten to `require` before connect. `sslmode=allow` / `prefer` are rejected so the process cannot silently drop to plaintext.
+- Production (non-loopback) binds fail closed without `CONTROL_PLANE_DATABASE_URL`. PostgreSQL is the production control-plane authority (3NF two-word tables, default-deny row-level security, snapshot persist in one transaction). Loopback still uses the JSON file / memory adapter. `/healthz.persistence` reports `postgres`, `file`, or `memory`. The URL is a secret and is bootstrapped into the credential registry.
 - Live `/gateway` transactions consult in-process libcoraza when `CORAZA_LIB_PATH` is set (with `CORAZA_RULES_PATH` and/or `CORAZA_DIRECTIVES`). Missing library, missing rules, or an empty ruleset fail startup before bind. Otherwise a Coraza sidecar is consulted when `CORAZA_WAF_URL` is set. The sidecar response is parsed with the existing Coraza audit adapter (OWASP CRS authority, not a hand-rolled engine). Engine outage is fail-closed when `PROVEN_ENGINE_FAIL_CLOSED` is true. `GET /api/waf/engine-status` and `/healthz.proven_engine` report `coraza_in_process`, `coraza_sidecar`, or `ingest_hints_only`.
 - Fail-closed destination policy on every outbound `http`/`https` call, including the Coraza sidecar URL (gateway upstream, threat-intel fetch, Clearfolio, SOC LLM). Private/loopback/metadata classes are denied unless `DESTINATION_ALLOWLIST` (or loopback development) permits them; `DESTINATION_DENYLIST` wins. Clients ignore ambient HTTP proxies and do not follow redirects. CIDR allowlist matches apply per resolved address; CIDR entries authorize non-default ports; IPv6 site-local (`fec0::/10`) is denied; invalid CIDR prefixes fail startup; `/healthz.destination_mode` reports the policy class. Blocking DNS runs on `spawn_blocking` with a 2s timeout. Persistence and destination-list validation complete before the readiness line is printed. After a host is allowed, the HTTP client connects only to those evaluated addresses (Host/SNI unchanged) so a rebinding answer cannot bypass the policy.

CLAUDE.md

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ The core stays an in-repo workspace crate on purpose (no git submodule) until it
 
 ## Runtime Configuration
 
-Read in `run_from_env` (`src/lib.rs`): `BIND_ADDR` (default `127.0.0.1:8080`), `ADMIN_TOKEN` (write token for `X-Admin-Token`), `ADMIN_TOKENS` (comma-separated `token:actor` pairs for multi-token RBAC with per-token audit actors), `WAF_IDS_STATE_PATH` (optional JSON state file; omitted = seeded in-memory state), `DNSBL_ORIGIN` (default `dnsbl.local`), `EVENT_LIMIT` (default 1000, must be > 0), `RATE_LIMIT` / `RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW`, `CORAZA_LIB_PATH` / `CORAZA_RULES_PATH` / `CORAZA_DIRECTIVES` (optional in-process libcoraza), `CORAZA_WAF_URL` (optional in-path Coraza sidecar), `PROVEN_ENGINE_FAIL_CLOSED` (boolean; default false — set true in production when an engine is set).
+Read in `run_from_env` (`src/lib.rs`): `BIND_ADDR` (default `127.0.0.1:8080`), `ADMIN_TOKEN` (write token for `X-Admin-Token`), `ADMIN_TOKENS` (comma-separated `token:actor` pairs for multi-token RBAC with per-token audit actors), `WAF_IDS_STATE_PATH` (optional JSON state file; omitted = seeded in-memory state), `CONTROL_PLANE_DATABASE_URL` (required for non-loopback binds; secret `control_plane_url`), `DNSBL_ORIGIN` (default `dnsbl.local`), `EVENT_LIMIT` (default 1000, must be > 0), `RATE_LIMIT` / `RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW`, `CORAZA_LIB_PATH` / `CORAZA_RULES_PATH` / `CORAZA_DIRECTIVES` (optional in-process libcoraza), `CORAZA_WAF_URL` (optional in-path Coraza sidecar), `PROVEN_ENGINE_FAIL_CLOSED` (boolean; default false — set true in production when an engine is set). PostgreSQL mode starts a leased outbox worker (`GET /api/outbox`, `/healthz.outbox`).
 
 ## Key Conventions